Two Dogmas of Coherentism

Autores
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
Año de publicación
2012
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
This paper discusses two dogmas attributed to Davidson's coherentism. The first dogma says that experience is only a causal link between experience and beliefs. The second one says that only beliefs justify other beliefs. Against these two stataments it is argued that the conception of expeirence as a mere causal link between the world and our beliefs makes the world unknowable. Moreover, the article presents some additional reasons against that conception: it misses the phenomenological and perspectival character of perception, and its independence of belief. Finally, Davidsonian externalism is considered. It is shown here that Davidson's conception of experience makes it impossible to individuate the contents of beliefs. The article concludes rehabilitating the empiricist idea according to which perceptual experience can be used to justify beliefs. 
Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina
Materia
Coherentism
Davidson
Experience
Belief
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/69277
Acceder
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spelling Two Dogmas of CoherentismKalpokas, Daniel EnriqueCoherentismDavidsonExperienceBeliefhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6This paper discusses two dogmas attributed to Davidson's coherentism. The first dogma says that experience is only a causal link between experience and beliefs. The second one says that only beliefs justify other beliefs. Against these two stataments it is argued that the conception of expeirence as a mere causal link between the world and our beliefs makes the world unknowable. Moreover, the article presents some additional reasons against that conception: it misses the phenomenological and perspectival character of perception, and its independence of belief. Finally, Davidsonian externalism is considered. It is shown here that Davidson's conception of experience makes it impossible to individuate the contents of beliefs. The article concludes rehabilitating the empiricist idea according to which perceptual experience can be used to justify beliefs. Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; ArgentinaBrill Academic Publishers2012-05info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/69277Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Two Dogmas of Coherentism; Brill Academic Publishers; Grazer Philosophische Studien; 85; 1; 5-2012; 213-2360165-9227CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://brill.com/abstract/journals/gps/85/1/article-p213_10.xmlinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1163/9789401208338_010info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-22T11:59:38Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/69277instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-22 11:59:38.41CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Two Dogmas of Coherentism
title Two Dogmas of Coherentism
spellingShingle Two Dogmas of Coherentism
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
Coherentism
Davidson
Experience
Belief
title_short Two Dogmas of Coherentism
title_full Two Dogmas of Coherentism
title_fullStr Two Dogmas of Coherentism
title_full_unstemmed Two Dogmas of Coherentism
title_sort Two Dogmas of Coherentism
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
author Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
author_facet Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Coherentism
Davidson
Experience
Belief
topic Coherentism
Davidson
Experience
Belief
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv This paper discusses two dogmas attributed to Davidson's coherentism. The first dogma says that experience is only a causal link between experience and beliefs. The second one says that only beliefs justify other beliefs. Against these two stataments it is argued that the conception of expeirence as a mere causal link between the world and our beliefs makes the world unknowable. Moreover, the article presents some additional reasons against that conception: it misses the phenomenological and perspectival character of perception, and its independence of belief. Finally, Davidsonian externalism is considered. It is shown here that Davidson's conception of experience makes it impossible to individuate the contents of beliefs. The article concludes rehabilitating the empiricist idea according to which perceptual experience can be used to justify beliefs. 
Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina
description This paper discusses two dogmas attributed to Davidson's coherentism. The first dogma says that experience is only a causal link between experience and beliefs. The second one says that only beliefs justify other beliefs. Against these two stataments it is argued that the conception of expeirence as a mere causal link between the world and our beliefs makes the world unknowable. Moreover, the article presents some additional reasons against that conception: it misses the phenomenological and perspectival character of perception, and its independence of belief. Finally, Davidsonian externalism is considered. It is shown here that Davidson's conception of experience makes it impossible to individuate the contents of beliefs. The article concludes rehabilitating the empiricist idea according to which perceptual experience can be used to justify beliefs. 
publishDate 2012
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2012-05
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/69277
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Two Dogmas of Coherentism; Brill Academic Publishers; Grazer Philosophische Studien; 85; 1; 5-2012; 213-236
0165-9227
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/69277
identifier_str_mv Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Two Dogmas of Coherentism; Brill Academic Publishers; Grazer Philosophische Studien; 85; 1; 5-2012; 213-236
0165-9227
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://brill.com/abstract/journals/gps/85/1/article-p213_10.xml
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1163/9789401208338_010
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Brill Academic Publishers
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Brill Academic Publishers
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
_version_ 1846782317505282048
score 12.982451

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