Crime and punishment: Does it pay to punish?

Autores
Iglesias, José Roberto; Semeshenko, Viktoriya; Schneider, E. M.; Gordon, M. B.
Año de publicación
2012
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Crime is the result of a rational distinctive balance between the benefits and costs of anillegal act. This idea was proposed by Becker more than forty years ago (Becker (1968) [1]).In this paper, we simulate a simple artificial society, in which agents earn fixed wages andcan augment (or lose) wealth as a result of a successful (or not) act of crime. The probabilityof apprehension depends on the gravity of the crime, and the punishment takes the formof imprisonment and fines. We study the costs of the law enforcement system requiredfor keeping crime within acceptable limits, and compare it with the harm produced bycrime. A sharp phase transition is observed as a function of the probability of punishment,and this transition exhibits a clear hysteresis effect, suggesting that the cost of reversing adeteriorated situation might be much higher than that of maintaining a relatively low levelof delinquency. Besides, we analyze economic consequences that arise from crimes underdifferent scenarios of criminal activity and probabilities of apprehension.
Fil: Iglesias, José Roberto. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul; Brasil
Fil: Semeshenko, Viktoriya. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Fil: Schneider, E. M.. Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul; Brasil
Fil: Gordon, M. B.. Universite Joseph Fourier; Francia
Materia
BECKER'S THEORY
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
INEQUALITY
SOCIAL SYSTEMS
SOCIOPHYSICS
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/197311
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Crime and punishment: Does it pay to punish?Iglesias, José RobertoSemeshenko, ViktoriyaSchneider, E. M.Gordon, M. B.BECKER'S THEORYCRIME AND PUNISHMENTINEQUALITYSOCIAL SYSTEMSSOCIOPHYSICShttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1Crime is the result of a rational distinctive balance between the benefits and costs of anillegal act. This idea was proposed by Becker more than forty years ago (Becker (1968) [1]).In this paper, we simulate a simple artificial society, in which agents earn fixed wages andcan augment (or lose) wealth as a result of a successful (or not) act of crime. The probabilityof apprehension depends on the gravity of the crime, and the punishment takes the formof imprisonment and fines. We study the costs of the law enforcement system requiredfor keeping crime within acceptable limits, and compare it with the harm produced bycrime. A sharp phase transition is observed as a function of the probability of punishment,and this transition exhibits a clear hysteresis effect, suggesting that the cost of reversing adeteriorated situation might be much higher than that of maintaining a relatively low levelof delinquency. Besides, we analyze economic consequences that arise from crimes underdifferent scenarios of criminal activity and probabilities of apprehension.Fil: Iglesias, José Roberto. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul; BrasilFil: Semeshenko, Viktoriya. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Schneider, E. M.. Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul; BrasilFil: Gordon, M. B.. Universite Joseph Fourier; FranciaElsevier Science2012-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/197311Iglesias, José Roberto; Semeshenko, Viktoriya; Schneider, E. M.; Gordon, M. B.; Crime and punishment: Does it pay to punish?; Elsevier Science; Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications; 391; 15; 9-2012; 3942-39500378-4371CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378437112002142info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.physa.2012.03.001info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T09:57:06Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/197311instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 09:57:06.306CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Crime and punishment: Does it pay to punish?
title Crime and punishment: Does it pay to punish?
spellingShingle Crime and punishment: Does it pay to punish?
Iglesias, José Roberto
BECKER'S THEORY
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
INEQUALITY
SOCIAL SYSTEMS
SOCIOPHYSICS
title_short Crime and punishment: Does it pay to punish?
title_full Crime and punishment: Does it pay to punish?
title_fullStr Crime and punishment: Does it pay to punish?
title_full_unstemmed Crime and punishment: Does it pay to punish?
title_sort Crime and punishment: Does it pay to punish?
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Iglesias, José Roberto
Semeshenko, Viktoriya
Schneider, E. M.
Gordon, M. B.
author Iglesias, José Roberto
author_facet Iglesias, José Roberto
Semeshenko, Viktoriya
Schneider, E. M.
Gordon, M. B.
author_role author
author2 Semeshenko, Viktoriya
Schneider, E. M.
Gordon, M. B.
author2_role author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv BECKER'S THEORY
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
INEQUALITY
SOCIAL SYSTEMS
SOCIOPHYSICS
topic BECKER'S THEORY
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
INEQUALITY
SOCIAL SYSTEMS
SOCIOPHYSICS
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Crime is the result of a rational distinctive balance between the benefits and costs of anillegal act. This idea was proposed by Becker more than forty years ago (Becker (1968) [1]).In this paper, we simulate a simple artificial society, in which agents earn fixed wages andcan augment (or lose) wealth as a result of a successful (or not) act of crime. The probabilityof apprehension depends on the gravity of the crime, and the punishment takes the formof imprisonment and fines. We study the costs of the law enforcement system requiredfor keeping crime within acceptable limits, and compare it with the harm produced bycrime. A sharp phase transition is observed as a function of the probability of punishment,and this transition exhibits a clear hysteresis effect, suggesting that the cost of reversing adeteriorated situation might be much higher than that of maintaining a relatively low levelof delinquency. Besides, we analyze economic consequences that arise from crimes underdifferent scenarios of criminal activity and probabilities of apprehension.
Fil: Iglesias, José Roberto. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul; Brasil
Fil: Semeshenko, Viktoriya. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Fil: Schneider, E. M.. Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul; Brasil
Fil: Gordon, M. B.. Universite Joseph Fourier; Francia
description Crime is the result of a rational distinctive balance between the benefits and costs of anillegal act. This idea was proposed by Becker more than forty years ago (Becker (1968) [1]).In this paper, we simulate a simple artificial society, in which agents earn fixed wages andcan augment (or lose) wealth as a result of a successful (or not) act of crime. The probabilityof apprehension depends on the gravity of the crime, and the punishment takes the formof imprisonment and fines. We study the costs of the law enforcement system requiredfor keeping crime within acceptable limits, and compare it with the harm produced bycrime. A sharp phase transition is observed as a function of the probability of punishment,and this transition exhibits a clear hysteresis effect, suggesting that the cost of reversing adeteriorated situation might be much higher than that of maintaining a relatively low levelof delinquency. Besides, we analyze economic consequences that arise from crimes underdifferent scenarios of criminal activity and probabilities of apprehension.
publishDate 2012
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2012-09
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/197311
Iglesias, José Roberto; Semeshenko, Viktoriya; Schneider, E. M.; Gordon, M. B.; Crime and punishment: Does it pay to punish?; Elsevier Science; Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications; 391; 15; 9-2012; 3942-3950
0378-4371
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/197311
identifier_str_mv Iglesias, José Roberto; Semeshenko, Viktoriya; Schneider, E. M.; Gordon, M. B.; Crime and punishment: Does it pay to punish?; Elsevier Science; Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications; 391; 15; 9-2012; 3942-3950
0378-4371
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378437112002142
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.physa.2012.03.001
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier Science
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier Science
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.13397

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