Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as

Autores
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
Año de publicación
2015
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main thesis of the article: seeing-as cannot be explained by the conception of experience defended by Rorty, Davidson and Brandom.
Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades. Centro de Investigaciones Maria Saleme Burnichón; Argentina
Materia
WITTGENSTEIN
SEEING ASPECTS
DAVIDSON
PERCEPTION
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/57547
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Perceptual Experience and Seeing-asKalpokas, Daniel EnriqueWITTGENSTEINSEEING ASPECTSDAVIDSONPERCEPTIONhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main thesis of the article: seeing-as cannot be explained by the conception of experience defended by Rorty, Davidson and Brandom.Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades. Centro de Investigaciones Maria Saleme Burnichón; ArgentinaNordic Wittgenstein Society2015-07info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/57547Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as; Nordic Wittgenstein Society; Nordic Wittgenstein Review; 4; 1; 7-2015; 123-1442242-248XCONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3296info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.15845/nwr.v4i1.3296info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-22T11:23:47Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/57547instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-22 11:23:47.378CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as
title Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as
spellingShingle Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
WITTGENSTEIN
SEEING ASPECTS
DAVIDSON
PERCEPTION
title_short Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as
title_full Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as
title_fullStr Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as
title_full_unstemmed Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as
title_sort Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
author Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
author_facet Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv WITTGENSTEIN
SEEING ASPECTS
DAVIDSON
PERCEPTION
topic WITTGENSTEIN
SEEING ASPECTS
DAVIDSON
PERCEPTION
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main thesis of the article: seeing-as cannot be explained by the conception of experience defended by Rorty, Davidson and Brandom.
Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades. Centro de Investigaciones Maria Saleme Burnichón; Argentina
description According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main thesis of the article: seeing-as cannot be explained by the conception of experience defended by Rorty, Davidson and Brandom.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015-07
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/57547
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as; Nordic Wittgenstein Society; Nordic Wittgenstein Review; 4; 1; 7-2015; 123-144
2242-248X
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/57547
identifier_str_mv Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as; Nordic Wittgenstein Society; Nordic Wittgenstein Review; 4; 1; 7-2015; 123-144
2242-248X
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3296
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.15845/nwr.v4i1.3296
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nordic Wittgenstein Society
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nordic Wittgenstein Society
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.229304

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