A Reply to Palmira

Autores
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco
Año de publicación
2013
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
In “Philosophical Peer Disagreement” I argued that in order to properly account for the phenomenon of philosophical peer disagreement it is necessary to drop the ‘same evidence’ condition from the definition of epistemic peerage. The reason is the following: different philosophical perspectives might come with different commitments concerning the evidential role of the same piece of data, and it would be wrong to deny the status of epistemic peer to someone that is acquainted with the same data, even if he does not consider it plays an evidential role. However, on “On the Necessity of the Evidential Equality Condition For Epistemic Peerage,” Michele Palmira has developed some criticisms to these ideas. Here I defend my view from Palmira’s objections.
Fil: Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Materia
Philosophical Peer Disagreement
'Same Evidence' Condition
Michele Palmira
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/28709
Acceder
id CONICETDig_752b6adcb03b73ed0df81866bf502d08
oai_identifier_str oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/28709
network_acronym_str CONICETDig
repository_id_str 3498
network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling A Reply to PalmiraLo Guercio, Nicolás FranciscoPhilosophical Peer Disagreement'Same Evidence' ConditionMichele Palmirahttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6In “Philosophical Peer Disagreement” I argued that in order to properly account for the phenomenon of philosophical peer disagreement it is necessary to drop the ‘same evidence’ condition from the definition of epistemic peerage. The reason is the following: different philosophical perspectives might come with different commitments concerning the evidential role of the same piece of data, and it would be wrong to deny the status of epistemic peer to someone that is acquainted with the same data, even if he does not consider it plays an evidential role. However, on “On the Necessity of the Evidential Equality Condition For Epistemic Peerage,” Michele Palmira has developed some criticisms to these ideas. Here I defend my view from Palmira’s objections.Fil: Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaLogos and Episteme2013-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/28709Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco; A Reply to Palmira; Logos and Episteme; Logos and Episteme; IV; 3; 9-2013; 361-3652069-05332069-3052CONICET DigitalCONICETenghttps://ri.conicet.gov.ar/handle/11336/197754info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://logos-and-episteme.proiectsbc.ro/?q=volumeIV_issue3_2013info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-15T14:48:02Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/28709instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-15 14:48:02.54CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A Reply to Palmira
title A Reply to Palmira
spellingShingle A Reply to Palmira
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco
Philosophical Peer Disagreement
'Same Evidence' Condition
Michele Palmira
title_short A Reply to Palmira
title_full A Reply to Palmira
title_fullStr A Reply to Palmira
title_full_unstemmed A Reply to Palmira
title_sort A Reply to Palmira
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco
author Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco
author_facet Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Philosophical Peer Disagreement
'Same Evidence' Condition
Michele Palmira
topic Philosophical Peer Disagreement
'Same Evidence' Condition
Michele Palmira
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv In “Philosophical Peer Disagreement” I argued that in order to properly account for the phenomenon of philosophical peer disagreement it is necessary to drop the ‘same evidence’ condition from the definition of epistemic peerage. The reason is the following: different philosophical perspectives might come with different commitments concerning the evidential role of the same piece of data, and it would be wrong to deny the status of epistemic peer to someone that is acquainted with the same data, even if he does not consider it plays an evidential role. However, on “On the Necessity of the Evidential Equality Condition For Epistemic Peerage,” Michele Palmira has developed some criticisms to these ideas. Here I defend my view from Palmira’s objections.
Fil: Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
description In “Philosophical Peer Disagreement” I argued that in order to properly account for the phenomenon of philosophical peer disagreement it is necessary to drop the ‘same evidence’ condition from the definition of epistemic peerage. The reason is the following: different philosophical perspectives might come with different commitments concerning the evidential role of the same piece of data, and it would be wrong to deny the status of epistemic peer to someone that is acquainted with the same data, even if he does not consider it plays an evidential role. However, on “On the Necessity of the Evidential Equality Condition For Epistemic Peerage,” Michele Palmira has developed some criticisms to these ideas. Here I defend my view from Palmira’s objections.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-09
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/28709
Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco; A Reply to Palmira; Logos and Episteme; Logos and Episteme; IV; 3; 9-2013; 361-365
2069-0533
2069-3052
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/28709
identifier_str_mv Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco; A Reply to Palmira; Logos and Episteme; Logos and Episteme; IV; 3; 9-2013; 361-365
2069-0533
2069-3052
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://ri.conicet.gov.ar/handle/11336/197754
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://logos-and-episteme.proiectsbc.ro/?q=volumeIV_issue3_2013
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Logos and Episteme
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Logos and Episteme
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
_version_ 1846082998960652288
score 13.22299

Publicaciones similares