The division problem with maximal capacity constraints

Autores
Bergantiños, Gustavo; Jordi, Massó Carreras; Neme, Alejandro José
Año de publicación
2012
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. Most of the literature has implicitly assumed that all divisions are feasible. In this paper we consider the division problem when each agent has a maximal capacity due to an objective and verifiable feasibility constraint which imposes an upper bound on his share. Then each agent has a feasible interval of shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent a feasible share. We focus mainly on strategy-proof, efficient and consistent rules and provide alternative characterizations of the extension of the uniform rule that deals explicitly with agents' maximal capacity constraints.
Fil: Bergantiños, Gustavo. Universidad de Vigo; España
Fil: Jordi, Massó Carreras. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; España
Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Materia
CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS
DIVISION PROBLEM
SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES
UNIFORM RULE
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/184759
Acceder
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network_acronym_str CONICETDig
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling The division problem with maximal capacity constraintsBergantiños, GustavoJordi, Massó CarrerasNeme, Alejandro JoséCAPACITY CONSTRAINTSDIVISION PROBLEMSINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCESUNIFORM RULEhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. Most of the literature has implicitly assumed that all divisions are feasible. In this paper we consider the division problem when each agent has a maximal capacity due to an objective and verifiable feasibility constraint which imposes an upper bound on his share. Then each agent has a feasible interval of shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent a feasible share. We focus mainly on strategy-proof, efficient and consistent rules and provide alternative characterizations of the extension of the uniform rule that deals explicitly with agents' maximal capacity constraints.Fil: Bergantiños, Gustavo. Universidad de Vigo; EspañaFil: Jordi, Massó Carreras. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; EspañaFil: Neme, Alejandro José. Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; ArgentinaSpringer2012-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/184759Bergantiños, Gustavo; Jordi, Massó Carreras; Neme, Alejandro José; The division problem with maximal capacity constraints; Springer; Series; 3; 1-2; 6-2012; 29-571869-4187CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s13209-011-0055-6info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13209-011-0055-6info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-22T11:09:08Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/184759instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-22 11:09:09.279CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The division problem with maximal capacity constraints
title The division problem with maximal capacity constraints
spellingShingle The division problem with maximal capacity constraints
Bergantiños, Gustavo
CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS
DIVISION PROBLEM
SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES
UNIFORM RULE
title_short The division problem with maximal capacity constraints
title_full The division problem with maximal capacity constraints
title_fullStr The division problem with maximal capacity constraints
title_full_unstemmed The division problem with maximal capacity constraints
title_sort The division problem with maximal capacity constraints
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Bergantiños, Gustavo
Jordi, Massó Carreras
Neme, Alejandro José
author Bergantiños, Gustavo
author_facet Bergantiños, Gustavo
Jordi, Massó Carreras
Neme, Alejandro José
author_role author
author2 Jordi, Massó Carreras
Neme, Alejandro José
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS
DIVISION PROBLEM
SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES
UNIFORM RULE
topic CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS
DIVISION PROBLEM
SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES
UNIFORM RULE
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. Most of the literature has implicitly assumed that all divisions are feasible. In this paper we consider the division problem when each agent has a maximal capacity due to an objective and verifiable feasibility constraint which imposes an upper bound on his share. Then each agent has a feasible interval of shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent a feasible share. We focus mainly on strategy-proof, efficient and consistent rules and provide alternative characterizations of the extension of the uniform rule that deals explicitly with agents' maximal capacity constraints.
Fil: Bergantiños, Gustavo. Universidad de Vigo; España
Fil: Jordi, Massó Carreras. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; España
Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
description The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. Most of the literature has implicitly assumed that all divisions are feasible. In this paper we consider the division problem when each agent has a maximal capacity due to an objective and verifiable feasibility constraint which imposes an upper bound on his share. Then each agent has a feasible interval of shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent a feasible share. We focus mainly on strategy-proof, efficient and consistent rules and provide alternative characterizations of the extension of the uniform rule that deals explicitly with agents' maximal capacity constraints.
publishDate 2012
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2012-06
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/184759
Bergantiños, Gustavo; Jordi, Massó Carreras; Neme, Alejandro José; The division problem with maximal capacity constraints; Springer; Series; 3; 1-2; 6-2012; 29-57
1869-4187
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/184759
identifier_str_mv Bergantiños, Gustavo; Jordi, Massó Carreras; Neme, Alejandro José; The division problem with maximal capacity constraints; Springer; Series; 3; 1-2; 6-2012; 29-57
1869-4187
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s13209-011-0055-6
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13209-011-0055-6
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 12.982451

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