¿Autorización perceptiva?
- Autores
- Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
- Año de publicación
- 2014
- Idioma
- español castellano
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- This article presents some objections to Burge´s theory of perceptual entitlement. According to Burge, perceptual entitlement is a sort of warrant that is different from justification because it does not require the subject to have reasons for its beliefs. In contrast, it is argued, firstly, that entitlement does not escape from an objection usually made to epistemological externalism, that is, that the warrant is detached from the subject´s rationality. Secondly, two of the reasons offered by Burge to think that perceptions cannot be reasons are critically examined.
Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina - Materia
-
PERCEPTION
BURGE
GARANTÍA EPISTÉMICA
JUSTIFICACIÓN - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/32897
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
id |
CONICETDig_2c8145d95a1d62a16329c3a14436ae5b |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/32897 |
network_acronym_str |
CONICETDig |
repository_id_str |
3498 |
network_name_str |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
spelling |
¿Autorización perceptiva?Kalpokas, Daniel EnriquePERCEPTIONBURGEGARANTÍA EPISTÉMICAJUSTIFICACIÓNhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6This article presents some objections to Burge´s theory of perceptual entitlement. According to Burge, perceptual entitlement is a sort of warrant that is different from justification because it does not require the subject to have reasons for its beliefs. In contrast, it is argued, firstly, that entitlement does not escape from an objection usually made to epistemological externalism, that is, that the warrant is detached from the subject´s rationality. Secondly, two of the reasons offered by Burge to think that perceptions cannot be reasons are critically examined.Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; ArgentinaUniversidad de Oviedo2014-12info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/32897¿Autorización perceptiva?; Universidad de Oviedo; Teorema; XXXIII; 1; 12-2014; 19-370210-1602CONICET DigitalCONICETspainfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/4679973.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:40:03Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/32897instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:40:03.4CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
¿Autorización perceptiva? |
title |
¿Autorización perceptiva? |
spellingShingle |
¿Autorización perceptiva? Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique PERCEPTION BURGE GARANTÍA EPISTÉMICA JUSTIFICACIÓN |
title_short |
¿Autorización perceptiva? |
title_full |
¿Autorización perceptiva? |
title_fullStr |
¿Autorización perceptiva? |
title_full_unstemmed |
¿Autorización perceptiva? |
title_sort |
¿Autorización perceptiva? |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique |
author |
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique |
author_facet |
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
PERCEPTION BURGE GARANTÍA EPISTÉMICA JUSTIFICACIÓN |
topic |
PERCEPTION BURGE GARANTÍA EPISTÉMICA JUSTIFICACIÓN |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
This article presents some objections to Burge´s theory of perceptual entitlement. According to Burge, perceptual entitlement is a sort of warrant that is different from justification because it does not require the subject to have reasons for its beliefs. In contrast, it is argued, firstly, that entitlement does not escape from an objection usually made to epistemological externalism, that is, that the warrant is detached from the subject´s rationality. Secondly, two of the reasons offered by Burge to think that perceptions cannot be reasons are critically examined. Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina |
description |
This article presents some objections to Burge´s theory of perceptual entitlement. According to Burge, perceptual entitlement is a sort of warrant that is different from justification because it does not require the subject to have reasons for its beliefs. In contrast, it is argued, firstly, that entitlement does not escape from an objection usually made to epistemological externalism, that is, that the warrant is detached from the subject´s rationality. Secondly, two of the reasons offered by Burge to think that perceptions cannot be reasons are critically examined. |
publishDate |
2014 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2014-12 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/32897 ¿Autorización perceptiva?; Universidad de Oviedo; Teorema; XXXIII; 1; 12-2014; 19-37 0210-1602 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/32897 |
identifier_str_mv |
¿Autorización perceptiva?; Universidad de Oviedo; Teorema; XXXIII; 1; 12-2014; 19-37 0210-1602 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
spa |
language |
spa |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/4679973.pdf |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad de Oviedo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad de Oviedo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
reponame_str |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
collection |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
instname_str |
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
_version_ |
1844613267025035264 |
score |
13.070432 |