Animal normativity

Autores
Danon, Laura
Año de publicación
2019
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Many philosophers think that human animals are the only normative creatures. In this paper, I will not provide reasons against such a claim, but I will engage in a related task: delineating and comparing two defationary accounts of what non-human animal normativity could consist in. One of them is based on Hannah Ginsborg's notion of primitive normativity and the other on my conjecture that some creatures may have frst-order robust “ought-thoughts”, composed by secondary representations about how things should be or about how one should act. Once I have sketched both models, I will focus on identifying some cognitive differences between creatures merely having primitive normativity and those also having robust ought-thoughts. Finally, I will draw a few tentative remarks on the kind of empirical evidence that would suggest that an animal has one or another of these two kinds of normativity.
Fil: Danon, Laura. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina
Materia
ANIMAL MINDS
OUGHT-THOUGHTS
PRIMITIVE NORMATIVITY
SECONDARY REPRESENTATIONS
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/119676
Acceder
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spelling Animal normativityDanon, LauraANIMAL MINDSOUGHT-THOUGHTSPRIMITIVE NORMATIVITYSECONDARY REPRESENTATIONShttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6Many philosophers think that human animals are the only normative creatures. In this paper, I will not provide reasons against such a claim, but I will engage in a related task: delineating and comparing two defationary accounts of what non-human animal normativity could consist in. One of them is based on Hannah Ginsborg's notion of primitive normativity and the other on my conjecture that some creatures may have frst-order robust “ought-thoughts”, composed by secondary representations about how things should be or about how one should act. Once I have sketched both models, I will focus on identifying some cognitive differences between creatures merely having primitive normativity and those also having robust ought-thoughts. Finally, I will draw a few tentative remarks on the kind of empirical evidence that would suggest that an animal has one or another of these two kinds of normativity.Fil: Danon, Laura. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; ArgentinaFirenze University Press2019-12info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/119676Danon, Laura; Animal normativity; Firenze University Press; Phenomenology and Mind; 17; 12-2019; 176-1872239-40282280-7853CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/8035info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.13128/pam-8035info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-10T13:18:13Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/119676instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-10 13:18:13.94CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Animal normativity
title Animal normativity
spellingShingle Animal normativity
Danon, Laura
ANIMAL MINDS
OUGHT-THOUGHTS
PRIMITIVE NORMATIVITY
SECONDARY REPRESENTATIONS
title_short Animal normativity
title_full Animal normativity
title_fullStr Animal normativity
title_full_unstemmed Animal normativity
title_sort Animal normativity
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Danon, Laura
author Danon, Laura
author_facet Danon, Laura
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv ANIMAL MINDS
OUGHT-THOUGHTS
PRIMITIVE NORMATIVITY
SECONDARY REPRESENTATIONS
topic ANIMAL MINDS
OUGHT-THOUGHTS
PRIMITIVE NORMATIVITY
SECONDARY REPRESENTATIONS
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Many philosophers think that human animals are the only normative creatures. In this paper, I will not provide reasons against such a claim, but I will engage in a related task: delineating and comparing two defationary accounts of what non-human animal normativity could consist in. One of them is based on Hannah Ginsborg's notion of primitive normativity and the other on my conjecture that some creatures may have frst-order robust “ought-thoughts”, composed by secondary representations about how things should be or about how one should act. Once I have sketched both models, I will focus on identifying some cognitive differences between creatures merely having primitive normativity and those also having robust ought-thoughts. Finally, I will draw a few tentative remarks on the kind of empirical evidence that would suggest that an animal has one or another of these two kinds of normativity.
Fil: Danon, Laura. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina
description Many philosophers think that human animals are the only normative creatures. In this paper, I will not provide reasons against such a claim, but I will engage in a related task: delineating and comparing two defationary accounts of what non-human animal normativity could consist in. One of them is based on Hannah Ginsborg's notion of primitive normativity and the other on my conjecture that some creatures may have frst-order robust “ought-thoughts”, composed by secondary representations about how things should be or about how one should act. Once I have sketched both models, I will focus on identifying some cognitive differences between creatures merely having primitive normativity and those also having robust ought-thoughts. Finally, I will draw a few tentative remarks on the kind of empirical evidence that would suggest that an animal has one or another of these two kinds of normativity.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019-12
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/119676
Danon, Laura; Animal normativity; Firenze University Press; Phenomenology and Mind; 17; 12-2019; 176-187
2239-4028
2280-7853
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/119676
identifier_str_mv Danon, Laura; Animal normativity; Firenze University Press; Phenomenology and Mind; 17; 12-2019; 176-187
2239-4028
2280-7853
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/8035
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.13128/pam-8035
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Firenze University Press
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Firenze University Press
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
_version_ 1842980997010817024
score 12.993085

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