Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica

Autores
Zambrano, María del Pilar
Año de publicación
2013
Idioma
italiano
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
This work intends to participate in the debate over the relevance of law in its participants' practical reasoning. The analysis is focused on fundamental rights principles, from the perspective of some of the tenets or preconcepts used by the so called "New Natural Law School". On this conceptual basis, we argue that fundamental rights principles are not mere transcriptions, receptions or "conclusions" from moral principles of justice, but always include what Aquinas called "determination". This thesis is based upon the distinction between the moral and the legal perspectives of analysis of human action. This distinction leads to the conclusion that fundamental rights principles possess a double margin of reference to moral principles of justice on the one hand, and positive principles and rules, on the other.
Fil: Zambrano, María del Pilar. Universidad de Navarra; España. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Materia
Acción
Semántica
Autoridad
Interpretación
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/27262

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spelling Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza praticaPrinciples, reasons and rights: law as a practical differenceZambrano, María del PilarAcciónSemánticaAutoridadInterpretaciónhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5This work intends to participate in the debate over the relevance of law in its participants' practical reasoning. The analysis is focused on fundamental rights principles, from the perspective of some of the tenets or preconcepts used by the so called "New Natural Law School". On this conceptual basis, we argue that fundamental rights principles are not mere transcriptions, receptions or "conclusions" from moral principles of justice, but always include what Aquinas called "determination". This thesis is based upon the distinction between the moral and the legal perspectives of analysis of human action. This distinction leads to the conclusion that fundamental rights principles possess a double margin of reference to moral principles of justice on the one hand, and positive principles and rules, on the other.Fil: Zambrano, María del Pilar. Universidad de Navarra; España. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaIl Mulino2013-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/27262Zambrano, María del Pilar; Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica; Il Mulino; Rivista di filosofia del diritto; 2; 1; 6-2013; 169-1902280-482XCONICET DigitalCONICETitainfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.4477/73546info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-17T11:54:18Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/27262instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-17 11:54:18.277CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica
Principles, reasons and rights: law as a practical difference
title Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica
spellingShingle Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica
Zambrano, María del Pilar
Acción
Semántica
Autoridad
Interpretación
title_short Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica
title_full Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica
title_fullStr Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica
title_full_unstemmed Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica
title_sort Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Zambrano, María del Pilar
author Zambrano, María del Pilar
author_facet Zambrano, María del Pilar
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Acción
Semántica
Autoridad
Interpretación
topic Acción
Semántica
Autoridad
Interpretación
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv This work intends to participate in the debate over the relevance of law in its participants' practical reasoning. The analysis is focused on fundamental rights principles, from the perspective of some of the tenets or preconcepts used by the so called "New Natural Law School". On this conceptual basis, we argue that fundamental rights principles are not mere transcriptions, receptions or "conclusions" from moral principles of justice, but always include what Aquinas called "determination". This thesis is based upon the distinction between the moral and the legal perspectives of analysis of human action. This distinction leads to the conclusion that fundamental rights principles possess a double margin of reference to moral principles of justice on the one hand, and positive principles and rules, on the other.
Fil: Zambrano, María del Pilar. Universidad de Navarra; España. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
description This work intends to participate in the debate over the relevance of law in its participants' practical reasoning. The analysis is focused on fundamental rights principles, from the perspective of some of the tenets or preconcepts used by the so called "New Natural Law School". On this conceptual basis, we argue that fundamental rights principles are not mere transcriptions, receptions or "conclusions" from moral principles of justice, but always include what Aquinas called "determination". This thesis is based upon the distinction between the moral and the legal perspectives of analysis of human action. This distinction leads to the conclusion that fundamental rights principles possess a double margin of reference to moral principles of justice on the one hand, and positive principles and rules, on the other.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-06
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/27262
Zambrano, María del Pilar; Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica; Il Mulino; Rivista di filosofia del diritto; 2; 1; 6-2013; 169-190
2280-482X
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/27262
identifier_str_mv Zambrano, María del Pilar; Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica; Il Mulino; Rivista di filosofia del diritto; 2; 1; 6-2013; 169-190
2280-482X
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv ita
language ita
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.4477/73546
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Il Mulino
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Il Mulino
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.000565