Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules

Autores
Bonifacio, Agustín Germán; Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
Año de publicación
2023
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
documento de conferencia
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences are allowed, we look for rules in which manipulations are not obvious. We show that a rule does not have obvious manipulations if and only if when an agent vetoes an alternative it can do so with any preference that does not have such alternative in the top.
Fil: Bonifacio, Agustín Germán. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Fil: Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
IX Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
Argentina
Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
Materia
OBVIOUS MANIPULATIONS
TOPS-ONLYNESS
VETOER
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/258700
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rulesBonifacio, Agustín GermánArribillaga, Roberto PabloOBVIOUS MANIPULATIONSTOPS-ONLYNESSVETOERhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences are allowed, we look for rules in which manipulations are not obvious. We show that a rule does not have obvious manipulations if and only if when an agent vetoes an alternative it can do so with any preference that does not have such alternative in the top.Fil: Bonifacio, Agustín Germán. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; ArgentinaFil: Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; ArgentinaIX Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e IndustrialArgentinaAsociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e IndustrialAsociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial2023info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjectWorkshopJournalhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferenciaapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/258700Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules; IX Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial; Argentina; 2023; 343-3462314-3282CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://asamaci.org.ar/revista-maci/Internacionalinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-15T14:49:19Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/258700instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-15 14:49:20.057CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
title Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
spellingShingle Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
Bonifacio, Agustín Germán
OBVIOUS MANIPULATIONS
TOPS-ONLYNESS
VETOER
title_short Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
title_full Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
title_fullStr Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
title_full_unstemmed Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
title_sort Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Bonifacio, Agustín Germán
Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
author Bonifacio, Agustín Germán
author_facet Bonifacio, Agustín Germán
Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
author_role author
author2 Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv OBVIOUS MANIPULATIONS
TOPS-ONLYNESS
VETOER
topic OBVIOUS MANIPULATIONS
TOPS-ONLYNESS
VETOER
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences are allowed, we look for rules in which manipulations are not obvious. We show that a rule does not have obvious manipulations if and only if when an agent vetoes an alternative it can do so with any preference that does not have such alternative in the top.
Fil: Bonifacio, Agustín Germán. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Fil: Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
IX Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
Argentina
Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
description In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences are allowed, we look for rules in which manipulations are not obvious. We show that a rule does not have obvious manipulations if and only if when an agent vetoes an alternative it can do so with any preference that does not have such alternative in the top.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
Workshop
Journal
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794
info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferencia
status_str publishedVersion
format conferenceObject
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/258700
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules; IX Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial; Argentina; 2023; 343-346
2314-3282
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/258700
identifier_str_mv Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules; IX Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial; Argentina; 2023; 343-346
2314-3282
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://asamaci.org.ar/revista-maci/
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv Internacional
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.22299

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