Intuition as Philosophical Evidence

Autores
Pailos, Federico Matias
Año de publicación
2012
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Earlenbaugh and Molyneux’s argument against considering intuitions as evidence has an uncharitable consequence — a substantial part of philosophical practice is not justified. A possible solution to this problem is to defend that philosophy must be descriptive metaphysics. But if this statement is rejected, one can only argue (a) that experts’ intuition does constitute evidence, and (b) that philosophical practice is justified by the overall growth of philosophical knowledge it generates.
Fil: Pailos, Federico Matias. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina
Materia
METAPHILOSOPHY
JUSTIFICATION
INTUITION
KNOWLEDGE
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/194769
Acceder
id CONICETDig_5467b7c2cb61423cf61cdc0be86d5a31
oai_identifier_str oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/194769
network_acronym_str CONICETDig
repository_id_str 3498
network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Intuition as Philosophical EvidencePailos, Federico MatiasMETAPHILOSOPHYJUSTIFICATIONINTUITIONKNOWLEDGEhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6Earlenbaugh and Molyneux’s argument against considering intuitions as evidence has an uncharitable consequence — a substantial part of philosophical practice is not justified. A possible solution to this problem is to defend that philosophy must be descriptive metaphysics. But if this statement is rejected, one can only argue (a) that experts’ intuition does constitute evidence, and (b) that philosophical practice is justified by the overall growth of philosophical knowledge it generates.Fil: Pailos, Federico Matias. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Universidad de Buenos Aires; ArgentinaPacific University Libraries2012-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/194769Pailos, Federico Matias; Intuition as Philosophical Evidence; Pacific University Libraries; Essays In Philosophy; 13; 1; 1-2012; 294-3091526-0569CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://commons.pacificu.edu/work/sc/ed7f8cb0-91ba-41da-a6e2-4a4107808981info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-29T11:48:25Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/194769instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-29 11:48:25.865CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Intuition as Philosophical Evidence
title Intuition as Philosophical Evidence
spellingShingle Intuition as Philosophical Evidence
Pailos, Federico Matias
METAPHILOSOPHY
JUSTIFICATION
INTUITION
KNOWLEDGE
title_short Intuition as Philosophical Evidence
title_full Intuition as Philosophical Evidence
title_fullStr Intuition as Philosophical Evidence
title_full_unstemmed Intuition as Philosophical Evidence
title_sort Intuition as Philosophical Evidence
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Pailos, Federico Matias
author Pailos, Federico Matias
author_facet Pailos, Federico Matias
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv METAPHILOSOPHY
JUSTIFICATION
INTUITION
KNOWLEDGE
topic METAPHILOSOPHY
JUSTIFICATION
INTUITION
KNOWLEDGE
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Earlenbaugh and Molyneux’s argument against considering intuitions as evidence has an uncharitable consequence — a substantial part of philosophical practice is not justified. A possible solution to this problem is to defend that philosophy must be descriptive metaphysics. But if this statement is rejected, one can only argue (a) that experts’ intuition does constitute evidence, and (b) that philosophical practice is justified by the overall growth of philosophical knowledge it generates.
Fil: Pailos, Federico Matias. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina
description Earlenbaugh and Molyneux’s argument against considering intuitions as evidence has an uncharitable consequence — a substantial part of philosophical practice is not justified. A possible solution to this problem is to defend that philosophy must be descriptive metaphysics. But if this statement is rejected, one can only argue (a) that experts’ intuition does constitute evidence, and (b) that philosophical practice is justified by the overall growth of philosophical knowledge it generates.
publishDate 2012
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2012-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/194769
Pailos, Federico Matias; Intuition as Philosophical Evidence; Pacific University Libraries; Essays In Philosophy; 13; 1; 1-2012; 294-309
1526-0569
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/194769
identifier_str_mv Pailos, Federico Matias; Intuition as Philosophical Evidence; Pacific University Libraries; Essays In Philosophy; 13; 1; 1-2012; 294-309
1526-0569
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://commons.pacificu.edu/work/sc/ed7f8cb0-91ba-41da-a6e2-4a4107808981
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pacific University Libraries
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pacific University Libraries
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
_version_ 1847426501203460096
score 13.10058

Publicaciones similares