Empirical support for perceptual conceptualism
- Autores
- Serrano, Nicolás Alejandro
- Año de publicación
- 2018
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- The main objective of this paper is to show that perceptual conceptualism can be understood as an empirically meaningful position and, furthermore, that there is some degree of empirical support for its main theses. In order to do this, I will start by offering an empirical reading of the conceptualist position, and making three predictions from it. Then, I will consider recent experimental results from cognitive sciences that seem to point towards those predictions. I will conclude that, while the evidence offered by those experiments is far from decisive, it is enough not only to show that conceptualism is an empirically meaningful position but also that there is empirical support for it.
Fil: Serrano, Nicolás Alejandro. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Instituto de Filosofía "Dr. Alejandro Korn"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina - Materia
-
CONCEPTUAL CONTENT
GROUNDED COGNITION
PERCEPTION
PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/175868
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
id |
CONICETDig_0308d08efbf30b13faf980226467a008 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/175868 |
network_acronym_str |
CONICETDig |
repository_id_str |
3498 |
network_name_str |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
spelling |
Empirical support for perceptual conceptualismSerrano, Nicolás AlejandroCONCEPTUAL CONTENTGROUNDED COGNITIONPERCEPTIONPERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCEhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6The main objective of this paper is to show that perceptual conceptualism can be understood as an empirically meaningful position and, furthermore, that there is some degree of empirical support for its main theses. In order to do this, I will start by offering an empirical reading of the conceptualist position, and making three predictions from it. Then, I will consider recent experimental results from cognitive sciences that seem to point towards those predictions. I will conclude that, while the evidence offered by those experiments is far from decisive, it is enough not only to show that conceptualism is an empirically meaningful position but also that there is empirical support for it.Fil: Serrano, Nicolás Alejandro. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Instituto de Filosofía "Dr. Alejandro Korn"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaMultidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute2018-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/175868Serrano, Nicolás Alejandro; Empirical support for perceptual conceptualism; Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute; Philosophies; 3; 8; 6-2018; 1-122409-9287CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/3/2/8info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.3390/philosophies3020008info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:34:05Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/175868instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:34:05.965CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Empirical support for perceptual conceptualism |
title |
Empirical support for perceptual conceptualism |
spellingShingle |
Empirical support for perceptual conceptualism Serrano, Nicolás Alejandro CONCEPTUAL CONTENT GROUNDED COGNITION PERCEPTION PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE |
title_short |
Empirical support for perceptual conceptualism |
title_full |
Empirical support for perceptual conceptualism |
title_fullStr |
Empirical support for perceptual conceptualism |
title_full_unstemmed |
Empirical support for perceptual conceptualism |
title_sort |
Empirical support for perceptual conceptualism |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Serrano, Nicolás Alejandro |
author |
Serrano, Nicolás Alejandro |
author_facet |
Serrano, Nicolás Alejandro |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
CONCEPTUAL CONTENT GROUNDED COGNITION PERCEPTION PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE |
topic |
CONCEPTUAL CONTENT GROUNDED COGNITION PERCEPTION PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
The main objective of this paper is to show that perceptual conceptualism can be understood as an empirically meaningful position and, furthermore, that there is some degree of empirical support for its main theses. In order to do this, I will start by offering an empirical reading of the conceptualist position, and making three predictions from it. Then, I will consider recent experimental results from cognitive sciences that seem to point towards those predictions. I will conclude that, while the evidence offered by those experiments is far from decisive, it is enough not only to show that conceptualism is an empirically meaningful position but also that there is empirical support for it. Fil: Serrano, Nicolás Alejandro. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Instituto de Filosofía "Dr. Alejandro Korn"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina |
description |
The main objective of this paper is to show that perceptual conceptualism can be understood as an empirically meaningful position and, furthermore, that there is some degree of empirical support for its main theses. In order to do this, I will start by offering an empirical reading of the conceptualist position, and making three predictions from it. Then, I will consider recent experimental results from cognitive sciences that seem to point towards those predictions. I will conclude that, while the evidence offered by those experiments is far from decisive, it is enough not only to show that conceptualism is an empirically meaningful position but also that there is empirical support for it. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-06 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/175868 Serrano, Nicolás Alejandro; Empirical support for perceptual conceptualism; Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute; Philosophies; 3; 8; 6-2018; 1-12 2409-9287 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/175868 |
identifier_str_mv |
Serrano, Nicolás Alejandro; Empirical support for perceptual conceptualism; Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute; Philosophies; 3; 8; 6-2018; 1-12 2409-9287 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/3/2/8 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.3390/philosophies3020008 |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
reponame_str |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
collection |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
instname_str |
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
_version_ |
1844614356905492480 |
score |
13.070432 |