Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica
- Autores
- Zambrano, María del Pilar
- Año de publicación
- 2013
- Idioma
- italiano
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- This work intends to participate in the debate over the relevance of law in its participants' practical reasoning. The analysis is focused on fundamental rights principles, from the perspective of some of the tenets or preconcepts used by the so called "New Natural Law School". On this conceptual basis, we argue that fundamental rights principles are not mere transcriptions, receptions or "conclusions" from moral principles of justice, but always include what Aquinas called "determination". This thesis is based upon the distinction between the moral and the legal perspectives of analysis of human action. This distinction leads to the conclusion that fundamental rights principles possess a double margin of reference to moral principles of justice on the one hand, and positive principles and rules, on the other.
Fil: Zambrano, María del Pilar. Universidad de Navarra; España. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina - Materia
-
Acción
Semántica
Autoridad
Interpretación - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/27262
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
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Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza praticaPrinciples, reasons and rights: law as a practical differenceZambrano, María del PilarAcciónSemánticaAutoridadInterpretaciónhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5This work intends to participate in the debate over the relevance of law in its participants' practical reasoning. The analysis is focused on fundamental rights principles, from the perspective of some of the tenets or preconcepts used by the so called "New Natural Law School". On this conceptual basis, we argue that fundamental rights principles are not mere transcriptions, receptions or "conclusions" from moral principles of justice, but always include what Aquinas called "determination". This thesis is based upon the distinction between the moral and the legal perspectives of analysis of human action. This distinction leads to the conclusion that fundamental rights principles possess a double margin of reference to moral principles of justice on the one hand, and positive principles and rules, on the other.Fil: Zambrano, María del Pilar. Universidad de Navarra; España. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaIl Mulino2013-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/27262Zambrano, María del Pilar; Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica; Il Mulino; Rivista di filosofia del diritto; 2; 1; 6-2013; 169-1902280-482XCONICET DigitalCONICETitainfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.4477/73546info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-17T11:54:18Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/27262instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-17 11:54:18.277CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica Principles, reasons and rights: law as a practical difference |
title |
Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica |
spellingShingle |
Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica Zambrano, María del Pilar Acción Semántica Autoridad Interpretación |
title_short |
Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica |
title_full |
Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica |
title_fullStr |
Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica |
title_full_unstemmed |
Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica |
title_sort |
Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Zambrano, María del Pilar |
author |
Zambrano, María del Pilar |
author_facet |
Zambrano, María del Pilar |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Acción Semántica Autoridad Interpretación |
topic |
Acción Semántica Autoridad Interpretación |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
This work intends to participate in the debate over the relevance of law in its participants' practical reasoning. The analysis is focused on fundamental rights principles, from the perspective of some of the tenets or preconcepts used by the so called "New Natural Law School". On this conceptual basis, we argue that fundamental rights principles are not mere transcriptions, receptions or "conclusions" from moral principles of justice, but always include what Aquinas called "determination". This thesis is based upon the distinction between the moral and the legal perspectives of analysis of human action. This distinction leads to the conclusion that fundamental rights principles possess a double margin of reference to moral principles of justice on the one hand, and positive principles and rules, on the other. Fil: Zambrano, María del Pilar. Universidad de Navarra; España. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina |
description |
This work intends to participate in the debate over the relevance of law in its participants' practical reasoning. The analysis is focused on fundamental rights principles, from the perspective of some of the tenets or preconcepts used by the so called "New Natural Law School". On this conceptual basis, we argue that fundamental rights principles are not mere transcriptions, receptions or "conclusions" from moral principles of justice, but always include what Aquinas called "determination". This thesis is based upon the distinction between the moral and the legal perspectives of analysis of human action. This distinction leads to the conclusion that fundamental rights principles possess a double margin of reference to moral principles of justice on the one hand, and positive principles and rules, on the other. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-06 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/27262 Zambrano, María del Pilar; Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica; Il Mulino; Rivista di filosofia del diritto; 2; 1; 6-2013; 169-190 2280-482X CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/27262 |
identifier_str_mv |
Zambrano, María del Pilar; Princìpi, ragioni e diritti: il diritto come differenza pratica; Il Mulino; Rivista di filosofia del diritto; 2; 1; 6-2013; 169-190 2280-482X CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
ita |
language |
ita |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.4477/73546 |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Il Mulino |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Il Mulino |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
reponame_str |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
collection |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
instname_str |
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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1843606887364296704 |
score |
13.000565 |