Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account

Autores
Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz
Año de publicación
2018
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
According to the usual way of understanding how true knowledge attribution works, it is not right to attribute knowledge of p to S unless p is true and S is justified in believing p. This assumption seems to hold even if we shun away from the idea that we can give an analysis of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. I want to raise some suspicions on the correctness of this traditional picture. I suggest that justification is not always perceived as a necessary condition for true knowledge attribution, according to our pre-theoretical usage of standard epistemic terms. This is not to say that justification is never seen as an important requirement; sometimes it certainly is. Still, the full-fledged, traditional position on epistemic justification needs to be seriously qualified. Ultimately, I will contend that this result lends support to a rival epistemological standpoint — what we might dub a Moderate Peircean stance on epistemic matters.
Fil: Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Materia
True belief
Knowledge attribution
Epistemic justification
Peircean justificaiton
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/100795

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spelling Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary accountCresto, Eleonora BeatrizTrue beliefKnowledge attributionEpistemic justificationPeircean justificaitonhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6According to the usual way of understanding how true knowledge attribution works, it is not right to attribute knowledge of p to S unless p is true and S is justified in believing p. This assumption seems to hold even if we shun away from the idea that we can give an analysis of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. I want to raise some suspicions on the correctness of this traditional picture. I suggest that justification is not always perceived as a necessary condition for true knowledge attribution, according to our pre-theoretical usage of standard epistemic terms. This is not to say that justification is never seen as an important requirement; sometimes it certainly is. Still, the full-fledged, traditional position on epistemic justification needs to be seriously qualified. Ultimately, I will contend that this result lends support to a rival epistemological standpoint — what we might dub a Moderate Peircean stance on epistemic matters.Fil: Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaSpringer2018-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/100795Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz; Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account; Springer; Synthese (Dordrecht); 195; 9; 9-2018; 3737-37530039-7857CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s11229-016-1282-yinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11229-016-1282-yinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:40:48Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/100795instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:40:48.35CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account
title Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account
spellingShingle Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account
Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz
True belief
Knowledge attribution
Epistemic justification
Peircean justificaiton
title_short Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account
title_full Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account
title_fullStr Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account
title_full_unstemmed Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account
title_sort Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz
author Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz
author_facet Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv True belief
Knowledge attribution
Epistemic justification
Peircean justificaiton
topic True belief
Knowledge attribution
Epistemic justification
Peircean justificaiton
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv According to the usual way of understanding how true knowledge attribution works, it is not right to attribute knowledge of p to S unless p is true and S is justified in believing p. This assumption seems to hold even if we shun away from the idea that we can give an analysis of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. I want to raise some suspicions on the correctness of this traditional picture. I suggest that justification is not always perceived as a necessary condition for true knowledge attribution, according to our pre-theoretical usage of standard epistemic terms. This is not to say that justification is never seen as an important requirement; sometimes it certainly is. Still, the full-fledged, traditional position on epistemic justification needs to be seriously qualified. Ultimately, I will contend that this result lends support to a rival epistemological standpoint — what we might dub a Moderate Peircean stance on epistemic matters.
Fil: Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
description According to the usual way of understanding how true knowledge attribution works, it is not right to attribute knowledge of p to S unless p is true and S is justified in believing p. This assumption seems to hold even if we shun away from the idea that we can give an analysis of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. I want to raise some suspicions on the correctness of this traditional picture. I suggest that justification is not always perceived as a necessary condition for true knowledge attribution, according to our pre-theoretical usage of standard epistemic terms. This is not to say that justification is never seen as an important requirement; sometimes it certainly is. Still, the full-fledged, traditional position on epistemic justification needs to be seriously qualified. Ultimately, I will contend that this result lends support to a rival epistemological standpoint — what we might dub a Moderate Peircean stance on epistemic matters.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-09
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/100795
Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz; Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account; Springer; Synthese (Dordrecht); 195; 9; 9-2018; 3737-3753
0039-7857
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/100795
identifier_str_mv Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz; Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account; Springer; Synthese (Dordrecht); 195; 9; 9-2018; 3737-3753
0039-7857
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s11229-016-1282-y
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11229-016-1282-y
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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