Intellectualism against empiricism

Autores
Castellano, Federico
Año de publicación
2014
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Intellectualism is the philosophical view that thinking involves the activity of reason-giving. In this paper I argue that the intellectualist point of view is incompatible with any form of empiricism. First, I show that Traditional Empiricism collapses because it brings together two conflicting theses: the intellectualist thesis according to which the normative properties of thoughts depend (rest) upon the activity of reason-giving, and the intuitive empiricist thesis according to which the normative properties of empirical thoughts derive from perceptual experience. Second, I argue that McDowell?s Minimal Empiricism collapses as well because of his attempt to make sense of an over-intellectualized and contradictory variety of empiricism: one that preserves both an intellectualist approach to thought and a conceptual but passive approach to perceptual experience.
Fil: Castellano, Federico. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina
Materia
PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE
REASONS
RULES
MCDOWELL
THE MYTH OF THE GIVEN
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/182782
Acceder
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spelling Intellectualism against empiricismCastellano, FedericoPERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCEREASONSRULESMCDOWELLTHE MYTH OF THE GIVENhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6Intellectualism is the philosophical view that thinking involves the activity of reason-giving. In this paper I argue that the intellectualist point of view is incompatible with any form of empiricism. First, I show that Traditional Empiricism collapses because it brings together two conflicting theses: the intellectualist thesis according to which the normative properties of thoughts depend (rest) upon the activity of reason-giving, and the intuitive empiricist thesis according to which the normative properties of empirical thoughts derive from perceptual experience. Second, I argue that McDowell?s Minimal Empiricism collapses as well because of his attempt to make sense of an over-intellectualized and contradictory variety of empiricism: one that preserves both an intellectualist approach to thought and a conceptual but passive approach to perceptual experience.Fil: Castellano, Federico. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; ArgentinaBrill - Rudopi2014-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/182782Castellano, Federico; Intellectualism against empiricism; Brill - Rudopi; Grazer Philosophische Studien; 90; 1-1-2014; 231-2510165-9227CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/9789004298767_015info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1163/9789004298767_015info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://brill.com/view/journals/gps/90/1/article-p231_15.xml?ebody=previewpdf-63165info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-29T11:15:03Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/182782instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-29 11:15:03.569CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Intellectualism against empiricism
title Intellectualism against empiricism
spellingShingle Intellectualism against empiricism
Castellano, Federico
PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE
REASONS
RULES
MCDOWELL
THE MYTH OF THE GIVEN
title_short Intellectualism against empiricism
title_full Intellectualism against empiricism
title_fullStr Intellectualism against empiricism
title_full_unstemmed Intellectualism against empiricism
title_sort Intellectualism against empiricism
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Castellano, Federico
author Castellano, Federico
author_facet Castellano, Federico
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE
REASONS
RULES
MCDOWELL
THE MYTH OF THE GIVEN
topic PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE
REASONS
RULES
MCDOWELL
THE MYTH OF THE GIVEN
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Intellectualism is the philosophical view that thinking involves the activity of reason-giving. In this paper I argue that the intellectualist point of view is incompatible with any form of empiricism. First, I show that Traditional Empiricism collapses because it brings together two conflicting theses: the intellectualist thesis according to which the normative properties of thoughts depend (rest) upon the activity of reason-giving, and the intuitive empiricist thesis according to which the normative properties of empirical thoughts derive from perceptual experience. Second, I argue that McDowell?s Minimal Empiricism collapses as well because of his attempt to make sense of an over-intellectualized and contradictory variety of empiricism: one that preserves both an intellectualist approach to thought and a conceptual but passive approach to perceptual experience.
Fil: Castellano, Federico. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina
description Intellectualism is the philosophical view that thinking involves the activity of reason-giving. In this paper I argue that the intellectualist point of view is incompatible with any form of empiricism. First, I show that Traditional Empiricism collapses because it brings together two conflicting theses: the intellectualist thesis according to which the normative properties of thoughts depend (rest) upon the activity of reason-giving, and the intuitive empiricist thesis according to which the normative properties of empirical thoughts derive from perceptual experience. Second, I argue that McDowell?s Minimal Empiricism collapses as well because of his attempt to make sense of an over-intellectualized and contradictory variety of empiricism: one that preserves both an intellectualist approach to thought and a conceptual but passive approach to perceptual experience.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2014-01-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/182782
Castellano, Federico; Intellectualism against empiricism; Brill - Rudopi; Grazer Philosophische Studien; 90; 1-1-2014; 231-251
0165-9227
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/182782
identifier_str_mv Castellano, Federico; Intellectualism against empiricism; Brill - Rudopi; Grazer Philosophische Studien; 90; 1-1-2014; 231-251
0165-9227
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/9789004298767_015
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1163/9789004298767_015
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://brill.com/view/journals/gps/90/1/article-p231_15.xml?ebody=previewpdf-63165
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Brill - Rudopi
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Brill - Rudopi
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
_version_ 1847426025579872256
score 13.10058

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