Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability

Autores
Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo; Jordi, Massó Carreras
Año de publicación
2016
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilaterally change the outcomes of the two generalized median voter schemes. We perform a specific analysis of all median voter schemes: the anonymous subfamily of generalized median voter schemes.
Fil: Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo. Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico- Matemáticas y Naturales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis ; Argentina
Fil: Jordi, Massó Carreras. Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona. Departamento de Economía y Historia Económica; España
Materia
ANONYMITY
GENERALIZED MEDIAN VOTING SCHEMES
STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/60966
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulabilityArribillaga, Roberto PabloJordi, Massó CarrerasANONYMITYGENERALIZED MEDIAN VOTING SCHEMESSTRATEGY-PROOFNESShttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilaterally change the outcomes of the two generalized median voter schemes. We perform a specific analysis of all median voter schemes: the anonymous subfamily of generalized median voter schemes.Fil: Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo. Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico- Matemáticas y Naturales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis ; ArgentinaFil: Jordi, Massó Carreras. Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona. Departamento de Economía y Historia Económica; EspañaSociety for Economic Theory2016-05info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/60966Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo; Jordi, Massó Carreras; Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability; Society for Economic Theory; Theoretical Economics; 11; 2; 5-2016; 547-5861933-6837CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewArticle/20160547info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/TE1910info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.3982/TE1910info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:13:50Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/60966instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:13:50.519CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
title Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
spellingShingle Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
ANONYMITY
GENERALIZED MEDIAN VOTING SCHEMES
STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
title_short Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
title_full Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
title_fullStr Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
title_full_unstemmed Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
title_sort Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
Jordi, Massó Carreras
author Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
author_facet Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
Jordi, Massó Carreras
author_role author
author2 Jordi, Massó Carreras
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv ANONYMITY
GENERALIZED MEDIAN VOTING SCHEMES
STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
topic ANONYMITY
GENERALIZED MEDIAN VOTING SCHEMES
STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilaterally change the outcomes of the two generalized median voter schemes. We perform a specific analysis of all median voter schemes: the anonymous subfamily of generalized median voter schemes.
Fil: Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo. Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico- Matemáticas y Naturales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis ; Argentina
Fil: Jordi, Massó Carreras. Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona. Departamento de Economía y Historia Económica; España
description We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilaterally change the outcomes of the two generalized median voter schemes. We perform a specific analysis of all median voter schemes: the anonymous subfamily of generalized median voter schemes.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016-05
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/60966
Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo; Jordi, Massó Carreras; Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability; Society for Economic Theory; Theoretical Economics; 11; 2; 5-2016; 547-586
1933-6837
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/60966
identifier_str_mv Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo; Jordi, Massó Carreras; Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability; Society for Economic Theory; Theoretical Economics; 11; 2; 5-2016; 547-586
1933-6837
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewArticle/20160547
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/TE1910
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.3982/TE1910
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Society for Economic Theory
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Society for Economic Theory
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.070432

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