Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account
- Autores
- Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz
- Año de publicación
- 2018
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- According to the usual way of understanding how true knowledge attribution works, it is not right to attribute knowledge of p to S unless p is true and S is justified in believing p. This assumption seems to hold even if we shun away from the idea that we can give an analysis of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. I want to raise some suspicions on the correctness of this traditional picture. I suggest that justification is not always perceived as a necessary condition for true knowledge attribution, according to our pre-theoretical usage of standard epistemic terms. This is not to say that justification is never seen as an important requirement; sometimes it certainly is. Still, the full-fledged, traditional position on epistemic justification needs to be seriously qualified. Ultimately, I will contend that this result lends support to a rival epistemological standpoint — what we might dub a Moderate Peircean stance on epistemic matters.
Fil: Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina - Materia
-
True belief
Knowledge attribution
Epistemic justification
Peircean justificaiton - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/100795
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Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary accountCresto, Eleonora BeatrizTrue beliefKnowledge attributionEpistemic justificationPeircean justificaitonhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6According to the usual way of understanding how true knowledge attribution works, it is not right to attribute knowledge of p to S unless p is true and S is justified in believing p. This assumption seems to hold even if we shun away from the idea that we can give an analysis of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. I want to raise some suspicions on the correctness of this traditional picture. I suggest that justification is not always perceived as a necessary condition for true knowledge attribution, according to our pre-theoretical usage of standard epistemic terms. This is not to say that justification is never seen as an important requirement; sometimes it certainly is. Still, the full-fledged, traditional position on epistemic justification needs to be seriously qualified. Ultimately, I will contend that this result lends support to a rival epistemological standpoint — what we might dub a Moderate Peircean stance on epistemic matters.Fil: Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaSpringer2018-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/100795Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz; Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account; Springer; Synthese (Dordrecht); 195; 9; 9-2018; 3737-37530039-7857CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s11229-016-1282-yinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11229-016-1282-yinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:40:48Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/100795instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:40:48.35CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account |
title |
Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account |
spellingShingle |
Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz True belief Knowledge attribution Epistemic justification Peircean justificaiton |
title_short |
Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account |
title_full |
Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account |
title_fullStr |
Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account |
title_full_unstemmed |
Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account |
title_sort |
Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz |
author |
Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz |
author_facet |
Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
True belief Knowledge attribution Epistemic justification Peircean justificaiton |
topic |
True belief Knowledge attribution Epistemic justification Peircean justificaiton |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
According to the usual way of understanding how true knowledge attribution works, it is not right to attribute knowledge of p to S unless p is true and S is justified in believing p. This assumption seems to hold even if we shun away from the idea that we can give an analysis of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. I want to raise some suspicions on the correctness of this traditional picture. I suggest that justification is not always perceived as a necessary condition for true knowledge attribution, according to our pre-theoretical usage of standard epistemic terms. This is not to say that justification is never seen as an important requirement; sometimes it certainly is. Still, the full-fledged, traditional position on epistemic justification needs to be seriously qualified. Ultimately, I will contend that this result lends support to a rival epistemological standpoint — what we might dub a Moderate Peircean stance on epistemic matters. Fil: Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina |
description |
According to the usual way of understanding how true knowledge attribution works, it is not right to attribute knowledge of p to S unless p is true and S is justified in believing p. This assumption seems to hold even if we shun away from the idea that we can give an analysis of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. I want to raise some suspicions on the correctness of this traditional picture. I suggest that justification is not always perceived as a necessary condition for true knowledge attribution, according to our pre-theoretical usage of standard epistemic terms. This is not to say that justification is never seen as an important requirement; sometimes it certainly is. Still, the full-fledged, traditional position on epistemic justification needs to be seriously qualified. Ultimately, I will contend that this result lends support to a rival epistemological standpoint — what we might dub a Moderate Peircean stance on epistemic matters. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/100795 Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz; Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account; Springer; Synthese (Dordrecht); 195; 9; 9-2018; 3737-3753 0039-7857 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/100795 |
identifier_str_mv |
Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz; Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account; Springer; Synthese (Dordrecht); 195; 9; 9-2018; 3737-3753 0039-7857 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s11229-016-1282-y info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11229-016-1282-y |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
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openAccess |
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https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Springer |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Springer |
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reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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1844613291337318400 |
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13.070432 |