The brother-in-law effect

Autores
Levine, David K.; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Zurita, Felipe
Año de publicación
2010
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
When a firm is forced to pay abnormally high wages, hiring transfers rents. This effectively endows the employer with the ability to grant favors, and he may wish to do so even at some cost to efficient production. We refer to this as the brother-in-law effect. This article analyzes its consequences. When the brother-in-law effect is due to unionization, decisions regarding both the number and type of workers employed could be inefficient; overemployment could obtain even relative to the workforce that would be employed without unionization. We also identify cases in which nepotism improves efficiency.
Fil: Levine, David K.. Washington University in St. Louis; Estados Unidos. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile; Chile. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina
Fil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Washington University in St. Louis; Estados Unidos. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile; Chile. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Fil: Zurita, Felipe. Washington University in St. Louis; Estados Unidos. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile; Chile. Universidad Católica de Chile; Chile
Materia
brother-in-law
favoritism
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/188893
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling The brother-in-law effectLevine, David K.Weinschelbaum, FedericoZurita, Felipebrother-in-lawfavoritismhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5When a firm is forced to pay abnormally high wages, hiring transfers rents. This effectively endows the employer with the ability to grant favors, and he may wish to do so even at some cost to efficient production. We refer to this as the brother-in-law effect. This article analyzes its consequences. When the brother-in-law effect is due to unionization, decisions regarding both the number and type of workers employed could be inefficient; overemployment could obtain even relative to the workforce that would be employed without unionization. We also identify cases in which nepotism improves efficiency.Fil: Levine, David K.. Washington University in St. Louis; Estados Unidos. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile; Chile. Universidad de San Andrés; ArgentinaFil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Washington University in St. Louis; Estados Unidos. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile; Chile. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Zurita, Felipe. Washington University in St. Louis; Estados Unidos. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile; Chile. Universidad Católica de Chile; ChileBlackwell Publishing2010-05info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/188893Levine, David K.; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Zurita, Felipe; The brother-in-law effect; Blackwell Publishing; International Economic Review; 51; 2; 5-2010; 497-5070020-6598CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00590.x/abstractinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00590.xinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:26:51Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/188893instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:26:52.031CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The brother-in-law effect
title The brother-in-law effect
spellingShingle The brother-in-law effect
Levine, David K.
brother-in-law
favoritism
title_short The brother-in-law effect
title_full The brother-in-law effect
title_fullStr The brother-in-law effect
title_full_unstemmed The brother-in-law effect
title_sort The brother-in-law effect
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Levine, David K.
Weinschelbaum, Federico
Zurita, Felipe
author Levine, David K.
author_facet Levine, David K.
Weinschelbaum, Federico
Zurita, Felipe
author_role author
author2 Weinschelbaum, Federico
Zurita, Felipe
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv brother-in-law
favoritism
topic brother-in-law
favoritism
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv When a firm is forced to pay abnormally high wages, hiring transfers rents. This effectively endows the employer with the ability to grant favors, and he may wish to do so even at some cost to efficient production. We refer to this as the brother-in-law effect. This article analyzes its consequences. When the brother-in-law effect is due to unionization, decisions regarding both the number and type of workers employed could be inefficient; overemployment could obtain even relative to the workforce that would be employed without unionization. We also identify cases in which nepotism improves efficiency.
Fil: Levine, David K.. Washington University in St. Louis; Estados Unidos. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile; Chile. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina
Fil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Washington University in St. Louis; Estados Unidos. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile; Chile. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Fil: Zurita, Felipe. Washington University in St. Louis; Estados Unidos. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile; Chile. Universidad Católica de Chile; Chile
description When a firm is forced to pay abnormally high wages, hiring transfers rents. This effectively endows the employer with the ability to grant favors, and he may wish to do so even at some cost to efficient production. We refer to this as the brother-in-law effect. This article analyzes its consequences. When the brother-in-law effect is due to unionization, decisions regarding both the number and type of workers employed could be inefficient; overemployment could obtain even relative to the workforce that would be employed without unionization. We also identify cases in which nepotism improves efficiency.
publishDate 2010
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2010-05
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/188893
Levine, David K.; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Zurita, Felipe; The brother-in-law effect; Blackwell Publishing; International Economic Review; 51; 2; 5-2010; 497-507
0020-6598
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/188893
identifier_str_mv Levine, David K.; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Zurita, Felipe; The brother-in-law effect; Blackwell Publishing; International Economic Review; 51; 2; 5-2010; 497-507
0020-6598
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00590.x/abstract
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00590.x
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Blackwell Publishing
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Blackwell Publishing
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.070432

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