Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support

Autores
Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac; Mamone, Miguel Ignacio
Año de publicación
2015
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Using original data from the period 1999–2011 on federal infrastructure investment for all subnational units in two federations, Argentina and Brazil, and a unitary nation, Colombia, this study shows that in developing federal countries with strong governors, presidents use nonearmarked transfers as a tool to compensate governors for sizable and secure territorial political support. The study argues that in these cases, resources do not make electoral power but chase it. In the unitary case, conversely, governors do not influence distributive politics. Variation also was found in the relevance of Congress, legislative overrepresentation, and programmatic criteria across cases. The article discusses possible reasons for these results and their implications for the comparative debate on distributive politics.
Fil: Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Martín. Escuela de Política y Gobierno; Argentina. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires". Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Políticas y de la Comunicación. Instituto de Ciencias Políticas; Argentina
Fil: Mamone, Miguel Ignacio. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires". Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Políticas y de la Comunicación. Instituto de Ciencias Políticas; Argentina. University of Pittsburgh; Estados Unidos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Materia
Distributive Politics
Governors
Public Infrastructure
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/112693
Acceder
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spelling Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial SupportGonzalez, Lucas IsaacMamone, Miguel IgnacioDistributive PoliticsGovernorsPublic InfrastructureArgentina, Brazil, Colombiahttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.6https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5Using original data from the period 1999–2011 on federal infrastructure investment for all subnational units in two federations, Argentina and Brazil, and a unitary nation, Colombia, this study shows that in developing federal countries with strong governors, presidents use nonearmarked transfers as a tool to compensate governors for sizable and secure territorial political support. The study argues that in these cases, resources do not make electoral power but chase it. In the unitary case, conversely, governors do not influence distributive politics. Variation also was found in the relevance of Congress, legislative overrepresentation, and programmatic criteria across cases. The article discusses possible reasons for these results and their implications for the comparative debate on distributive politics.Fil: Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Martín. Escuela de Política y Gobierno; Argentina. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires". Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Políticas y de la Comunicación. Instituto de Ciencias Políticas; ArgentinaFil: Mamone, Miguel Ignacio. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires". Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Políticas y de la Comunicación. Instituto de Ciencias Políticas; Argentina. University of Pittsburgh; Estados Unidos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaUniversity of Miami2015-08info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/112693Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac; Mamone, Miguel Ignacio; Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support; University of Miami; Latin American Politics and Society; 57; 3; 8-2015; 50-761531-426X1548-2456CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2015.00279.x/abstractinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2015.00279.xinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/latin-american-politics-and-society/article/distributive-politics-in-developing-federal-democracies-compensating-governors-for-their-territorial-support/580BD16C9D9EC90734705029C9E4CECEinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-15T15:08:29Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/112693instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-15 15:08:29.888CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support
title Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support
spellingShingle Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support
Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac
Distributive Politics
Governors
Public Infrastructure
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia
title_short Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support
title_full Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support
title_fullStr Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support
title_full_unstemmed Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support
title_sort Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac
Mamone, Miguel Ignacio
author Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac
author_facet Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac
Mamone, Miguel Ignacio
author_role author
author2 Mamone, Miguel Ignacio
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Distributive Politics
Governors
Public Infrastructure
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia
topic Distributive Politics
Governors
Public Infrastructure
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.6
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Using original data from the period 1999–2011 on federal infrastructure investment for all subnational units in two federations, Argentina and Brazil, and a unitary nation, Colombia, this study shows that in developing federal countries with strong governors, presidents use nonearmarked transfers as a tool to compensate governors for sizable and secure territorial political support. The study argues that in these cases, resources do not make electoral power but chase it. In the unitary case, conversely, governors do not influence distributive politics. Variation also was found in the relevance of Congress, legislative overrepresentation, and programmatic criteria across cases. The article discusses possible reasons for these results and their implications for the comparative debate on distributive politics.
Fil: Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Martín. Escuela de Política y Gobierno; Argentina. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires". Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Políticas y de la Comunicación. Instituto de Ciencias Políticas; Argentina
Fil: Mamone, Miguel Ignacio. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires". Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Políticas y de la Comunicación. Instituto de Ciencias Políticas; Argentina. University of Pittsburgh; Estados Unidos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
description Using original data from the period 1999–2011 on federal infrastructure investment for all subnational units in two federations, Argentina and Brazil, and a unitary nation, Colombia, this study shows that in developing federal countries with strong governors, presidents use nonearmarked transfers as a tool to compensate governors for sizable and secure territorial political support. The study argues that in these cases, resources do not make electoral power but chase it. In the unitary case, conversely, governors do not influence distributive politics. Variation also was found in the relevance of Congress, legislative overrepresentation, and programmatic criteria across cases. The article discusses possible reasons for these results and their implications for the comparative debate on distributive politics.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015-08
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/112693
Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac; Mamone, Miguel Ignacio; Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support; University of Miami; Latin American Politics and Society; 57; 3; 8-2015; 50-76
1531-426X
1548-2456
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/112693
identifier_str_mv Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac; Mamone, Miguel Ignacio; Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support; University of Miami; Latin American Politics and Society; 57; 3; 8-2015; 50-76
1531-426X
1548-2456
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2015.00279.x/abstract
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2015.00279.x
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/latin-american-politics-and-society/article/distributive-politics-in-developing-federal-democracies-compensating-governors-for-their-territorial-support/580BD16C9D9EC90734705029C9E4CECE
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv University of Miami
publisher.none.fl_str_mv University of Miami
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.22299

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