Political alignments and distributive politics at the municipal level in federal countries

Autores
Moscovich, Lorena; Brusco, Valeria
Año de publicación
2018
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Fil: Moscovich, Lorena. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina.
Fil: Brusco, Valeria. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales; Argentina.
Governors and mayors contribute with necessary political inputs to federal politics, and the president may have no incentive or choice to exclude any of them from their alliances. When presidents have money to distribute with discretion, they do not allocate it uniformly; there are differences in funds allocated between and within provinces, as well as different municipalities within them. The objective of this paper is to explain these differences and particularly how this distribution works in countries where municipalities are not autonomous and the president cannot bypass governors. Transfer distribution patterns at two municipal levels will be explored in order to show that partisan alignments between mayors and presidents (along with other political variables, such as mayors being up for reelection) can be analyzed to explain differences in funding levels.
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Fil: Moscovich, Lorena. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina.
Fil: Brusco, Valeria. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales; Argentina.
Otras Ciencia Política
Materia
Distributive Politics
Federalism
Elections
Presidencialism
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
Repositorio
Repositorio Digital Universitario (UNC)
Institución
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
OAI Identificador
oai:rdu.unc.edu.ar:11086/551076
Acceder
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oai_identifier_str oai:rdu.unc.edu.ar:11086/551076
network_acronym_str RDUUNC
repository_id_str 2572
network_name_str Repositorio Digital Universitario (UNC)
spelling Political alignments and distributive politics at the municipal level in federal countriesMoscovich, LorenaBrusco, ValeriaDistributive PoliticsFederalismElectionsPresidencialismFil: Moscovich, Lorena. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina.Fil: Brusco, Valeria. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales; Argentina.Governors and mayors contribute with necessary political inputs to federal politics, and the president may have no incentive or choice to exclude any of them from their alliances. When presidents have money to distribute with discretion, they do not allocate it uniformly; there are differences in funds allocated between and within provinces, as well as different municipalities within them. The objective of this paper is to explain these differences and particularly how this distribution works in countries where municipalities are not autonomous and the president cannot bypass governors. Transfer distribution patterns at two municipal levels will be explored in order to show that partisan alignments between mayors and presidents (along with other political variables, such as mayors being up for reelection) can be analyzed to explain differences in funding levels.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionFil: Moscovich, Lorena. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina.Fil: Brusco, Valeria. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales; Argentina.Otras Ciencia PolíticaUniversidade de Brasília. Instituto de Ciência Política2018info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdf0103-3352http://hdl.handle.net/11086/5510762178-4884https://www.scielo.br/j/rbcpol/i/2018.n26/enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositorio Digital Universitario (UNC)instname:Universidad Nacional de Córdobainstacron:UNC2025-10-16T09:29:01Zoai:rdu.unc.edu.ar:11086/551076Institucionalhttps://rdu.unc.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://rdu.unc.edu.ar/oai/snrdoca.unc@gmail.comArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:25722025-10-16 09:29:01.37Repositorio Digital Universitario (UNC) - Universidad Nacional de Córdobafalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Political alignments and distributive politics at the municipal level in federal countries
title Political alignments and distributive politics at the municipal level in federal countries
spellingShingle Political alignments and distributive politics at the municipal level in federal countries
Moscovich, Lorena
Distributive Politics
Federalism
Elections
Presidencialism
title_short Political alignments and distributive politics at the municipal level in federal countries
title_full Political alignments and distributive politics at the municipal level in federal countries
title_fullStr Political alignments and distributive politics at the municipal level in federal countries
title_full_unstemmed Political alignments and distributive politics at the municipal level in federal countries
title_sort Political alignments and distributive politics at the municipal level in federal countries
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Moscovich, Lorena
Brusco, Valeria
author Moscovich, Lorena
author_facet Moscovich, Lorena
Brusco, Valeria
author_role author
author2 Brusco, Valeria
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Distributive Politics
Federalism
Elections
Presidencialism
topic Distributive Politics
Federalism
Elections
Presidencialism
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Fil: Moscovich, Lorena. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina.
Fil: Brusco, Valeria. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales; Argentina.
Governors and mayors contribute with necessary political inputs to federal politics, and the president may have no incentive or choice to exclude any of them from their alliances. When presidents have money to distribute with discretion, they do not allocate it uniformly; there are differences in funds allocated between and within provinces, as well as different municipalities within them. The objective of this paper is to explain these differences and particularly how this distribution works in countries where municipalities are not autonomous and the president cannot bypass governors. Transfer distribution patterns at two municipal levels will be explored in order to show that partisan alignments between mayors and presidents (along with other political variables, such as mayors being up for reelection) can be analyzed to explain differences in funding levels.
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Fil: Moscovich, Lorena. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina.
Fil: Brusco, Valeria. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales; Argentina.
Otras Ciencia Política
description Fil: Moscovich, Lorena. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
status_str publishedVersion
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv 0103-3352
http://hdl.handle.net/11086/551076
2178-4884
https://www.scielo.br/j/rbcpol/i/2018.n26/
identifier_str_mv 0103-3352
2178-4884
url http://hdl.handle.net/11086/551076
https://www.scielo.br/j/rbcpol/i/2018.n26/
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de Brasília. Instituto de Ciência Política
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de Brasília. Instituto de Ciência Política
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Digital Universitario (UNC)
instname:Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
instacron:UNC
reponame_str Repositorio Digital Universitario (UNC)
collection Repositorio Digital Universitario (UNC)
instname_str Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
instacron_str UNC
institution UNC
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio Digital Universitario (UNC) - Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
repository.mail.fl_str_mv oca.unc@gmail.com
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score 12.712165

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