Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support
- Autores
- Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac; Mamone, Miguel Ignacio
- Año de publicación
- 2015
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- Using original data from the period 1999–2011 on federal infrastructure investment for all subnational units in two federations, Argentina and Brazil, and a unitary nation, Colombia, this study shows that in developing federal countries with strong governors, presidents use nonearmarked transfers as a tool to compensate governors for sizable and secure territorial political support. The study argues that in these cases, resources do not make electoral power but chase it. In the unitary case, conversely, governors do not influence distributive politics. Variation also was found in the relevance of Congress, legislative overrepresentation, and programmatic criteria across cases. The article discusses possible reasons for these results and their implications for the comparative debate on distributive politics.
Fil: Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Martín. Escuela de Política y Gobierno; Argentina. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires". Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Políticas y de la Comunicación. Instituto de Ciencias Políticas; Argentina
Fil: Mamone, Miguel Ignacio. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires". Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Políticas y de la Comunicación. Instituto de Ciencias Políticas; Argentina. University of Pittsburgh; Estados Unidos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina - Materia
-
Distributive Politics
Governors
Public Infrastructure
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/112693
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
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Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial SupportGonzalez, Lucas IsaacMamone, Miguel IgnacioDistributive PoliticsGovernorsPublic InfrastructureArgentina, Brazil, Colombiahttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.6https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5Using original data from the period 1999–2011 on federal infrastructure investment for all subnational units in two federations, Argentina and Brazil, and a unitary nation, Colombia, this study shows that in developing federal countries with strong governors, presidents use nonearmarked transfers as a tool to compensate governors for sizable and secure territorial political support. The study argues that in these cases, resources do not make electoral power but chase it. In the unitary case, conversely, governors do not influence distributive politics. Variation also was found in the relevance of Congress, legislative overrepresentation, and programmatic criteria across cases. The article discusses possible reasons for these results and their implications for the comparative debate on distributive politics.Fil: Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Martín. Escuela de Política y Gobierno; Argentina. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires". Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Políticas y de la Comunicación. Instituto de Ciencias Políticas; ArgentinaFil: Mamone, Miguel Ignacio. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires". Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Políticas y de la Comunicación. Instituto de Ciencias Políticas; Argentina. University of Pittsburgh; Estados Unidos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaUniversity of Miami2015-08info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/112693Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac; Mamone, Miguel Ignacio; Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support; University of Miami; Latin American Politics and Society; 57; 3; 8-2015; 50-761531-426X1548-2456CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2015.00279.x/abstractinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2015.00279.xinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/latin-american-politics-and-society/article/distributive-politics-in-developing-federal-democracies-compensating-governors-for-their-territorial-support/580BD16C9D9EC90734705029C9E4CECEinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:11:21Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/112693instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:11:21.568CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support |
title |
Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support |
spellingShingle |
Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac Distributive Politics Governors Public Infrastructure Argentina, Brazil, Colombia |
title_short |
Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support |
title_full |
Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support |
title_fullStr |
Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support |
title_full_unstemmed |
Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support |
title_sort |
Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac Mamone, Miguel Ignacio |
author |
Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac |
author_facet |
Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac Mamone, Miguel Ignacio |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Mamone, Miguel Ignacio |
author2_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Distributive Politics Governors Public Infrastructure Argentina, Brazil, Colombia |
topic |
Distributive Politics Governors Public Infrastructure Argentina, Brazil, Colombia |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.6 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
Using original data from the period 1999–2011 on federal infrastructure investment for all subnational units in two federations, Argentina and Brazil, and a unitary nation, Colombia, this study shows that in developing federal countries with strong governors, presidents use nonearmarked transfers as a tool to compensate governors for sizable and secure territorial political support. The study argues that in these cases, resources do not make electoral power but chase it. In the unitary case, conversely, governors do not influence distributive politics. Variation also was found in the relevance of Congress, legislative overrepresentation, and programmatic criteria across cases. The article discusses possible reasons for these results and their implications for the comparative debate on distributive politics. Fil: Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Martín. Escuela de Política y Gobierno; Argentina. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires". Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Políticas y de la Comunicación. Instituto de Ciencias Políticas; Argentina Fil: Mamone, Miguel Ignacio. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires". Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Políticas y de la Comunicación. Instituto de Ciencias Políticas; Argentina. University of Pittsburgh; Estados Unidos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina |
description |
Using original data from the period 1999–2011 on federal infrastructure investment for all subnational units in two federations, Argentina and Brazil, and a unitary nation, Colombia, this study shows that in developing federal countries with strong governors, presidents use nonearmarked transfers as a tool to compensate governors for sizable and secure territorial political support. The study argues that in these cases, resources do not make electoral power but chase it. In the unitary case, conversely, governors do not influence distributive politics. Variation also was found in the relevance of Congress, legislative overrepresentation, and programmatic criteria across cases. The article discusses possible reasons for these results and their implications for the comparative debate on distributive politics. |
publishDate |
2015 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2015-08 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/112693 Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac; Mamone, Miguel Ignacio; Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support; University of Miami; Latin American Politics and Society; 57; 3; 8-2015; 50-76 1531-426X 1548-2456 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/112693 |
identifier_str_mv |
Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac; Mamone, Miguel Ignacio; Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support; University of Miami; Latin American Politics and Society; 57; 3; 8-2015; 50-76 1531-426X 1548-2456 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2015.00279.x/abstract info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2015.00279.x info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/latin-american-politics-and-society/article/distributive-politics-in-developing-federal-democracies-compensating-governors-for-their-territorial-support/580BD16C9D9EC90734705029C9E4CECE |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
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openAccess |
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https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
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application/pdf application/pdf |
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University of Miami |
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University of Miami |
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