Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as
- Autores
- Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
- Año de publicación
- 2015
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main thesis of the article: seeing-as cannot be explained by the conception of experience defended by Rorty, Davidson and Brandom.
Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades. Centro de Investigaciones Maria Saleme Burnichón; Argentina - Materia
-
WITTGENSTEIN
SEEING ASPECTS
DAVIDSON
PERCEPTION - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/57547
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Perceptual Experience and Seeing-asKalpokas, Daniel EnriqueWITTGENSTEINSEEING ASPECTSDAVIDSONPERCEPTIONhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main thesis of the article: seeing-as cannot be explained by the conception of experience defended by Rorty, Davidson and Brandom.Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades. Centro de Investigaciones Maria Saleme Burnichón; ArgentinaNordic Wittgenstein Society2015-07info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/57547Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as; Nordic Wittgenstein Society; Nordic Wittgenstein Review; 4; 1; 7-2015; 123-1442242-248XCONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3296info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.15845/nwr.v4i1.3296info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:54:30Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/57547instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:54:30.375CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as |
title |
Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as |
spellingShingle |
Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique WITTGENSTEIN SEEING ASPECTS DAVIDSON PERCEPTION |
title_short |
Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as |
title_full |
Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as |
title_fullStr |
Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as |
title_full_unstemmed |
Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as |
title_sort |
Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique |
author |
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique |
author_facet |
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
WITTGENSTEIN SEEING ASPECTS DAVIDSON PERCEPTION |
topic |
WITTGENSTEIN SEEING ASPECTS DAVIDSON PERCEPTION |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main thesis of the article: seeing-as cannot be explained by the conception of experience defended by Rorty, Davidson and Brandom. Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades. Centro de Investigaciones Maria Saleme Burnichón; Argentina |
description |
According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main thesis of the article: seeing-as cannot be explained by the conception of experience defended by Rorty, Davidson and Brandom. |
publishDate |
2015 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2015-07 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/57547 Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as; Nordic Wittgenstein Society; Nordic Wittgenstein Review; 4; 1; 7-2015; 123-144 2242-248X CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/57547 |
identifier_str_mv |
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as; Nordic Wittgenstein Society; Nordic Wittgenstein Review; 4; 1; 7-2015; 123-144 2242-248X CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3296 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.15845/nwr.v4i1.3296 |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
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openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
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application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Nordic Wittgenstein Society |
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Nordic Wittgenstein Society |
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reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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13.070432 |