The Division Problem under Constraints

Autores
Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro José
Año de publicación
2015
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We characterize axiomatically the family of extended uniform rules proposed to solve the division problem under constraints. Rules in this family extend the uniform rule used to solve the classical division problem without constraints. We show that the family of all extended uniform rules coincides with the set of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, bound monotonicity, consistency, and independence of irrelevant coalitions.
Fil: Bergantiños, Gustavo. Universidad de Vigo; España
Fil: Massó, Jordi. Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona; España
Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Argentina
Materia
Division Problem Single-Peaked Preferences
Single-Peaked Preferences
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/14809
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling The Division Problem under ConstraintsBergantiños, GustavoMassó, JordiNeme, Alejandro JoséDivision Problem Single-Peaked PreferencesSingle-Peaked Preferenceshttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We characterize axiomatically the family of extended uniform rules proposed to solve the division problem under constraints. Rules in this family extend the uniform rule used to solve the classical division problem without constraints. We show that the family of all extended uniform rules coincides with the set of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, bound monotonicity, consistency, and independence of irrelevant coalitions.Fil: Bergantiños, Gustavo. Universidad de Vigo; EspañaFil: Massó, Jordi. Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona; EspañaFil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Luis; ArgentinaElsevier2015-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/14809Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro José; The Division Problem under Constraints; Elsevier; Games and Economic Behavior; 89; 1-2015; 56-770899-8256enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825614001687info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.002info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:29:22Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/14809instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:29:22.893CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Division Problem under Constraints
title The Division Problem under Constraints
spellingShingle The Division Problem under Constraints
Bergantiños, Gustavo
Division Problem Single-Peaked Preferences
Single-Peaked Preferences
title_short The Division Problem under Constraints
title_full The Division Problem under Constraints
title_fullStr The Division Problem under Constraints
title_full_unstemmed The Division Problem under Constraints
title_sort The Division Problem under Constraints
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Bergantiños, Gustavo
Massó, Jordi
Neme, Alejandro José
author Bergantiños, Gustavo
author_facet Bergantiños, Gustavo
Massó, Jordi
Neme, Alejandro José
author_role author
author2 Massó, Jordi
Neme, Alejandro José
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Division Problem Single-Peaked Preferences
Single-Peaked Preferences
topic Division Problem Single-Peaked Preferences
Single-Peaked Preferences
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We characterize axiomatically the family of extended uniform rules proposed to solve the division problem under constraints. Rules in this family extend the uniform rule used to solve the classical division problem without constraints. We show that the family of all extended uniform rules coincides with the set of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, bound monotonicity, consistency, and independence of irrelevant coalitions.
Fil: Bergantiños, Gustavo. Universidad de Vigo; España
Fil: Massó, Jordi. Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona; España
Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Argentina
description The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We characterize axiomatically the family of extended uniform rules proposed to solve the division problem under constraints. Rules in this family extend the uniform rule used to solve the classical division problem without constraints. We show that the family of all extended uniform rules coincides with the set of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, bound monotonicity, consistency, and independence of irrelevant coalitions.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/14809
Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro José; The Division Problem under Constraints; Elsevier; Games and Economic Behavior; 89; 1-2015; 56-77
0899-8256
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/14809
identifier_str_mv Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro José; The Division Problem under Constraints; Elsevier; Games and Economic Behavior; 89; 1-2015; 56-77
0899-8256
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825614001687
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.002
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.070432

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