Comparing voting by committees according to their manipulability

Autores
Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo; Jordi, Massó Carreras
Año de publicación
2017
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
We consider the class of voting by committees to be used by a society to collectively choose a subset from a given set of objects. We offer a simple criterion to compare two voting by committees without dummy agents according to their manipulability. This criterion is based on the set- inclusion relationships between the two corresponding pairs of sets of objects, those at which each agent is decisive and those at which each agent is vetoer. We show that the binary relation "to be as manipulable as" endows the set of equivalence classes of anonymous voting by committees (i.e., voting by quotas) with a complete upper semilattice structure, whose supremum is the equivalence class containing all voting by quotas with the property that the quota of each object is strictly larger than one and strictly lower than the number of agents. Finally, we extend the comparability criterion to the full class of all voting by committees.
Fil: Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis ; Argentina
Fil: Jordi, Massó Carreras. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; España
Materia
STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
SEPARABLE PREFERENCES
VOTING BY COMMITTEES
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/65497
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Comparing voting by committees according to their manipulabilityArribillaga, Roberto PabloJordi, Massó CarrerasSTRATEGY-PROOFNESSSEPARABLE PREFERENCESVOTING BY COMMITTEEShttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.6https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5We consider the class of voting by committees to be used by a society to collectively choose a subset from a given set of objects. We offer a simple criterion to compare two voting by committees without dummy agents according to their manipulability. This criterion is based on the set- inclusion relationships between the two corresponding pairs of sets of objects, those at which each agent is decisive and those at which each agent is vetoer. We show that the binary relation "to be as manipulable as" endows the set of equivalence classes of anonymous voting by committees (i.e., voting by quotas) with a complete upper semilattice structure, whose supremum is the equivalence class containing all voting by quotas with the property that the quota of each object is strictly larger than one and strictly lower than the number of agents. Finally, we extend the comparability criterion to the full class of all voting by committees.Fil: Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis ; ArgentinaFil: Jordi, Massó Carreras. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; EspañaAmerican Economic Association2017-11info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/65497Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo; Jordi, Massó Carreras; Comparing voting by committees according to their manipulability; American Economic Association; American Economic Journal: Microeconomics; 9; 4; 11-2017; 74-1071945-7685CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/mic.20160107info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20160107info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:20:03Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/65497instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:20:03.804CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Comparing voting by committees according to their manipulability
title Comparing voting by committees according to their manipulability
spellingShingle Comparing voting by committees according to their manipulability
Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
SEPARABLE PREFERENCES
VOTING BY COMMITTEES
title_short Comparing voting by committees according to their manipulability
title_full Comparing voting by committees according to their manipulability
title_fullStr Comparing voting by committees according to their manipulability
title_full_unstemmed Comparing voting by committees according to their manipulability
title_sort Comparing voting by committees according to their manipulability
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
Jordi, Massó Carreras
author Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
author_facet Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
Jordi, Massó Carreras
author_role author
author2 Jordi, Massó Carreras
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
SEPARABLE PREFERENCES
VOTING BY COMMITTEES
topic STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
SEPARABLE PREFERENCES
VOTING BY COMMITTEES
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.6
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv We consider the class of voting by committees to be used by a society to collectively choose a subset from a given set of objects. We offer a simple criterion to compare two voting by committees without dummy agents according to their manipulability. This criterion is based on the set- inclusion relationships between the two corresponding pairs of sets of objects, those at which each agent is decisive and those at which each agent is vetoer. We show that the binary relation "to be as manipulable as" endows the set of equivalence classes of anonymous voting by committees (i.e., voting by quotas) with a complete upper semilattice structure, whose supremum is the equivalence class containing all voting by quotas with the property that the quota of each object is strictly larger than one and strictly lower than the number of agents. Finally, we extend the comparability criterion to the full class of all voting by committees.
Fil: Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis ; Argentina
Fil: Jordi, Massó Carreras. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; España
description We consider the class of voting by committees to be used by a society to collectively choose a subset from a given set of objects. We offer a simple criterion to compare two voting by committees without dummy agents according to their manipulability. This criterion is based on the set- inclusion relationships between the two corresponding pairs of sets of objects, those at which each agent is decisive and those at which each agent is vetoer. We show that the binary relation "to be as manipulable as" endows the set of equivalence classes of anonymous voting by committees (i.e., voting by quotas) with a complete upper semilattice structure, whose supremum is the equivalence class containing all voting by quotas with the property that the quota of each object is strictly larger than one and strictly lower than the number of agents. Finally, we extend the comparability criterion to the full class of all voting by committees.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-11
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/65497
Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo; Jordi, Massó Carreras; Comparing voting by committees according to their manipulability; American Economic Association; American Economic Journal: Microeconomics; 9; 4; 11-2017; 74-107
1945-7685
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/65497
identifier_str_mv Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo; Jordi, Massó Carreras; Comparing voting by committees according to their manipulability; American Economic Association; American Economic Journal: Microeconomics; 9; 4; 11-2017; 74-107
1945-7685
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/mic.20160107
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20160107
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv American Economic Association
publisher.none.fl_str_mv American Economic Association
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.070432

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