Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem

Autores
Neme, Alejandro José; Jordi, Massó Carreras
Año de publicación
2001
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, then the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. We identify the maximal set of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and strong symmetry. In addition, we show that our characterization implies a slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawa's (1998) result. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D78, D63.
Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Fil: Jordi, Massó Carreras. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; España
Materia
MAXIMAL DOMAIN
PREFERENCE
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/118411
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Maximal domain of preferences in the division problemNeme, Alejandro JoséJordi, Massó CarrerasMAXIMAL DOMAINPREFERENCEhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, then the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. We identify the maximal set of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and strong symmetry. In addition, we show that our characterization implies a slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawa's (1998) result. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D78, D63.Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; ArgentinaFil: Jordi, Massó Carreras. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; EspañaElsevier2001-12info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/118411Neme, Alejandro José; Jordi, Massó Carreras; Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem; Elsevier; Games and Economic Behavior; 37; 2; 12-2001; 367-3870899-8256CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0899825601908504info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1006/game.2001.0850info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-15T14:52:42Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/118411instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-15 14:52:42.769CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
title Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
spellingShingle Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
Neme, Alejandro José
MAXIMAL DOMAIN
PREFERENCE
title_short Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
title_full Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
title_fullStr Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
title_full_unstemmed Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
title_sort Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Neme, Alejandro José
Jordi, Massó Carreras
author Neme, Alejandro José
author_facet Neme, Alejandro José
Jordi, Massó Carreras
author_role author
author2 Jordi, Massó Carreras
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv MAXIMAL DOMAIN
PREFERENCE
topic MAXIMAL DOMAIN
PREFERENCE
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, then the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. We identify the maximal set of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and strong symmetry. In addition, we show that our characterization implies a slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawa's (1998) result. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D78, D63.
Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Fil: Jordi, Massó Carreras. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; España
description The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, then the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. We identify the maximal set of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and strong symmetry. In addition, we show that our characterization implies a slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawa's (1998) result. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D78, D63.
publishDate 2001
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2001-12
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/118411
Neme, Alejandro José; Jordi, Massó Carreras; Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem; Elsevier; Games and Economic Behavior; 37; 2; 12-2001; 367-387
0899-8256
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/118411
identifier_str_mv Neme, Alejandro José; Jordi, Massó Carreras; Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem; Elsevier; Games and Economic Behavior; 37; 2; 12-2001; 367-387
0899-8256
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0899825601908504
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1006/game.2001.0850
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.22299

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