Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism

Autores
Arozamena, Leandro Roberto; Shunda, Nicholas; Weinschelbaum, Federico
Año de publicación
2014
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
In many auction settings, there is favoritism: the seller´s welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. However, laws or regulations may not allow the seller to discriminate among bidders. We find the optimal nondiscriminatory auction in a private value, single-unit model under favoritism. At the optimal auction there is a reserve price, or an entry fee, which is decreasing in the proportion of preferred bidders and in the intensity of the preference. Otherwise, the highest-valuation bidder wins. We show that, at least under some conditions, imposing a no-discrimination constraint raises expected seller revenue.
Fil: Arozamena, Leandro Roberto. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Fil: Shunda, Nicholas. University Of Redlands; Estados Unidos
Fil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina
Materia
Auctions
Favoritism
Nondiscriminatory Mechanisms
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/35578
Acceder
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repository_id_str 3498
network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritismArozamena, Leandro RobertoShunda, NicholasWeinschelbaum, FedericoAuctionsFavoritismNondiscriminatory Mechanismshttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5In many auction settings, there is favoritism: the seller´s welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. However, laws or regulations may not allow the seller to discriminate among bidders. We find the optimal nondiscriminatory auction in a private value, single-unit model under favoritism. At the optimal auction there is a reserve price, or an entry fee, which is decreasing in the proportion of preferred bidders and in the intensity of the preference. Otherwise, the highest-valuation bidder wins. We show that, at least under some conditions, imposing a no-discrimination constraint raises expected seller revenue.Fil: Arozamena, Leandro Roberto. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Shunda, Nicholas. University Of Redlands; Estados UnidosFil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; ArgentinaAccessEcon2014-05info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/35578Arozamena, Leandro Roberto; Shunda, Nicholas; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism; AccessEcon; Economics Bulletin; 34; 1; 5-2014; 252-2621545-2921CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.accessecon.com/includes/CountdownloadPDF.aspx?PaperID=EB-13-00718info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-11-05T09:52:18Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/35578instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-11-05 09:52:18.273CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism
title Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism
spellingShingle Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism
Arozamena, Leandro Roberto
Auctions
Favoritism
Nondiscriminatory Mechanisms
title_short Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism
title_full Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism
title_fullStr Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism
title_full_unstemmed Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism
title_sort Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Arozamena, Leandro Roberto
Shunda, Nicholas
Weinschelbaum, Federico
author Arozamena, Leandro Roberto
author_facet Arozamena, Leandro Roberto
Shunda, Nicholas
Weinschelbaum, Federico
author_role author
author2 Shunda, Nicholas
Weinschelbaum, Federico
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Auctions
Favoritism
Nondiscriminatory Mechanisms
topic Auctions
Favoritism
Nondiscriminatory Mechanisms
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv In many auction settings, there is favoritism: the seller´s welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. However, laws or regulations may not allow the seller to discriminate among bidders. We find the optimal nondiscriminatory auction in a private value, single-unit model under favoritism. At the optimal auction there is a reserve price, or an entry fee, which is decreasing in the proportion of preferred bidders and in the intensity of the preference. Otherwise, the highest-valuation bidder wins. We show that, at least under some conditions, imposing a no-discrimination constraint raises expected seller revenue.
Fil: Arozamena, Leandro Roberto. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Fil: Shunda, Nicholas. University Of Redlands; Estados Unidos
Fil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina
description In many auction settings, there is favoritism: the seller´s welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. However, laws or regulations may not allow the seller to discriminate among bidders. We find the optimal nondiscriminatory auction in a private value, single-unit model under favoritism. At the optimal auction there is a reserve price, or an entry fee, which is decreasing in the proportion of preferred bidders and in the intensity of the preference. Otherwise, the highest-valuation bidder wins. We show that, at least under some conditions, imposing a no-discrimination constraint raises expected seller revenue.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2014-05
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/35578
Arozamena, Leandro Roberto; Shunda, Nicholas; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism; AccessEcon; Economics Bulletin; 34; 1; 5-2014; 252-262
1545-2921
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/35578
identifier_str_mv Arozamena, Leandro Roberto; Shunda, Nicholas; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism; AccessEcon; Economics Bulletin; 34; 1; 5-2014; 252-262
1545-2921
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.accessecon.com/includes/CountdownloadPDF.aspx?PaperID=EB-13-00718
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv AccessEcon
publisher.none.fl_str_mv AccessEcon
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.087074

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