Legal reasons: Between universalism and particularism

Autores
Redondo, Maria Cristina
Año de publicación
2005
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
The first part of this work analyses the universalist and the particularist conceptions of reasons. The second part projects this analysis to the legal domain. The author stresses that universalism and particularism regarding reasons are mutually exclusive theories linked to incompatible conceptions of norms, i.e. norms as strict universal conditionals and norms as defeasible conditionals. In giving an account of this tenet, different meanings of universality and defeasibility are explored. A parallel debate regarding reasons can be found in the legal domain, where two contrasting categories of norms are usually distinguished: rules and principles. On this issue the author argues that the conception of legal reasons depends on the way in which this contrast between different kinds of legal norms is shaped.
Fil: Redondo, Maria Cristina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales; Argentina
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/115467
Acceder
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spelling Legal reasons: Between universalism and particularismRedondo, Maria Cristinahttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5The first part of this work analyses the universalist and the particularist conceptions of reasons. The second part projects this analysis to the legal domain. The author stresses that universalism and particularism regarding reasons are mutually exclusive theories linked to incompatible conceptions of norms, i.e. norms as strict universal conditionals and norms as defeasible conditionals. In giving an account of this tenet, different meanings of universality and defeasibility are explored. A parallel debate regarding reasons can be found in the legal domain, where two contrasting categories of norms are usually distinguished: rules and principles. On this issue the author argues that the conception of legal reasons depends on the way in which this contrast between different kinds of legal norms is shaped.Fil: Redondo, Maria Cristina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales; ArgentinaSAGE Publications2005-12info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/115467Redondo, Maria Cristina; Legal reasons: Between universalism and particularism; SAGE Publications; Journal of Moral Philosophy; 2; 1; 12-2005; 47-681740-46811745-5243CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1177/1740468105052583info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://brill.com/view/journals/jmp/2/1/article-p47_5.xmlinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:20:41Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/115467instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:20:41.598CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Legal reasons: Between universalism and particularism
title Legal reasons: Between universalism and particularism
spellingShingle Legal reasons: Between universalism and particularism
Redondo, Maria Cristina
title_short Legal reasons: Between universalism and particularism
title_full Legal reasons: Between universalism and particularism
title_fullStr Legal reasons: Between universalism and particularism
title_full_unstemmed Legal reasons: Between universalism and particularism
title_sort Legal reasons: Between universalism and particularism
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Redondo, Maria Cristina
author Redondo, Maria Cristina
author_facet Redondo, Maria Cristina
author_role author
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv The first part of this work analyses the universalist and the particularist conceptions of reasons. The second part projects this analysis to the legal domain. The author stresses that universalism and particularism regarding reasons are mutually exclusive theories linked to incompatible conceptions of norms, i.e. norms as strict universal conditionals and norms as defeasible conditionals. In giving an account of this tenet, different meanings of universality and defeasibility are explored. A parallel debate regarding reasons can be found in the legal domain, where two contrasting categories of norms are usually distinguished: rules and principles. On this issue the author argues that the conception of legal reasons depends on the way in which this contrast between different kinds of legal norms is shaped.
Fil: Redondo, Maria Cristina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales; Argentina
description The first part of this work analyses the universalist and the particularist conceptions of reasons. The second part projects this analysis to the legal domain. The author stresses that universalism and particularism regarding reasons are mutually exclusive theories linked to incompatible conceptions of norms, i.e. norms as strict universal conditionals and norms as defeasible conditionals. In giving an account of this tenet, different meanings of universality and defeasibility are explored. A parallel debate regarding reasons can be found in the legal domain, where two contrasting categories of norms are usually distinguished: rules and principles. On this issue the author argues that the conception of legal reasons depends on the way in which this contrast between different kinds of legal norms is shaped.
publishDate 2005
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2005-12
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/115467
Redondo, Maria Cristina; Legal reasons: Between universalism and particularism; SAGE Publications; Journal of Moral Philosophy; 2; 1; 12-2005; 47-68
1740-4681
1745-5243
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/115467
identifier_str_mv Redondo, Maria Cristina; Legal reasons: Between universalism and particularism; SAGE Publications; Journal of Moral Philosophy; 2; 1; 12-2005; 47-68
1740-4681
1745-5243
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1177/1740468105052583
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://brill.com/view/journals/jmp/2/1/article-p47_5.xml
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv SAGE Publications
publisher.none.fl_str_mv SAGE Publications
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.070432

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