Dual intuitionistic paraconsistency without ontological commitments

Autores
Roetti, Jorge Alfredo; Rahman, Shahid
Año de publicación
1999
Idioma
español castellano
Tipo de recurso
documento de conferencia
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
The issue of this paper is to offer two (dialogical) ways of defending a non­ committal interpretation of paraconsistency: we will call one the permis sive interpretation and the other the non-ontological commitment interpretation. Stating contradictions and negations is from a permissive point of view of paraconsistency a purely formal matter: lf you do so, so can l. The non-ontological commitment approach results from two rules. One restricts the use and introduction of singular terms to its formal use. The other establishes how to combine the permissive interpretation with this restriction in a second order free logic.
Fil: Roetti, Jorge Alfredo. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Humanidades; Argentina.
Fil: Rahman, Shahid. Universität des Saarlandes; Germany.
Materia
Lógica filosófica
Lógica
Inconsistencia
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Repositorio
Repositorio Institucional Digital de la Universidad Nacional del Sur (RID-UNS)
Institución
Universidad Nacional del Sur
OAI Identificador
oai:repositorio.bc.uns.edu.ar:123456789/6455
Acceder
id RID-UNS_f8cf201e6a3b5b48eb6f8fb6cd5c1099
oai_identifier_str oai:repositorio.bc.uns.edu.ar:123456789/6455
network_acronym_str RID-UNS
repository_id_str
network_name_str Repositorio Institucional Digital de la Universidad Nacional del Sur (RID-UNS)
spelling Dual intuitionistic paraconsistency without ontological commitmentsRoetti, Jorge AlfredoRahman, ShahidLógica filosóficaLógicaInconsistenciaThe issue of this paper is to offer two (dialogical) ways of defending a non­ committal interpretation of paraconsistency: we will call one the permis sive interpretation and the other the non-ontological commitment interpretation. Stating contradictions and negations is from a permissive point of view of paraconsistency a purely formal matter: lf you do so, so can l. The non-ontological commitment approach results from two rules. One restricts the use and introduction of singular terms to its formal use. The other establishes how to combine the permissive interpretation with this restriction in a second order free logic.Fil: Roetti, Jorge Alfredo. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Humanidades; Argentina.Fil: Rahman, Shahid. Universität des Saarlandes; Germany.Universidade de Santiago de Compostela1999info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjectinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferenciaapplication/pdfhttps://repositoriodigital.uns.edu.ar/handle/123456789/6455spainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/reponame:Repositorio Institucional Digital de la Universidad Nacional del Sur (RID-UNS)instname:Universidad Nacional del Sur2025-09-29T13:41:53Zoai:repositorio.bc.uns.edu.ar:123456789/6455instacron:UNSInstitucionalhttp://repositoriodigital.uns.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://repositoriodigital.uns.edu.ar/oaimesnaola@uns.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:2025-09-29 13:41:53.253Repositorio Institucional Digital de la Universidad Nacional del Sur (RID-UNS) - Universidad Nacional del Surfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Dual intuitionistic paraconsistency without ontological commitments
title Dual intuitionistic paraconsistency without ontological commitments
spellingShingle Dual intuitionistic paraconsistency without ontological commitments
Roetti, Jorge Alfredo
Lógica filosófica
Lógica
Inconsistencia
title_short Dual intuitionistic paraconsistency without ontological commitments
title_full Dual intuitionistic paraconsistency without ontological commitments
title_fullStr Dual intuitionistic paraconsistency without ontological commitments
title_full_unstemmed Dual intuitionistic paraconsistency without ontological commitments
title_sort Dual intuitionistic paraconsistency without ontological commitments
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Roetti, Jorge Alfredo
Rahman, Shahid
author Roetti, Jorge Alfredo
author_facet Roetti, Jorge Alfredo
Rahman, Shahid
author_role author
author2 Rahman, Shahid
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Lógica filosófica
Lógica
Inconsistencia
topic Lógica filosófica
Lógica
Inconsistencia
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv The issue of this paper is to offer two (dialogical) ways of defending a non­ committal interpretation of paraconsistency: we will call one the permis sive interpretation and the other the non-ontological commitment interpretation. Stating contradictions and negations is from a permissive point of view of paraconsistency a purely formal matter: lf you do so, so can l. The non-ontological commitment approach results from two rules. One restricts the use and introduction of singular terms to its formal use. The other establishes how to combine the permissive interpretation with this restriction in a second order free logic.
Fil: Roetti, Jorge Alfredo. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Humanidades; Argentina.
Fil: Rahman, Shahid. Universität des Saarlandes; Germany.
description The issue of this paper is to offer two (dialogical) ways of defending a non­ committal interpretation of paraconsistency: we will call one the permis sive interpretation and the other the non-ontological commitment interpretation. Stating contradictions and negations is from a permissive point of view of paraconsistency a purely formal matter: lf you do so, so can l. The non-ontological commitment approach results from two rules. One restricts the use and introduction of singular terms to its formal use. The other establishes how to combine the permissive interpretation with this restriction in a second order free logic.
publishDate 1999
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 1999
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794
info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferencia
format conferenceObject
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://repositoriodigital.uns.edu.ar/handle/123456789/6455
url https://repositoriodigital.uns.edu.ar/handle/123456789/6455
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Institucional Digital de la Universidad Nacional del Sur (RID-UNS)
instname:Universidad Nacional del Sur
reponame_str Repositorio Institucional Digital de la Universidad Nacional del Sur (RID-UNS)
collection Repositorio Institucional Digital de la Universidad Nacional del Sur (RID-UNS)
instname_str Universidad Nacional del Sur
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio Institucional Digital de la Universidad Nacional del Sur (RID-UNS) - Universidad Nacional del Sur
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mesnaola@uns.edu.ar
_version_ 1844619074320990208
score 12.559606

Publicaciones similares