Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics
- Autores
- Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
- Año de publicación
- 2019
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- Brandom explains perceptual knowledge as the product of two distinguishable sorts of capacities: (i) the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli; and (ii) the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlement of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental state. In this article, I argue that this is a blind spot, which makes Brandom's account of perceptual knowledge unable to properly accommodate the phenomenon of seeing aspects and to explain how we can justify the attributions of reliability to observers that make observation reports.
Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades. Centro de Investigaciones María Saleme Burnichón; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina - Materia
-
WITTGENSTEIN
SEEING ASPECTS
RELIABILISM
PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/119592
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
id |
CONICETDig_c155a828147664dacf49e28d596c04bf |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/119592 |
network_acronym_str |
CONICETDig |
repository_id_str |
3498 |
network_name_str |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
spelling |
Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative PragmaticsKalpokas, Daniel EnriqueWITTGENSTEINSEEING ASPECTSRELIABILISMPERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCEhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6Brandom explains perceptual knowledge as the product of two distinguishable sorts of capacities: (i) the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli; and (ii) the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlement of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental state. In this article, I argue that this is a blind spot, which makes Brandom's account of perceptual knowledge unable to properly accommodate the phenomenon of seeing aspects and to explain how we can justify the attributions of reliability to observers that make observation reports.Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades. Centro de Investigaciones María Saleme Burnichón; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; ArgentinaUniversidad de Salamanca2019-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/119592Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics; Universidad de Salamanca; Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin; 8; 9; 9-2019; 1-202254-0601CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://disputatio.eu/vols/vol-8-no-9/kalpokas-pragmatics/info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.5281/zenodo.3236910info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:19:48Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/119592instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:19:49.23CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics |
title |
Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics |
spellingShingle |
Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique WITTGENSTEIN SEEING ASPECTS RELIABILISM PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE |
title_short |
Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics |
title_full |
Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics |
title_fullStr |
Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics |
title_full_unstemmed |
Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics |
title_sort |
Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique |
author |
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique |
author_facet |
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
WITTGENSTEIN SEEING ASPECTS RELIABILISM PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE |
topic |
WITTGENSTEIN SEEING ASPECTS RELIABILISM PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
Brandom explains perceptual knowledge as the product of two distinguishable sorts of capacities: (i) the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli; and (ii) the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlement of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental state. In this article, I argue that this is a blind spot, which makes Brandom's account of perceptual knowledge unable to properly accommodate the phenomenon of seeing aspects and to explain how we can justify the attributions of reliability to observers that make observation reports. Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades. Centro de Investigaciones María Saleme Burnichón; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina |
description |
Brandom explains perceptual knowledge as the product of two distinguishable sorts of capacities: (i) the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli; and (ii) the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlement of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental state. In this article, I argue that this is a blind spot, which makes Brandom's account of perceptual knowledge unable to properly accommodate the phenomenon of seeing aspects and to explain how we can justify the attributions of reliability to observers that make observation reports. |
publishDate |
2019 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2019-09 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/119592 Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics; Universidad de Salamanca; Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin; 8; 9; 9-2019; 1-20 2254-0601 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/119592 |
identifier_str_mv |
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics; Universidad de Salamanca; Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin; 8; 9; 9-2019; 1-20 2254-0601 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://disputatio.eu/vols/vol-8-no-9/kalpokas-pragmatics/ info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.5281/zenodo.3236910 |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad de Salamanca |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad de Salamanca |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
reponame_str |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
collection |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
instname_str |
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
_version_ |
1844614172905570304 |
score |
13.070432 |