A Puzzle for Philosophers
- Autores
- Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco
- Año de publicación
- 2013
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- In the paper I tackle a puzzle by Goldberg (2009) that challenges all of us as philosophers. There are three plausible thesis, separately defensible, that together seem to lead to a contradiction: 1) Reliability is a necessary condition for epistemic justification. 2) On contested matters in philosophy, philosophers are not reliable. 3) At least some philosophical theses regarding contested matters in philosophy are epistemically justified. In this paper I will assess the status of the puzzle and attempt to solve it. In the first section, I'll present the puzzle with a little more detail. Secondly, I'll provide some general arguments to show that the alleged puzzle is not a legitimate one. Finally, in section 3, I will argue that even assuming that the puzzle can be coherently formulated, Goldberg's arguments in favor of premise (2) are either unsound or too limited in their scope in order to represent a significant or interesting problem for philosophers.
Fil: Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Instituto de Filosofía; Argentina - Materia
-
JUSTIFICATION
RELIABILITY
PHILOSOPHICAL DISAGREEMENT - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/9464
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
id |
CONICETDig_7fc077c2b37047441c68695507f31eac |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/9464 |
network_acronym_str |
CONICETDig |
repository_id_str |
3498 |
network_name_str |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
spelling |
A Puzzle for PhilosophersLo Guercio, Nicolás FranciscoJUSTIFICATIONRELIABILITYPHILOSOPHICAL DISAGREEMENThttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6In the paper I tackle a puzzle by Goldberg (2009) that challenges all of us as philosophers. There are three plausible thesis, separately defensible, that together seem to lead to a contradiction: 1) Reliability is a necessary condition for epistemic justification. 2) On contested matters in philosophy, philosophers are not reliable. 3) At least some philosophical theses regarding contested matters in philosophy are epistemically justified. In this paper I will assess the status of the puzzle and attempt to solve it. In the first section, I'll present the puzzle with a little more detail. Secondly, I'll provide some general arguments to show that the alleged puzzle is not a legitimate one. Finally, in section 3, I will argue that even assuming that the puzzle can be coherently formulated, Goldberg's arguments in favor of premise (2) are either unsound or too limited in their scope in order to represent a significant or interesting problem for philosophers.Fil: Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Instituto de Filosofía; ArgentinaUniversidade Estadual de Campinas. Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2013-07info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/9464Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco; A Puzzle for Philosophers; Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência; Manuscrito; 36; 2; 7-2013; 215-2280100-6045enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452013000200001&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0100-60452013000200001info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-22T11:12:48Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/9464instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-22 11:12:48.791CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
A Puzzle for Philosophers |
title |
A Puzzle for Philosophers |
spellingShingle |
A Puzzle for Philosophers Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco JUSTIFICATION RELIABILITY PHILOSOPHICAL DISAGREEMENT |
title_short |
A Puzzle for Philosophers |
title_full |
A Puzzle for Philosophers |
title_fullStr |
A Puzzle for Philosophers |
title_full_unstemmed |
A Puzzle for Philosophers |
title_sort |
A Puzzle for Philosophers |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco |
author |
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco |
author_facet |
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
JUSTIFICATION RELIABILITY PHILOSOPHICAL DISAGREEMENT |
topic |
JUSTIFICATION RELIABILITY PHILOSOPHICAL DISAGREEMENT |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
In the paper I tackle a puzzle by Goldberg (2009) that challenges all of us as philosophers. There are three plausible thesis, separately defensible, that together seem to lead to a contradiction: 1) Reliability is a necessary condition for epistemic justification. 2) On contested matters in philosophy, philosophers are not reliable. 3) At least some philosophical theses regarding contested matters in philosophy are epistemically justified. In this paper I will assess the status of the puzzle and attempt to solve it. In the first section, I'll present the puzzle with a little more detail. Secondly, I'll provide some general arguments to show that the alleged puzzle is not a legitimate one. Finally, in section 3, I will argue that even assuming that the puzzle can be coherently formulated, Goldberg's arguments in favor of premise (2) are either unsound or too limited in their scope in order to represent a significant or interesting problem for philosophers. Fil: Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Instituto de Filosofía; Argentina |
description |
In the paper I tackle a puzzle by Goldberg (2009) that challenges all of us as philosophers. There are three plausible thesis, separately defensible, that together seem to lead to a contradiction: 1) Reliability is a necessary condition for epistemic justification. 2) On contested matters in philosophy, philosophers are not reliable. 3) At least some philosophical theses regarding contested matters in philosophy are epistemically justified. In this paper I will assess the status of the puzzle and attempt to solve it. In the first section, I'll present the puzzle with a little more detail. Secondly, I'll provide some general arguments to show that the alleged puzzle is not a legitimate one. Finally, in section 3, I will argue that even assuming that the puzzle can be coherently formulated, Goldberg's arguments in favor of premise (2) are either unsound or too limited in their scope in order to represent a significant or interesting problem for philosophers. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-07 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/9464 Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco; A Puzzle for Philosophers; Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência; Manuscrito; 36; 2; 7-2013; 215-228 0100-6045 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/9464 |
identifier_str_mv |
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco; A Puzzle for Philosophers; Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência; Manuscrito; 36; 2; 7-2013; 215-228 0100-6045 |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452013000200001&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0100-60452013000200001 |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
reponame_str |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
collection |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
instname_str |
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
_version_ |
1846781527465132032 |
score |
12.982451 |