The Experience Not Well Lost
- Autores
- Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
- Año de publicación
- 2014
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- According to Rorty, we can avoid the typical problems of traditional epistemology if we do not posit epistemological intermediaries between mind and world in order to explain empirical knowledge. In particular, one can do that if one considers perceptual experiences, not as mental states with representational content, but as causes of empirical beliefs. Accordingly, Rorty rejects any justificatory relation between experience and belief. Only beliefs can justify other beliefs. Experience has only a causal role in the acquisition of an empirical belief. In this article, I show how Rorty's resistance to attribute representational content to perceptual experience conspires against his attempt to overcome Cartesian epistemology.
Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina - Materia
-
Rorty
Perceptual Experience
Epistemology - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/32896
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The Experience Not Well LostKalpokas, Daniel EnriqueRortyPerceptual ExperienceEpistemologyhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6According to Rorty, we can avoid the typical problems of traditional epistemology if we do not posit epistemological intermediaries between mind and world in order to explain empirical knowledge. In particular, one can do that if one considers perceptual experiences, not as mental states with representational content, but as causes of empirical beliefs. Accordingly, Rorty rejects any justificatory relation between experience and belief. Only beliefs can justify other beliefs. Experience has only a causal role in the acquisition of an empirical belief. In this article, I show how Rorty's resistance to attribute representational content to perceptual experience conspires against his attempt to overcome Cartesian epistemology.Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; ArgentinaBrill Academic Publishers2014-12info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/32896The Experience Not Well Lost; Brill Academic Publishers; Contemporary Pragmatism; 11; 1; 12-2014; 43-561572-34291875-8185CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/18758185-90000275info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1163/18758185-90000275info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:05:04Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/32896instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:05:04.876CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The Experience Not Well Lost |
title |
The Experience Not Well Lost |
spellingShingle |
The Experience Not Well Lost Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique Rorty Perceptual Experience Epistemology |
title_short |
The Experience Not Well Lost |
title_full |
The Experience Not Well Lost |
title_fullStr |
The Experience Not Well Lost |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Experience Not Well Lost |
title_sort |
The Experience Not Well Lost |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique |
author |
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique |
author_facet |
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Rorty Perceptual Experience Epistemology |
topic |
Rorty Perceptual Experience Epistemology |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
According to Rorty, we can avoid the typical problems of traditional epistemology if we do not posit epistemological intermediaries between mind and world in order to explain empirical knowledge. In particular, one can do that if one considers perceptual experiences, not as mental states with representational content, but as causes of empirical beliefs. Accordingly, Rorty rejects any justificatory relation between experience and belief. Only beliefs can justify other beliefs. Experience has only a causal role in the acquisition of an empirical belief. In this article, I show how Rorty's resistance to attribute representational content to perceptual experience conspires against his attempt to overcome Cartesian epistemology. Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina |
description |
According to Rorty, we can avoid the typical problems of traditional epistemology if we do not posit epistemological intermediaries between mind and world in order to explain empirical knowledge. In particular, one can do that if one considers perceptual experiences, not as mental states with representational content, but as causes of empirical beliefs. Accordingly, Rorty rejects any justificatory relation between experience and belief. Only beliefs can justify other beliefs. Experience has only a causal role in the acquisition of an empirical belief. In this article, I show how Rorty's resistance to attribute representational content to perceptual experience conspires against his attempt to overcome Cartesian epistemology. |
publishDate |
2014 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2014-12 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/32896 The Experience Not Well Lost; Brill Academic Publishers; Contemporary Pragmatism; 11; 1; 12-2014; 43-56 1572-3429 1875-8185 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/32896 |
identifier_str_mv |
The Experience Not Well Lost; Brill Academic Publishers; Contemporary Pragmatism; 11; 1; 12-2014; 43-56 1572-3429 1875-8185 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/18758185-90000275 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1163/18758185-90000275 |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
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https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
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application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Brill Academic Publishers |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Brill Academic Publishers |
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reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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13.070432 |