When Are Federations More Unequal? The Political Economy of Interregional Redistribution in Developing Federations

Autores
Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac
Año de publicación
2016
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Why do some countries redistribute more to poorer regions than others? This paper explores which factors explain variation in the degree of interregional redistribution among countries between 1983 and 2010. The main argument is that interregional redistribution increases with the need and capacity of strong presidents to build territorial coalitions with governors from poorer regions and, by implication, decreases with the ability of strong governors in rich districts to resist pressures to extract resources from their units. Using a multilevel structural equation model (the Generalized Linear Latent Multilevel Model, GLLAMM), the study analyzes these and competing claims on the determinants of interregional redistribution using original data from the subnational units of four types of cases, ranging from decentralized and federal to centralized, unitary countries. Empirical results indicate that the type of redistributive coalition between presidents and governors complement purely structural and institutional models to explain fiscal redistributive outcomes in the context of sharp regional inequality.
Fil: Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Martín. Escuela de Política y Gobierno; Argentina. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires"; Argentina
Materia
Federalism
Governors
Inequality
Interregional Redistribution
Presidents
Redistribution
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/74752
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling When Are Federations More Unequal? The Political Economy of Interregional Redistribution in Developing FederationsGonzalez, Lucas IsaacFederalismGovernorsInequalityInterregional RedistributionPresidentsRedistributionhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.7https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5Why do some countries redistribute more to poorer regions than others? This paper explores which factors explain variation in the degree of interregional redistribution among countries between 1983 and 2010. The main argument is that interregional redistribution increases with the need and capacity of strong presidents to build territorial coalitions with governors from poorer regions and, by implication, decreases with the ability of strong governors in rich districts to resist pressures to extract resources from their units. Using a multilevel structural equation model (the Generalized Linear Latent Multilevel Model, GLLAMM), the study analyzes these and competing claims on the determinants of interregional redistribution using original data from the subnational units of four types of cases, ranging from decentralized and federal to centralized, unitary countries. Empirical results indicate that the type of redistributive coalition between presidents and governors complement purely structural and institutional models to explain fiscal redistributive outcomes in the context of sharp regional inequality.Fil: Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Martín. Escuela de Política y Gobierno; Argentina. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires"; ArgentinaSpringer New York LLC2016-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/74752Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac; When Are Federations More Unequal? The Political Economy of Interregional Redistribution in Developing Federations; Springer New York LLC; Studies in Comparative International Development; 51; 2; 6-2016; 209-2340039-3606CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12116-015-9205-3info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s12116-015-9205-3info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T10:03:03Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/74752instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 10:03:03.791CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv When Are Federations More Unequal? The Political Economy of Interregional Redistribution in Developing Federations
title When Are Federations More Unequal? The Political Economy of Interregional Redistribution in Developing Federations
spellingShingle When Are Federations More Unequal? The Political Economy of Interregional Redistribution in Developing Federations
Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac
Federalism
Governors
Inequality
Interregional Redistribution
Presidents
Redistribution
title_short When Are Federations More Unequal? The Political Economy of Interregional Redistribution in Developing Federations
title_full When Are Federations More Unequal? The Political Economy of Interregional Redistribution in Developing Federations
title_fullStr When Are Federations More Unequal? The Political Economy of Interregional Redistribution in Developing Federations
title_full_unstemmed When Are Federations More Unequal? The Political Economy of Interregional Redistribution in Developing Federations
title_sort When Are Federations More Unequal? The Political Economy of Interregional Redistribution in Developing Federations
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac
author Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac
author_facet Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Federalism
Governors
Inequality
Interregional Redistribution
Presidents
Redistribution
topic Federalism
Governors
Inequality
Interregional Redistribution
Presidents
Redistribution
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.7
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Why do some countries redistribute more to poorer regions than others? This paper explores which factors explain variation in the degree of interregional redistribution among countries between 1983 and 2010. The main argument is that interregional redistribution increases with the need and capacity of strong presidents to build territorial coalitions with governors from poorer regions and, by implication, decreases with the ability of strong governors in rich districts to resist pressures to extract resources from their units. Using a multilevel structural equation model (the Generalized Linear Latent Multilevel Model, GLLAMM), the study analyzes these and competing claims on the determinants of interregional redistribution using original data from the subnational units of four types of cases, ranging from decentralized and federal to centralized, unitary countries. Empirical results indicate that the type of redistributive coalition between presidents and governors complement purely structural and institutional models to explain fiscal redistributive outcomes in the context of sharp regional inequality.
Fil: Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Martín. Escuela de Política y Gobierno; Argentina. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires"; Argentina
description Why do some countries redistribute more to poorer regions than others? This paper explores which factors explain variation in the degree of interregional redistribution among countries between 1983 and 2010. The main argument is that interregional redistribution increases with the need and capacity of strong presidents to build territorial coalitions with governors from poorer regions and, by implication, decreases with the ability of strong governors in rich districts to resist pressures to extract resources from their units. Using a multilevel structural equation model (the Generalized Linear Latent Multilevel Model, GLLAMM), the study analyzes these and competing claims on the determinants of interregional redistribution using original data from the subnational units of four types of cases, ranging from decentralized and federal to centralized, unitary countries. Empirical results indicate that the type of redistributive coalition between presidents and governors complement purely structural and institutional models to explain fiscal redistributive outcomes in the context of sharp regional inequality.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016-06
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/74752
Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac; When Are Federations More Unequal? The Political Economy of Interregional Redistribution in Developing Federations; Springer New York LLC; Studies in Comparative International Development; 51; 2; 6-2016; 209-234
0039-3606
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/74752
identifier_str_mv Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac; When Are Federations More Unequal? The Political Economy of Interregional Redistribution in Developing Federations; Springer New York LLC; Studies in Comparative International Development; 51; 2; 6-2016; 209-234
0039-3606
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12116-015-9205-3
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s12116-015-9205-3
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer New York LLC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer New York LLC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.13397

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