Reallocation in mixed ownership economies with single-peaked preferences
- Autores
- Bonifacio, Agustín Germán
- Año de publicación
- 2011
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- documento de conferencia
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- In the context of a mixed ownership economy consisting of agents with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments together with an outside obligation with the rest of the world, we study rules to reallocate the resources available to the agents involved. We show that the adaptation to our model of the uniform reallocation rule fulfills nice properties (obligation monotonicity, efficiency, consistency and replacement monotonicity) and that it is immune to strategic behavior in a very general way: it is a bribe-proof rule. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their characteristics (either preferences or endowments, or both at the same time) and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a weakly preferred share and all agents in the misrepresenting subgroup obtain a strictly preferred share. Bribe-proofness includes as special cases known and widely studied non-manipulation properties such as strategy-proofness, withholding-proofness and borrowing-proofness.
Fil: Bonifacio, Agustín Germán. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
III Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
BahÍa Blanca
Argentina
Universidad Nacional del Sur
Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial - Materia
-
MIXED-OWNERSHIP ECONOMIES
UNIFORM REALLOCATION RULES
BRIBE-PROOFNESS - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/266658
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
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Reallocation in mixed ownership economies with single-peaked preferencesBonifacio, Agustín GermánMIXED-OWNERSHIP ECONOMIESUNIFORM REALLOCATION RULESBRIBE-PROOFNESShttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1In the context of a mixed ownership economy consisting of agents with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments together with an outside obligation with the rest of the world, we study rules to reallocate the resources available to the agents involved. We show that the adaptation to our model of the uniform reallocation rule fulfills nice properties (obligation monotonicity, efficiency, consistency and replacement monotonicity) and that it is immune to strategic behavior in a very general way: it is a bribe-proof rule. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their characteristics (either preferences or endowments, or both at the same time) and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a weakly preferred share and all agents in the misrepresenting subgroup obtain a strictly preferred share. Bribe-proofness includes as special cases known and widely studied non-manipulation properties such as strategy-proofness, withholding-proofness and borrowing-proofness.Fil: Bonifacio, Agustín Germán. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; ArgentinaIII Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e IndustrialBahÍa BlancaArgentinaUniversidad Nacional del SurAsociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e IndustrialAsociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial2011info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjectCongresoJournalhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferenciaapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/266658Reallocation in mixed ownership economies with single-peaked preferences; III Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial; BahÍa Blanca; Argentina; 2011; 81-832314-3282CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://asamaci.org.ar/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/MACI-Vol-3-2011.pdfNacionalinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:47:49Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/266658instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:47:49.402CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Reallocation in mixed ownership economies with single-peaked preferences |
title |
Reallocation in mixed ownership economies with single-peaked preferences |
spellingShingle |
Reallocation in mixed ownership economies with single-peaked preferences Bonifacio, Agustín Germán MIXED-OWNERSHIP ECONOMIES UNIFORM REALLOCATION RULES BRIBE-PROOFNESS |
title_short |
Reallocation in mixed ownership economies with single-peaked preferences |
title_full |
Reallocation in mixed ownership economies with single-peaked preferences |
title_fullStr |
Reallocation in mixed ownership economies with single-peaked preferences |
title_full_unstemmed |
Reallocation in mixed ownership economies with single-peaked preferences |
title_sort |
Reallocation in mixed ownership economies with single-peaked preferences |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Bonifacio, Agustín Germán |
author |
Bonifacio, Agustín Germán |
author_facet |
Bonifacio, Agustín Germán |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
MIXED-OWNERSHIP ECONOMIES UNIFORM REALLOCATION RULES BRIBE-PROOFNESS |
topic |
MIXED-OWNERSHIP ECONOMIES UNIFORM REALLOCATION RULES BRIBE-PROOFNESS |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
In the context of a mixed ownership economy consisting of agents with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments together with an outside obligation with the rest of the world, we study rules to reallocate the resources available to the agents involved. We show that the adaptation to our model of the uniform reallocation rule fulfills nice properties (obligation monotonicity, efficiency, consistency and replacement monotonicity) and that it is immune to strategic behavior in a very general way: it is a bribe-proof rule. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their characteristics (either preferences or endowments, or both at the same time) and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a weakly preferred share and all agents in the misrepresenting subgroup obtain a strictly preferred share. Bribe-proofness includes as special cases known and widely studied non-manipulation properties such as strategy-proofness, withholding-proofness and borrowing-proofness. Fil: Bonifacio, Agustín Germán. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina III Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial BahÍa Blanca Argentina Universidad Nacional del Sur Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial |
description |
In the context of a mixed ownership economy consisting of agents with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments together with an outside obligation with the rest of the world, we study rules to reallocate the resources available to the agents involved. We show that the adaptation to our model of the uniform reallocation rule fulfills nice properties (obligation monotonicity, efficiency, consistency and replacement monotonicity) and that it is immune to strategic behavior in a very general way: it is a bribe-proof rule. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their characteristics (either preferences or endowments, or both at the same time) and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a weakly preferred share and all agents in the misrepresenting subgroup obtain a strictly preferred share. Bribe-proofness includes as special cases known and widely studied non-manipulation properties such as strategy-proofness, withholding-proofness and borrowing-proofness. |
publishDate |
2011 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2011 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject Congreso Journal http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794 info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferencia |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
format |
conferenceObject |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/266658 Reallocation in mixed ownership economies with single-peaked preferences; III Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial; BahÍa Blanca; Argentina; 2011; 81-83 2314-3282 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/266658 |
identifier_str_mv |
Reallocation in mixed ownership economies with single-peaked preferences; III Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial; BahÍa Blanca; Argentina; 2011; 81-83 2314-3282 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://asamaci.org.ar/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/MACI-Vol-3-2011.pdf |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
Nacional |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial |
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reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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13.070432 |