Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules

Autores
Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo; Bonifacio, Agustín Germán
Año de publicación
2024
Idioma
español castellano
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences are allowed, we look for rules in which manipulations are not obvious. First, we show that a rule does not have obvious manipulations if and only if when an agent vetoes an alternative it can do so with any preference that does not have such alternative in the top.Second, we focus on two classes of tops-only rules: (i) (generalized) median voter schemes, and (ii) voting by committees. For each class, we identify which rules do not have obvious manipulations on the universal domain of preferences.
Fil: Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Fil: Bonifacio, Agustín Germán. Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Departamento de Matemáticas; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis; Argentina
Materia
OBVIOUS MANIPULATIONS,
(GENERALIZED) MEDIAN VOTING SCHEMES,
TOPS-ONLINESS
VOTING BY QUOTA
VOTING BY COMMITTEES
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/247267
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rulesArribillaga, Roberto PabloBonifacio, Agustín GermánOBVIOUS MANIPULATIONS,(GENERALIZED) MEDIAN VOTING SCHEMES,TOPS-ONLINESSVOTING BY QUOTAVOTING BY COMMITTEEShttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences are allowed, we look for rules in which manipulations are not obvious. First, we show that a rule does not have obvious manipulations if and only if when an agent vetoes an alternative it can do so with any preference that does not have such alternative in the top.Second, we focus on two classes of tops-only rules: (i) (generalized) median voter schemes, and (ii) voting by committees. For each class, we identify which rules do not have obvious manipulations on the universal domain of preferences.Fil: Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; ArgentinaFil: Bonifacio, Agustín Germán. Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Departamento de Matemáticas; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis; ArgentinaAcademic Press Inc Elsevier Science2024-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/247267Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo; Bonifacio, Agustín Germán; Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules; Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science; Games and Economic Behavior; 143; 1-2024; 12-240899-8256CONICET DigitalCONICETspainfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.002info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S089982562300177X?via%3Dihubinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/arxiv/https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.11627info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-15T15:09:31Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/247267instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-15 15:09:31.612CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
title Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
spellingShingle Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
OBVIOUS MANIPULATIONS,
(GENERALIZED) MEDIAN VOTING SCHEMES,
TOPS-ONLINESS
VOTING BY QUOTA
VOTING BY COMMITTEES
title_short Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
title_full Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
title_fullStr Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
title_full_unstemmed Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
title_sort Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
Bonifacio, Agustín Germán
author Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
author_facet Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
Bonifacio, Agustín Germán
author_role author
author2 Bonifacio, Agustín Germán
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv OBVIOUS MANIPULATIONS,
(GENERALIZED) MEDIAN VOTING SCHEMES,
TOPS-ONLINESS
VOTING BY QUOTA
VOTING BY COMMITTEES
topic OBVIOUS MANIPULATIONS,
(GENERALIZED) MEDIAN VOTING SCHEMES,
TOPS-ONLINESS
VOTING BY QUOTA
VOTING BY COMMITTEES
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences are allowed, we look for rules in which manipulations are not obvious. First, we show that a rule does not have obvious manipulations if and only if when an agent vetoes an alternative it can do so with any preference that does not have such alternative in the top.Second, we focus on two classes of tops-only rules: (i) (generalized) median voter schemes, and (ii) voting by committees. For each class, we identify which rules do not have obvious manipulations on the universal domain of preferences.
Fil: Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Fil: Bonifacio, Agustín Germán. Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Departamento de Matemáticas; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis; Argentina
description In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences are allowed, we look for rules in which manipulations are not obvious. First, we show that a rule does not have obvious manipulations if and only if when an agent vetoes an alternative it can do so with any preference that does not have such alternative in the top.Second, we focus on two classes of tops-only rules: (i) (generalized) median voter schemes, and (ii) voting by committees. For each class, we identify which rules do not have obvious manipulations on the universal domain of preferences.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/247267
Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo; Bonifacio, Agustín Germán; Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules; Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science; Games and Economic Behavior; 143; 1-2024; 12-24
0899-8256
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/247267
identifier_str_mv Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo; Bonifacio, Agustín Germán; Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules; Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science; Games and Economic Behavior; 143; 1-2024; 12-24
0899-8256
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.002
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S089982562300177X?via%3Dihub
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/arxiv/https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.11627
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.22299

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