Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
- Autores
- Bonifacio, Agustín Germán; Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
- Año de publicación
- 2023
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- documento de conferencia
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences are allowed, we look for rules in which manipulations are not obvious. We show that a rule does not have obvious manipulations if and only if when an agent vetoes an alternative it can do so with any preference that does not have such alternative in the top.
Fil: Bonifacio, Agustín Germán. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Fil: Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
IX Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
Argentina
Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial - Materia
-
OBVIOUS MANIPULATIONS
TOPS-ONLYNESS
VETOER - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/258700
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
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Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rulesBonifacio, Agustín GermánArribillaga, Roberto PabloOBVIOUS MANIPULATIONSTOPS-ONLYNESSVETOERhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences are allowed, we look for rules in which manipulations are not obvious. We show that a rule does not have obvious manipulations if and only if when an agent vetoes an alternative it can do so with any preference that does not have such alternative in the top.Fil: Bonifacio, Agustín Germán. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; ArgentinaFil: Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; ArgentinaIX Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e IndustrialArgentinaAsociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e IndustrialAsociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial2023info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjectWorkshopJournalhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferenciaapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/258700Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules; IX Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial; Argentina; 2023; 343-3462314-3282CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://asamaci.org.ar/revista-maci/Internacionalinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:54:20Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/258700instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:54:20.299CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules |
title |
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules |
spellingShingle |
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules Bonifacio, Agustín Germán OBVIOUS MANIPULATIONS TOPS-ONLYNESS VETOER |
title_short |
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules |
title_full |
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules |
title_fullStr |
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules |
title_full_unstemmed |
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules |
title_sort |
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Bonifacio, Agustín Germán Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo |
author |
Bonifacio, Agustín Germán |
author_facet |
Bonifacio, Agustín Germán Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo |
author2_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
OBVIOUS MANIPULATIONS TOPS-ONLYNESS VETOER |
topic |
OBVIOUS MANIPULATIONS TOPS-ONLYNESS VETOER |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences are allowed, we look for rules in which manipulations are not obvious. We show that a rule does not have obvious manipulations if and only if when an agent vetoes an alternative it can do so with any preference that does not have such alternative in the top. Fil: Bonifacio, Agustín Germán. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina Fil: Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina IX Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial Argentina Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial |
description |
In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences are allowed, we look for rules in which manipulations are not obvious. We show that a rule does not have obvious manipulations if and only if when an agent vetoes an alternative it can do so with any preference that does not have such alternative in the top. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject Workshop Journal http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794 info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferencia |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
format |
conferenceObject |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/258700 Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules; IX Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial; Argentina; 2023; 343-346 2314-3282 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/258700 |
identifier_str_mv |
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules; IX Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial; Argentina; 2023; 343-346 2314-3282 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://asamaci.org.ar/revista-maci/ |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
Internacional |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
reponame_str |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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13.070432 |