A neo-Pyrrhonian response to the disagreeing about disagreement argument

Autores
Machuca, Diego Emanuel
Año de publicación
2017
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
An objection that has been raised to the conciliatory stance on the epistemic significance of peer disagreement known as the Equal Weight View is that it is self-defeating, self-undermining, or self-refuting. The proponent of that view claims that equal weight should be given to all the parties to a peer dispute. Hence, if one of his epistemic peers defends the opposite view, he is required to give equal weight to the two rival views, thereby undermining his confidence in the correctness of the Equal Weight View. It seems that the same objection could be leveled against those who claim to suspend judgment in the face of pervasive unresolvable disagreements, as do the Pyrrhonian skeptics. In this paper, I explore the kind of response to the objection that could be offered from a neo-Pyrrhonian perspective, with the aim of better understanding the intriguing character of Pyrrhonian skepticism.
Fil: Machuca, Diego Emanuel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Materia
CONCILIATIONISM
DISAGREEMENT
EQUAL WEIGHT VIEW
PYRRHONIAN SKEPTICISM
RATIONALITY
SELF-DEFEAT
SELF-REFUTATION
SUSPENSION OF JUDGMENT
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/53085
Acceder
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oai_identifier_str oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/53085
network_acronym_str CONICETDig
repository_id_str 3498
network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling A neo-Pyrrhonian response to the disagreeing about disagreement argumentMachuca, Diego EmanuelCONCILIATIONISMDISAGREEMENTEQUAL WEIGHT VIEWPYRRHONIAN SKEPTICISMRATIONALITYSELF-DEFEATSELF-REFUTATIONSUSPENSION OF JUDGMENThttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6An objection that has been raised to the conciliatory stance on the epistemic significance of peer disagreement known as the Equal Weight View is that it is self-defeating, self-undermining, or self-refuting. The proponent of that view claims that equal weight should be given to all the parties to a peer dispute. Hence, if one of his epistemic peers defends the opposite view, he is required to give equal weight to the two rival views, thereby undermining his confidence in the correctness of the Equal Weight View. It seems that the same objection could be leveled against those who claim to suspend judgment in the face of pervasive unresolvable disagreements, as do the Pyrrhonian skeptics. In this paper, I explore the kind of response to the objection that could be offered from a neo-Pyrrhonian perspective, with the aim of better understanding the intriguing character of Pyrrhonian skepticism.Fil: Machuca, Diego Emanuel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaSpringer2017-05info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/53085Machuca, Diego Emanuel; A neo-Pyrrhonian response to the disagreeing about disagreement argument; Springer; Synthese (Dordrecht); 194; 5; 5-2017; 1663-16800039-7857CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s11229-015-1012-xinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11229-015-1012-xinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:16:16Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/53085instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:16:16.311CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A neo-Pyrrhonian response to the disagreeing about disagreement argument
title A neo-Pyrrhonian response to the disagreeing about disagreement argument
spellingShingle A neo-Pyrrhonian response to the disagreeing about disagreement argument
Machuca, Diego Emanuel
CONCILIATIONISM
DISAGREEMENT
EQUAL WEIGHT VIEW
PYRRHONIAN SKEPTICISM
RATIONALITY
SELF-DEFEAT
SELF-REFUTATION
SUSPENSION OF JUDGMENT
title_short A neo-Pyrrhonian response to the disagreeing about disagreement argument
title_full A neo-Pyrrhonian response to the disagreeing about disagreement argument
title_fullStr A neo-Pyrrhonian response to the disagreeing about disagreement argument
title_full_unstemmed A neo-Pyrrhonian response to the disagreeing about disagreement argument
title_sort A neo-Pyrrhonian response to the disagreeing about disagreement argument
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Machuca, Diego Emanuel
author Machuca, Diego Emanuel
author_facet Machuca, Diego Emanuel
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv CONCILIATIONISM
DISAGREEMENT
EQUAL WEIGHT VIEW
PYRRHONIAN SKEPTICISM
RATIONALITY
SELF-DEFEAT
SELF-REFUTATION
SUSPENSION OF JUDGMENT
topic CONCILIATIONISM
DISAGREEMENT
EQUAL WEIGHT VIEW
PYRRHONIAN SKEPTICISM
RATIONALITY
SELF-DEFEAT
SELF-REFUTATION
SUSPENSION OF JUDGMENT
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv An objection that has been raised to the conciliatory stance on the epistemic significance of peer disagreement known as the Equal Weight View is that it is self-defeating, self-undermining, or self-refuting. The proponent of that view claims that equal weight should be given to all the parties to a peer dispute. Hence, if one of his epistemic peers defends the opposite view, he is required to give equal weight to the two rival views, thereby undermining his confidence in the correctness of the Equal Weight View. It seems that the same objection could be leveled against those who claim to suspend judgment in the face of pervasive unresolvable disagreements, as do the Pyrrhonian skeptics. In this paper, I explore the kind of response to the objection that could be offered from a neo-Pyrrhonian perspective, with the aim of better understanding the intriguing character of Pyrrhonian skepticism.
Fil: Machuca, Diego Emanuel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
description An objection that has been raised to the conciliatory stance on the epistemic significance of peer disagreement known as the Equal Weight View is that it is self-defeating, self-undermining, or self-refuting. The proponent of that view claims that equal weight should be given to all the parties to a peer dispute. Hence, if one of his epistemic peers defends the opposite view, he is required to give equal weight to the two rival views, thereby undermining his confidence in the correctness of the Equal Weight View. It seems that the same objection could be leveled against those who claim to suspend judgment in the face of pervasive unresolvable disagreements, as do the Pyrrhonian skeptics. In this paper, I explore the kind of response to the objection that could be offered from a neo-Pyrrhonian perspective, with the aim of better understanding the intriguing character of Pyrrhonian skepticism.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-05
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/53085
Machuca, Diego Emanuel; A neo-Pyrrhonian response to the disagreeing about disagreement argument; Springer; Synthese (Dordrecht); 194; 5; 5-2017; 1663-1680
0039-7857
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/53085
identifier_str_mv Machuca, Diego Emanuel; A neo-Pyrrhonian response to the disagreeing about disagreement argument; Springer; Synthese (Dordrecht); 194; 5; 5-2017; 1663-1680
0039-7857
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s11229-015-1012-x
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11229-015-1012-x
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.069144

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