Testimony and Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief (A Non-Purist Place for Interpersonalism)

Autores
Rimoldi, Florencia; Penelas, Federico Carlos
Año de publicación
2024
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Interpersonalist theories of testimony have the theoretical virtue of giving room to the characteristic interpersonal features of testimonial exchange among persons. Nonetheless, it has been argued that they are at a serious disadvantage when it comes to accounting for the way in which testimonial beliefs may be epistemically justified. In this paper, we defend the epistemological credentials of interpersonalism, emphasizing that it is inseparable from the acceptance of non-evidential epistemic reasons to believe, which demands proper conceptual elaborations on the notions of epistemic reasons and of epistemic justification. We offer a proper reading of epistemic reason, and we defend non-purism on justification as the adequate way to conceive the epistemic proposal of interpersonalism on testimony, realizing that only this combination is capable of apprehending certain cases in which there seems to be no way to rule out the idea that the assurance offered by the testifier offers an epistemic reason to believe that it is not evidential.
Fil: Rimoldi, Florencia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina
Fil: Penelas, Federico Carlos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentina
Materia
TESTIMONY
REASON FOR BELIEF
INTERPERSONALISM
EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/260752
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Testimony and Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief (A Non-Purist Place for Interpersonalism)Rimoldi, FlorenciaPenelas, Federico CarlosTESTIMONYREASON FOR BELIEFINTERPERSONALISMEPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATIONhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6Interpersonalist theories of testimony have the theoretical virtue of giving room to the characteristic interpersonal features of testimonial exchange among persons. Nonetheless, it has been argued that they are at a serious disadvantage when it comes to accounting for the way in which testimonial beliefs may be epistemically justified. In this paper, we defend the epistemological credentials of interpersonalism, emphasizing that it is inseparable from the acceptance of non-evidential epistemic reasons to believe, which demands proper conceptual elaborations on the notions of epistemic reasons and of epistemic justification. We offer a proper reading of epistemic reason, and we defend non-purism on justification as the adequate way to conceive the epistemic proposal of interpersonalism on testimony, realizing that only this combination is capable of apprehending certain cases in which there seems to be no way to rule out the idea that the assurance offered by the testifier offers an epistemic reason to believe that it is not evidential.Fil: Rimoldi, Florencia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; ArgentinaFil: Penelas, Federico Carlos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; ArgentinaCambridge University Press2024-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/260752Rimoldi, Florencia; Penelas, Federico Carlos; Testimony and Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief (A Non-Purist Place for Interpersonalism); Cambridge University Press; Episteme; 1-2024; 1-211742-36001750-0117CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/testimony-and-nonevidential-reasons-for-belief-a-nonpurist-place-for-interpersonalism/C1A705FDD725B7961AE9643E7E88BA9Binfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1017/epi.2023.55info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-10T13:07:58Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/260752instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-10 13:07:58.285CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Testimony and Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief (A Non-Purist Place for Interpersonalism)
title Testimony and Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief (A Non-Purist Place for Interpersonalism)
spellingShingle Testimony and Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief (A Non-Purist Place for Interpersonalism)
Rimoldi, Florencia
TESTIMONY
REASON FOR BELIEF
INTERPERSONALISM
EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION
title_short Testimony and Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief (A Non-Purist Place for Interpersonalism)
title_full Testimony and Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief (A Non-Purist Place for Interpersonalism)
title_fullStr Testimony and Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief (A Non-Purist Place for Interpersonalism)
title_full_unstemmed Testimony and Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief (A Non-Purist Place for Interpersonalism)
title_sort Testimony and Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief (A Non-Purist Place for Interpersonalism)
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Rimoldi, Florencia
Penelas, Federico Carlos
author Rimoldi, Florencia
author_facet Rimoldi, Florencia
Penelas, Federico Carlos
author_role author
author2 Penelas, Federico Carlos
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv TESTIMONY
REASON FOR BELIEF
INTERPERSONALISM
EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION
topic TESTIMONY
REASON FOR BELIEF
INTERPERSONALISM
EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Interpersonalist theories of testimony have the theoretical virtue of giving room to the characteristic interpersonal features of testimonial exchange among persons. Nonetheless, it has been argued that they are at a serious disadvantage when it comes to accounting for the way in which testimonial beliefs may be epistemically justified. In this paper, we defend the epistemological credentials of interpersonalism, emphasizing that it is inseparable from the acceptance of non-evidential epistemic reasons to believe, which demands proper conceptual elaborations on the notions of epistemic reasons and of epistemic justification. We offer a proper reading of epistemic reason, and we defend non-purism on justification as the adequate way to conceive the epistemic proposal of interpersonalism on testimony, realizing that only this combination is capable of apprehending certain cases in which there seems to be no way to rule out the idea that the assurance offered by the testifier offers an epistemic reason to believe that it is not evidential.
Fil: Rimoldi, Florencia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina
Fil: Penelas, Federico Carlos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentina
description Interpersonalist theories of testimony have the theoretical virtue of giving room to the characteristic interpersonal features of testimonial exchange among persons. Nonetheless, it has been argued that they are at a serious disadvantage when it comes to accounting for the way in which testimonial beliefs may be epistemically justified. In this paper, we defend the epistemological credentials of interpersonalism, emphasizing that it is inseparable from the acceptance of non-evidential epistemic reasons to believe, which demands proper conceptual elaborations on the notions of epistemic reasons and of epistemic justification. We offer a proper reading of epistemic reason, and we defend non-purism on justification as the adequate way to conceive the epistemic proposal of interpersonalism on testimony, realizing that only this combination is capable of apprehending certain cases in which there seems to be no way to rule out the idea that the assurance offered by the testifier offers an epistemic reason to believe that it is not evidential.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/260752
Rimoldi, Florencia; Penelas, Federico Carlos; Testimony and Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief (A Non-Purist Place for Interpersonalism); Cambridge University Press; Episteme; 1-2024; 1-21
1742-3600
1750-0117
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/260752
identifier_str_mv Rimoldi, Florencia; Penelas, Federico Carlos; Testimony and Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief (A Non-Purist Place for Interpersonalism); Cambridge University Press; Episteme; 1-2024; 1-21
1742-3600
1750-0117
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/testimony-and-nonevidential-reasons-for-belief-a-nonpurist-place-for-interpersonalism/C1A705FDD725B7961AE9643E7E88BA9B
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1017/epi.2023.55
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Cambridge University Press
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Cambridge University Press
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 12.993085

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