An undominated nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit

Autores
Berga, Dolors; Bergantiños, Gustavo; Jordi, Massó Carreras; Neme, Alejandro José
Año de publicación
2007
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
We consider the problem of a society whose members choose, with a voting by committees, a subset of new members from a given set of candidates. After knowing the elected candidates, former members may decide to either stay or exit the society. We analyze the voting behavior of members who take into account the effect of their votes not only on the elected candidates, but also on the final composition of the society. For additive and monotonic preferences with dichotomous bads we construct a strategy profile that is an undominated pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced voting game.
Fil: Berga, Dolors. Universidad de Girona; España
Fil: Bergantiños, Gustavo. Universidad de Vigo; España
Fil: Jordi, Massó Carreras. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; España
Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Materia
VOTING
COMMITTEES
UNDOMINATED NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/135139
Acceder
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oai_identifier_str oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/135139
network_acronym_str CONICETDig
repository_id_str 3498
network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling An undominated nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exitBerga, DolorsBergantiños, GustavoJordi, Massó CarrerasNeme, Alejandro JoséVOTINGCOMMITTEESUNDOMINATED NASH EQUILIBRIUMhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1We consider the problem of a society whose members choose, with a voting by committees, a subset of new members from a given set of candidates. After knowing the elected candidates, former members may decide to either stay or exit the society. We analyze the voting behavior of members who take into account the effect of their votes not only on the elected candidates, but also on the final composition of the society. For additive and monotonic preferences with dichotomous bads we construct a strategy profile that is an undominated pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced voting game.Fil: Berga, Dolors. Universidad de Girona; EspañaFil: Bergantiños, Gustavo. Universidad de Vigo; EspañaFil: Jordi, Massó Carreras. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; EspañaFil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; ArgentinaElsevier2007-03info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/135139Berga, Dolors; Bergantiños, Gustavo; Jordi, Massó Carreras; Neme, Alejandro José; An undominated nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit; Elsevier; Mathematical Social Sciences; 54; 2; 3-2007; 152-1750165-4896CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.03.004info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0165489607000261?via%3Dihubinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T09:54:25Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/135139instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 09:54:25.409CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv An undominated nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
title An undominated nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
spellingShingle An undominated nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
Berga, Dolors
VOTING
COMMITTEES
UNDOMINATED NASH EQUILIBRIUM
title_short An undominated nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
title_full An undominated nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
title_fullStr An undominated nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
title_full_unstemmed An undominated nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
title_sort An undominated nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Berga, Dolors
Bergantiños, Gustavo
Jordi, Massó Carreras
Neme, Alejandro José
author Berga, Dolors
author_facet Berga, Dolors
Bergantiños, Gustavo
Jordi, Massó Carreras
Neme, Alejandro José
author_role author
author2 Bergantiños, Gustavo
Jordi, Massó Carreras
Neme, Alejandro José
author2_role author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv VOTING
COMMITTEES
UNDOMINATED NASH EQUILIBRIUM
topic VOTING
COMMITTEES
UNDOMINATED NASH EQUILIBRIUM
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv We consider the problem of a society whose members choose, with a voting by committees, a subset of new members from a given set of candidates. After knowing the elected candidates, former members may decide to either stay or exit the society. We analyze the voting behavior of members who take into account the effect of their votes not only on the elected candidates, but also on the final composition of the society. For additive and monotonic preferences with dichotomous bads we construct a strategy profile that is an undominated pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced voting game.
Fil: Berga, Dolors. Universidad de Girona; España
Fil: Bergantiños, Gustavo. Universidad de Vigo; España
Fil: Jordi, Massó Carreras. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; España
Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
description We consider the problem of a society whose members choose, with a voting by committees, a subset of new members from a given set of candidates. After knowing the elected candidates, former members may decide to either stay or exit the society. We analyze the voting behavior of members who take into account the effect of their votes not only on the elected candidates, but also on the final composition of the society. For additive and monotonic preferences with dichotomous bads we construct a strategy profile that is an undominated pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced voting game.
publishDate 2007
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2007-03
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/135139
Berga, Dolors; Bergantiños, Gustavo; Jordi, Massó Carreras; Neme, Alejandro José; An undominated nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit; Elsevier; Mathematical Social Sciences; 54; 2; 3-2007; 152-175
0165-4896
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/135139
identifier_str_mv Berga, Dolors; Bergantiños, Gustavo; Jordi, Massó Carreras; Neme, Alejandro José; An undominated nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit; Elsevier; Mathematical Social Sciences; 54; 2; 3-2007; 152-175
0165-4896
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.03.004
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0165489607000261?via%3Dihub
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.13397

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