A Puzzle for Philosophers

Autores
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco
Año de publicación
2013
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
In the paper I tackle a puzzle by Goldberg (2009) that challenges all of us as philosophers. There are three plausible thesis, separately defensible, that together seem to lead to a contradiction: 1) Reliability is a necessary condition for epistemic justification. 2) On contested matters in philosophy, philosophers are not reliable. 3) At least some philosophical theses regarding contested matters in philosophy are epistemically justified. In this paper I will assess the status of the puzzle and attempt to solve it. In the first section, I'll present the puzzle with a little more detail. Secondly, I'll provide some general arguments to show that the alleged puzzle is not a legitimate one. Finally, in section 3, I will argue that even assuming that the puzzle can be coherently formulated, Goldberg's arguments in favor of premise (2) are either unsound or too limited in their scope in order to represent a significant or interesting problem for philosophers.
Fil: Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Instituto de Filosofía; Argentina
Materia
JUSTIFICATION
RELIABILITY
PHILOSOPHICAL DISAGREEMENT
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/9464

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spelling A Puzzle for PhilosophersLo Guercio, Nicolás FranciscoJUSTIFICATIONRELIABILITYPHILOSOPHICAL DISAGREEMENThttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6In the paper I tackle a puzzle by Goldberg (2009) that challenges all of us as philosophers. There are three plausible thesis, separately defensible, that together seem to lead to a contradiction: 1) Reliability is a necessary condition for epistemic justification. 2) On contested matters in philosophy, philosophers are not reliable. 3) At least some philosophical theses regarding contested matters in philosophy are epistemically justified. In this paper I will assess the status of the puzzle and attempt to solve it. In the first section, I'll present the puzzle with a little more detail. Secondly, I'll provide some general arguments to show that the alleged puzzle is not a legitimate one. Finally, in section 3, I will argue that even assuming that the puzzle can be coherently formulated, Goldberg's arguments in favor of premise (2) are either unsound or too limited in their scope in order to represent a significant or interesting problem for philosophers.Fil: Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Instituto de Filosofía; ArgentinaUniversidade Estadual de Campinas. Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2013-07info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/9464Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco; A Puzzle for Philosophers; Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência; Manuscrito; 36; 2; 7-2013; 215-2280100-6045enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452013000200001&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0100-60452013000200001info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-22T11:12:48Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/9464instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-22 11:12:48.791CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A Puzzle for Philosophers
title A Puzzle for Philosophers
spellingShingle A Puzzle for Philosophers
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco
JUSTIFICATION
RELIABILITY
PHILOSOPHICAL DISAGREEMENT
title_short A Puzzle for Philosophers
title_full A Puzzle for Philosophers
title_fullStr A Puzzle for Philosophers
title_full_unstemmed A Puzzle for Philosophers
title_sort A Puzzle for Philosophers
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco
author Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco
author_facet Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv JUSTIFICATION
RELIABILITY
PHILOSOPHICAL DISAGREEMENT
topic JUSTIFICATION
RELIABILITY
PHILOSOPHICAL DISAGREEMENT
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv In the paper I tackle a puzzle by Goldberg (2009) that challenges all of us as philosophers. There are three plausible thesis, separately defensible, that together seem to lead to a contradiction: 1) Reliability is a necessary condition for epistemic justification. 2) On contested matters in philosophy, philosophers are not reliable. 3) At least some philosophical theses regarding contested matters in philosophy are epistemically justified. In this paper I will assess the status of the puzzle and attempt to solve it. In the first section, I'll present the puzzle with a little more detail. Secondly, I'll provide some general arguments to show that the alleged puzzle is not a legitimate one. Finally, in section 3, I will argue that even assuming that the puzzle can be coherently formulated, Goldberg's arguments in favor of premise (2) are either unsound or too limited in their scope in order to represent a significant or interesting problem for philosophers.
Fil: Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Instituto de Filosofía; Argentina
description In the paper I tackle a puzzle by Goldberg (2009) that challenges all of us as philosophers. There are three plausible thesis, separately defensible, that together seem to lead to a contradiction: 1) Reliability is a necessary condition for epistemic justification. 2) On contested matters in philosophy, philosophers are not reliable. 3) At least some philosophical theses regarding contested matters in philosophy are epistemically justified. In this paper I will assess the status of the puzzle and attempt to solve it. In the first section, I'll present the puzzle with a little more detail. Secondly, I'll provide some general arguments to show that the alleged puzzle is not a legitimate one. Finally, in section 3, I will argue that even assuming that the puzzle can be coherently formulated, Goldberg's arguments in favor of premise (2) are either unsound or too limited in their scope in order to represent a significant or interesting problem for philosophers.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-07
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/9464
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco; A Puzzle for Philosophers; Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência; Manuscrito; 36; 2; 7-2013; 215-228
0100-6045
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/9464
identifier_str_mv Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco; A Puzzle for Philosophers; Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência; Manuscrito; 36; 2; 7-2013; 215-228
0100-6045
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0100-60452013000200001
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
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instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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