Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics

Autores
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
Año de publicación
2019
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Brandom explains perceptual knowledge as the product of two distinguishable sorts of capacities: (i) the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli; and (ii) the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlement of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental state. In this article, I argue that this is a blind spot, which makes Brandom's account of perceptual knowledge unable to properly accommodate the phenomenon of seeing aspects and to explain how we can justify the attributions of reliability to observers that make observation reports.
Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades. Centro de Investigaciones María Saleme Burnichón; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina
Materia
WITTGENSTEIN
SEEING ASPECTS
RELIABILISM
PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/119592
Acceder
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spelling Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative PragmaticsKalpokas, Daniel EnriqueWITTGENSTEINSEEING ASPECTSRELIABILISMPERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCEhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6Brandom explains perceptual knowledge as the product of two distinguishable sorts of capacities: (i) the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli; and (ii) the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlement of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental state. In this article, I argue that this is a blind spot, which makes Brandom's account of perceptual knowledge unable to properly accommodate the phenomenon of seeing aspects and to explain how we can justify the attributions of reliability to observers that make observation reports.Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades. Centro de Investigaciones María Saleme Burnichón; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; ArgentinaUniversidad de Salamanca2019-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/119592Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics; Universidad de Salamanca; Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin; 8; 9; 9-2019; 1-202254-0601CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://disputatio.eu/vols/vol-8-no-9/kalpokas-pragmatics/info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.5281/zenodo.3236910info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-15T15:16:58Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/119592instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-15 15:16:59.151CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics
title Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics
spellingShingle Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
WITTGENSTEIN
SEEING ASPECTS
RELIABILISM
PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE
title_short Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics
title_full Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics
title_fullStr Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics
title_full_unstemmed Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics
title_sort Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
author Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
author_facet Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv WITTGENSTEIN
SEEING ASPECTS
RELIABILISM
PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE
topic WITTGENSTEIN
SEEING ASPECTS
RELIABILISM
PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Brandom explains perceptual knowledge as the product of two distinguishable sorts of capacities: (i) the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli; and (ii) the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlement of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental state. In this article, I argue that this is a blind spot, which makes Brandom's account of perceptual knowledge unable to properly accommodate the phenomenon of seeing aspects and to explain how we can justify the attributions of reliability to observers that make observation reports.
Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades. Centro de Investigaciones María Saleme Burnichón; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina
description Brandom explains perceptual knowledge as the product of two distinguishable sorts of capacities: (i) the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli; and (ii) the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlement of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental state. In this article, I argue that this is a blind spot, which makes Brandom's account of perceptual knowledge unable to properly accommodate the phenomenon of seeing aspects and to explain how we can justify the attributions of reliability to observers that make observation reports.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019-09
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/119592
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics; Universidad de Salamanca; Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin; 8; 9; 9-2019; 1-20
2254-0601
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/119592
identifier_str_mv Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom's Normative Pragmatics; Universidad de Salamanca; Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin; 8; 9; 9-2019; 1-20
2254-0601
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://disputatio.eu/vols/vol-8-no-9/kalpokas-pragmatics/
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.5281/zenodo.3236910
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de Salamanca
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de Salamanca
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
_version_ 1846083318327541760
score 13.22299

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