Legal normativity as a moral property

Autores
Redondo, Maria Cristina
Año de publicación
2019
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
This paper comments on Brian Bix’s article "Kelsen, Hart, and Legal Normativity". It provides some remarks regarding the concept of normativity and subscribes to the idea that it should not be reduced to an empirical nor a moral property. The discussion is primarily focused on the current, post-Hartian thesis that reduces legal normativity to moral normativity. In this regard, on the one hand, it advances a criticism of Bix’s analysis, which at first glance rejects both forms of reductionism but, at the end of the day accepts a post-Hartian approach that treats normativity as a moral property. On the other hand, it highlights that this moralist concept of normativity is primarily based on the assumption that normative terms have a unified meaning in moral and legal contexts and that, according to that meaning, normativity is a moral property. The proposal is that within a positivist approach, it is necessary to discuss these assumptions in order to give an adequate account of legal normativity as an essential property of every legal system.
Fil: Redondo, Maria Cristina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales; Argentina
Materia
LEGAL NORMATIVITY
LEGAL POSITIVISM
MORAL NORMATIVITY
MORALITY’S IMPERIALISM
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/182787
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Legal normativity as a moral propertyRedondo, Maria CristinaLEGAL NORMATIVITYLEGAL POSITIVISMMORAL NORMATIVITYMORALITY’S IMPERIALISMhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5This paper comments on Brian Bix’s article "Kelsen, Hart, and Legal Normativity". It provides some remarks regarding the concept of normativity and subscribes to the idea that it should not be reduced to an empirical nor a moral property. The discussion is primarily focused on the current, post-Hartian thesis that reduces legal normativity to moral normativity. In this regard, on the one hand, it advances a criticism of Bix’s analysis, which at first glance rejects both forms of reductionism but, at the end of the day accepts a post-Hartian approach that treats normativity as a moral property. On the other hand, it highlights that this moralist concept of normativity is primarily based on the assumption that normative terms have a unified meaning in moral and legal contexts and that, according to that meaning, normativity is a moral property. The proposal is that within a positivist approach, it is necessary to discuss these assumptions in order to give an adequate account of legal normativity as an essential property of every legal system.Fil: Redondo, Maria Cristina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales; ArgentinaKlub Revus2019-03info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/182787Redondo, Maria Cristina; Legal normativity as a moral property; Klub Revus; Revus; 37; 3-2019; 57-681855-7112CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.4000/revus.4825info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://journals.openedition.org/revus/4825info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T10:08:28Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/182787instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 10:08:28.565CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Legal normativity as a moral property
title Legal normativity as a moral property
spellingShingle Legal normativity as a moral property
Redondo, Maria Cristina
LEGAL NORMATIVITY
LEGAL POSITIVISM
MORAL NORMATIVITY
MORALITY’S IMPERIALISM
title_short Legal normativity as a moral property
title_full Legal normativity as a moral property
title_fullStr Legal normativity as a moral property
title_full_unstemmed Legal normativity as a moral property
title_sort Legal normativity as a moral property
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Redondo, Maria Cristina
author Redondo, Maria Cristina
author_facet Redondo, Maria Cristina
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv LEGAL NORMATIVITY
LEGAL POSITIVISM
MORAL NORMATIVITY
MORALITY’S IMPERIALISM
topic LEGAL NORMATIVITY
LEGAL POSITIVISM
MORAL NORMATIVITY
MORALITY’S IMPERIALISM
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv This paper comments on Brian Bix’s article "Kelsen, Hart, and Legal Normativity". It provides some remarks regarding the concept of normativity and subscribes to the idea that it should not be reduced to an empirical nor a moral property. The discussion is primarily focused on the current, post-Hartian thesis that reduces legal normativity to moral normativity. In this regard, on the one hand, it advances a criticism of Bix’s analysis, which at first glance rejects both forms of reductionism but, at the end of the day accepts a post-Hartian approach that treats normativity as a moral property. On the other hand, it highlights that this moralist concept of normativity is primarily based on the assumption that normative terms have a unified meaning in moral and legal contexts and that, according to that meaning, normativity is a moral property. The proposal is that within a positivist approach, it is necessary to discuss these assumptions in order to give an adequate account of legal normativity as an essential property of every legal system.
Fil: Redondo, Maria Cristina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales; Argentina
description This paper comments on Brian Bix’s article "Kelsen, Hart, and Legal Normativity". It provides some remarks regarding the concept of normativity and subscribes to the idea that it should not be reduced to an empirical nor a moral property. The discussion is primarily focused on the current, post-Hartian thesis that reduces legal normativity to moral normativity. In this regard, on the one hand, it advances a criticism of Bix’s analysis, which at first glance rejects both forms of reductionism but, at the end of the day accepts a post-Hartian approach that treats normativity as a moral property. On the other hand, it highlights that this moralist concept of normativity is primarily based on the assumption that normative terms have a unified meaning in moral and legal contexts and that, according to that meaning, normativity is a moral property. The proposal is that within a positivist approach, it is necessary to discuss these assumptions in order to give an adequate account of legal normativity as an essential property of every legal system.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019-03
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/182787
Redondo, Maria Cristina; Legal normativity as a moral property; Klub Revus; Revus; 37; 3-2019; 57-68
1855-7112
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/182787
identifier_str_mv Redondo, Maria Cristina; Legal normativity as a moral property; Klub Revus; Revus; 37; 3-2019; 57-68
1855-7112
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.4000/revus.4825
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://journals.openedition.org/revus/4825
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Klub Revus
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Klub Revus
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
_version_ 1842270046061068288
score 13.13397

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