The Experience Not Well Lost

Autores
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
Año de publicación
2014
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
According to Rorty, we can avoid the typical problems of traditional epistemology if we do not posit epistemological intermediaries between mind and world in order to explain empirical knowledge. In particular, one can do that if one considers perceptual experiences, not as mental states with representational content, but as causes of empirical beliefs. Accordingly, Rorty rejects any justificatory relation between experience and belief. Only beliefs can justify other beliefs. Experience has only a causal role in the acquisition of an empirical belief. In this article, I show how Rorty's resistance to attribute representational content to perceptual experience conspires against his attempt to overcome Cartesian epistemology.
Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina
Materia
Rorty
Perceptual Experience
Epistemology
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/32896
Acceder
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spelling The Experience Not Well LostKalpokas, Daniel EnriqueRortyPerceptual ExperienceEpistemologyhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6According to Rorty, we can avoid the typical problems of traditional epistemology if we do not posit epistemological intermediaries between mind and world in order to explain empirical knowledge. In particular, one can do that if one considers perceptual experiences, not as mental states with representational content, but as causes of empirical beliefs. Accordingly, Rorty rejects any justificatory relation between experience and belief. Only beliefs can justify other beliefs. Experience has only a causal role in the acquisition of an empirical belief. In this article, I show how Rorty's resistance to attribute representational content to perceptual experience conspires against his attempt to overcome Cartesian epistemology.Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; ArgentinaBrill Academic Publishers2014-12info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/32896The Experience Not Well Lost; Brill Academic Publishers; Contemporary Pragmatism; 11; 1; 12-2014; 43-561572-34291875-8185CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/18758185-90000275info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1163/18758185-90000275info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-22T11:34:45Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/32896instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-22 11:34:46.081CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Experience Not Well Lost
title The Experience Not Well Lost
spellingShingle The Experience Not Well Lost
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
Rorty
Perceptual Experience
Epistemology
title_short The Experience Not Well Lost
title_full The Experience Not Well Lost
title_fullStr The Experience Not Well Lost
title_full_unstemmed The Experience Not Well Lost
title_sort The Experience Not Well Lost
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
author Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
author_facet Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Rorty
Perceptual Experience
Epistemology
topic Rorty
Perceptual Experience
Epistemology
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv According to Rorty, we can avoid the typical problems of traditional epistemology if we do not posit epistemological intermediaries between mind and world in order to explain empirical knowledge. In particular, one can do that if one considers perceptual experiences, not as mental states with representational content, but as causes of empirical beliefs. Accordingly, Rorty rejects any justificatory relation between experience and belief. Only beliefs can justify other beliefs. Experience has only a causal role in the acquisition of an empirical belief. In this article, I show how Rorty's resistance to attribute representational content to perceptual experience conspires against his attempt to overcome Cartesian epistemology.
Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina
description According to Rorty, we can avoid the typical problems of traditional epistemology if we do not posit epistemological intermediaries between mind and world in order to explain empirical knowledge. In particular, one can do that if one considers perceptual experiences, not as mental states with representational content, but as causes of empirical beliefs. Accordingly, Rorty rejects any justificatory relation between experience and belief. Only beliefs can justify other beliefs. Experience has only a causal role in the acquisition of an empirical belief. In this article, I show how Rorty's resistance to attribute representational content to perceptual experience conspires against his attempt to overcome Cartesian epistemology.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2014-12
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/32896
The Experience Not Well Lost; Brill Academic Publishers; Contemporary Pragmatism; 11; 1; 12-2014; 43-56
1572-3429
1875-8185
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/32896
identifier_str_mv The Experience Not Well Lost; Brill Academic Publishers; Contemporary Pragmatism; 11; 1; 12-2014; 43-56
1572-3429
1875-8185
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/18758185-90000275
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1163/18758185-90000275
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Brill Academic Publishers
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Brill Academic Publishers
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 12.982451

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