The Conjunction Fallacy and the Debate on Human Rationality

Autores
Moro, Rodrigo
Año de publicación
2009
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
A. Tversky and D. Kahneman (1983) showed that in some contexts people tend to believe that a conjunction of events is more likely to occur than one of the events involved (a phenomenon called “conjunction fallacy”). The goal of this paper is to analyze the consequences of this phenomenon for the issue of human rationality. The key questions are as follows. Given the evidence from the conjunction fallacy experiments, are we justified to endorse some thesis on human rationality? If yes, which thesis? If not, why? The answers we give to these questions, I will argue, depends on the conception of rationality we advocate. I will then explore the consequences of the empirical evidence for three conceptions of rationality: The Standard Picture, Ecological Rationality, and the Goal Oriented View. Finally, I will compare these positions and offer a menu of philosophical options on human rationality that take into account the psychological studies in this area.
Fil: Moro, Rodrigo. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Humanidades; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; Argentina
Materia
Cognitive Psychology
Conjunction Fallacy
Probability Judgment
Human Rationality
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/69705
Acceder
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oai_identifier_str oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/69705
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repository_id_str 3498
network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling The Conjunction Fallacy and the Debate on Human RationalityMoro, RodrigoCognitive PsychologyConjunction FallacyProbability JudgmentHuman Rationalityhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6A. Tversky and D. Kahneman (1983) showed that in some contexts people tend to believe that a conjunction of events is more likely to occur than one of the events involved (a phenomenon called “conjunction fallacy”). The goal of this paper is to analyze the consequences of this phenomenon for the issue of human rationality. The key questions are as follows. Given the evidence from the conjunction fallacy experiments, are we justified to endorse some thesis on human rationality? If yes, which thesis? If not, why? The answers we give to these questions, I will argue, depends on the conception of rationality we advocate. I will then explore the consequences of the empirical evidence for three conceptions of rationality: The Standard Picture, Ecological Rationality, and the Goal Oriented View. Finally, I will compare these positions and offer a menu of philosophical options on human rationality that take into account the psychological studies in this area.Fil: Moro, Rodrigo. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Humanidades; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; ArgentinaProgressive Frontiers Press2009-12info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/69705Moro, Rodrigo; The Conjunction Fallacy and the Debate on Human Rationality; Progressive Frontiers Press; Philosophical Frontiers; 4; 2; 12-2009; 41-551758-1532CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-15T14:58:40Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/69705instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-15 14:58:40.728CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Conjunction Fallacy and the Debate on Human Rationality
title The Conjunction Fallacy and the Debate on Human Rationality
spellingShingle The Conjunction Fallacy and the Debate on Human Rationality
Moro, Rodrigo
Cognitive Psychology
Conjunction Fallacy
Probability Judgment
Human Rationality
title_short The Conjunction Fallacy and the Debate on Human Rationality
title_full The Conjunction Fallacy and the Debate on Human Rationality
title_fullStr The Conjunction Fallacy and the Debate on Human Rationality
title_full_unstemmed The Conjunction Fallacy and the Debate on Human Rationality
title_sort The Conjunction Fallacy and the Debate on Human Rationality
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Moro, Rodrigo
author Moro, Rodrigo
author_facet Moro, Rodrigo
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Cognitive Psychology
Conjunction Fallacy
Probability Judgment
Human Rationality
topic Cognitive Psychology
Conjunction Fallacy
Probability Judgment
Human Rationality
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv A. Tversky and D. Kahneman (1983) showed that in some contexts people tend to believe that a conjunction of events is more likely to occur than one of the events involved (a phenomenon called “conjunction fallacy”). The goal of this paper is to analyze the consequences of this phenomenon for the issue of human rationality. The key questions are as follows. Given the evidence from the conjunction fallacy experiments, are we justified to endorse some thesis on human rationality? If yes, which thesis? If not, why? The answers we give to these questions, I will argue, depends on the conception of rationality we advocate. I will then explore the consequences of the empirical evidence for three conceptions of rationality: The Standard Picture, Ecological Rationality, and the Goal Oriented View. Finally, I will compare these positions and offer a menu of philosophical options on human rationality that take into account the psychological studies in this area.
Fil: Moro, Rodrigo. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Humanidades; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; Argentina
description A. Tversky and D. Kahneman (1983) showed that in some contexts people tend to believe that a conjunction of events is more likely to occur than one of the events involved (a phenomenon called “conjunction fallacy”). The goal of this paper is to analyze the consequences of this phenomenon for the issue of human rationality. The key questions are as follows. Given the evidence from the conjunction fallacy experiments, are we justified to endorse some thesis on human rationality? If yes, which thesis? If not, why? The answers we give to these questions, I will argue, depends on the conception of rationality we advocate. I will then explore the consequences of the empirical evidence for three conceptions of rationality: The Standard Picture, Ecological Rationality, and the Goal Oriented View. Finally, I will compare these positions and offer a menu of philosophical options on human rationality that take into account the psychological studies in this area.
publishDate 2009
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2009-12
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/69705
Moro, Rodrigo; The Conjunction Fallacy and the Debate on Human Rationality; Progressive Frontiers Press; Philosophical Frontiers; 4; 2; 12-2009; 41-55
1758-1532
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/69705
identifier_str_mv Moro, Rodrigo; The Conjunction Fallacy and the Debate on Human Rationality; Progressive Frontiers Press; Philosophical Frontiers; 4; 2; 12-2009; 41-55
1758-1532
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Progressive Frontiers Press
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Progressive Frontiers Press
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
_version_ 1846083127627218944
score 13.22299

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