Obviously strategy-proofness and generalized median voter schemes

Autores
Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo; Masso, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro José
Año de publicación
2019
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
documento de conferencia
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
The set of all strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences over a finite and linearly ordered set of alternatives coincides with the class of all generalized median voter schemes. Our objective in this paper is to characterize the subclass of generalized median voter schemes that, in addition of being strategy-proof, are also obviously strategy-proof. Our proof is constructive: for each obviously strategy-proof generalized median voter scheme we define an extensive game form that implements it in obviously dominant strategies.
Fil: Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo. Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Departamento de Matemáticas; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Fil: Masso, Jordi. Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona. Departamento de Economía y Historia Económica; España
Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Departamento de Matemáticas; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
VII Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
Argentina
Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
Materia
OBVIOUSLY STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
MAJORITY VOTING
MEDIAN VOTERS
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/258694
Acceder
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oai_identifier_str oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/258694
network_acronym_str CONICETDig
repository_id_str 3498
network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Obviously strategy-proofness and generalized median voter schemesArribillaga, Roberto PabloMasso, JordiNeme, Alejandro JoséOBVIOUSLY STRATEGY-PROOFNESSMAJORITY VOTINGMEDIAN VOTERShttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1The set of all strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences over a finite and linearly ordered set of alternatives coincides with the class of all generalized median voter schemes. Our objective in this paper is to characterize the subclass of generalized median voter schemes that, in addition of being strategy-proof, are also obviously strategy-proof. Our proof is constructive: for each obviously strategy-proof generalized median voter scheme we define an extensive game form that implements it in obviously dominant strategies.Fil: Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo. Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Departamento de Matemáticas; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; ArgentinaFil: Masso, Jordi. Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona. Departamento de Economía y Historia Económica; EspañaFil: Neme, Alejandro José. Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Departamento de Matemáticas; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; ArgentinaVII Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e IndustrialArgentinaAsociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e IndustrialAsociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial2019info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjectCongresoJournalhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferenciaapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/258694Obviously strategy-proofness and generalized median voter schemes; VII Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial; Argentina; 2019; 93-962314-3282CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://asamaci.org.ar/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/MACI-Vol-7-2019.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://asamaci.org.ar/revista-maci/Internacionalinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-22T11:04:47Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/258694instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-22 11:04:47.499CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Obviously strategy-proofness and generalized median voter schemes
title Obviously strategy-proofness and generalized median voter schemes
spellingShingle Obviously strategy-proofness and generalized median voter schemes
Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
OBVIOUSLY STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
MAJORITY VOTING
MEDIAN VOTERS
title_short Obviously strategy-proofness and generalized median voter schemes
title_full Obviously strategy-proofness and generalized median voter schemes
title_fullStr Obviously strategy-proofness and generalized median voter schemes
title_full_unstemmed Obviously strategy-proofness and generalized median voter schemes
title_sort Obviously strategy-proofness and generalized median voter schemes
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
Masso, Jordi
Neme, Alejandro José
author Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
author_facet Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
Masso, Jordi
Neme, Alejandro José
author_role author
author2 Masso, Jordi
Neme, Alejandro José
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv OBVIOUSLY STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
MAJORITY VOTING
MEDIAN VOTERS
topic OBVIOUSLY STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
MAJORITY VOTING
MEDIAN VOTERS
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv The set of all strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences over a finite and linearly ordered set of alternatives coincides with the class of all generalized median voter schemes. Our objective in this paper is to characterize the subclass of generalized median voter schemes that, in addition of being strategy-proof, are also obviously strategy-proof. Our proof is constructive: for each obviously strategy-proof generalized median voter scheme we define an extensive game form that implements it in obviously dominant strategies.
Fil: Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo. Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Departamento de Matemáticas; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Fil: Masso, Jordi. Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona. Departamento de Economía y Historia Económica; España
Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Departamento de Matemáticas; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
VII Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
Argentina
Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
description The set of all strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences over a finite and linearly ordered set of alternatives coincides with the class of all generalized median voter schemes. Our objective in this paper is to characterize the subclass of generalized median voter schemes that, in addition of being strategy-proof, are also obviously strategy-proof. Our proof is constructive: for each obviously strategy-proof generalized median voter scheme we define an extensive game form that implements it in obviously dominant strategies.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
Congreso
Journal
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794
info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferencia
status_str publishedVersion
format conferenceObject
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/258694
Obviously strategy-proofness and generalized median voter schemes; VII Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial; Argentina; 2019; 93-96
2314-3282
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/258694
identifier_str_mv Obviously strategy-proofness and generalized median voter schemes; VII Congreso de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial; Argentina; 2019; 93-96
2314-3282
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://asamaci.org.ar/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/MACI-Vol-7-2019.pdf
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://asamaci.org.ar/revista-maci/
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv Internacional
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Asociación Argentina de Matemática Aplicada, Computacional e Industrial
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 12.982451

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