Bribe-proof rules in the division problem

Autores
Jordi, Massó Carreras; Neme, Alejandro José
Año de publicación
2007
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their preferences and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtains a weakly preferred share and all agents in the misrepresenting subgroup obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and weakly replacement monotonic rules. This class is larger than the set of sequential allotment rules identified in Barberà et al. [Barberà, S., Jackson, M., Neme, A., 1997. Strategy-proof allotment rules. Games Econ. Behav. 18, 1–21]
Fil: Jordi, Massó Carreras. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; España
Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Materia
BRIBE-PROOFNESS
STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
PARETO EFFICIENCY
REPLACEMENT MONOTONICITY
SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/119338
Acceder
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oai_identifier_str oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/119338
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Bribe-proof rules in the division problemJordi, Massó CarrerasNeme, Alejandro JoséBRIBE-PROOFNESSSTRATEGY-PROOFNESSPARETO EFFICIENCYREPLACEMENT MONOTONICITYSINGLE-PEAKEDNESShttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their preferences and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtains a weakly preferred share and all agents in the misrepresenting subgroup obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and weakly replacement monotonic rules. This class is larger than the set of sequential allotment rules identified in Barberà et al. [Barberà, S., Jackson, M., Neme, A., 1997. Strategy-proof allotment rules. Games Econ. Behav. 18, 1–21]Fil: Jordi, Massó Carreras. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; EspañaFil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; ArgentinaElsevier2007-11info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/119338Jordi, Massó Carreras; Neme, Alejandro José; Bribe-proof rules in the division problem; Elsevier; Games and Economic Behavior; 61; 2; 11-2007; 331-3430899-8256CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.006info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0899825607000139?via%3Dihubinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:21:56Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/119338instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:21:56.697CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
title Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
spellingShingle Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
Jordi, Massó Carreras
BRIBE-PROOFNESS
STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
PARETO EFFICIENCY
REPLACEMENT MONOTONICITY
SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS
title_short Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
title_full Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
title_fullStr Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
title_full_unstemmed Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
title_sort Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Jordi, Massó Carreras
Neme, Alejandro José
author Jordi, Massó Carreras
author_facet Jordi, Massó Carreras
Neme, Alejandro José
author_role author
author2 Neme, Alejandro José
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv BRIBE-PROOFNESS
STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
PARETO EFFICIENCY
REPLACEMENT MONOTONICITY
SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS
topic BRIBE-PROOFNESS
STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
PARETO EFFICIENCY
REPLACEMENT MONOTONICITY
SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their preferences and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtains a weakly preferred share and all agents in the misrepresenting subgroup obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and weakly replacement monotonic rules. This class is larger than the set of sequential allotment rules identified in Barberà et al. [Barberà, S., Jackson, M., Neme, A., 1997. Strategy-proof allotment rules. Games Econ. Behav. 18, 1–21]
Fil: Jordi, Massó Carreras. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; España
Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
description The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their preferences and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtains a weakly preferred share and all agents in the misrepresenting subgroup obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and weakly replacement monotonic rules. This class is larger than the set of sequential allotment rules identified in Barberà et al. [Barberà, S., Jackson, M., Neme, A., 1997. Strategy-proof allotment rules. Games Econ. Behav. 18, 1–21]
publishDate 2007
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2007-11
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/119338
Jordi, Massó Carreras; Neme, Alejandro José; Bribe-proof rules in the division problem; Elsevier; Games and Economic Behavior; 61; 2; 11-2007; 331-343
0899-8256
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/119338
identifier_str_mv Jordi, Massó Carreras; Neme, Alejandro José; Bribe-proof rules in the division problem; Elsevier; Games and Economic Behavior; 61; 2; 11-2007; 331-343
0899-8256
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.006
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0899825607000139?via%3Dihub
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.070432

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