¿Autorización perceptiva?

Autores
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
Año de publicación
2014
Idioma
español castellano
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
This article presents some objections to Burge´s theory of perceptual entitlement. According to Burge, perceptual entitlement is a sort of warrant that is different from justification because it does not require the subject to have reasons for its beliefs. In contrast, it is argued, firstly, that entitlement does not escape from an objection usually made to epistemological externalism, that is, that the warrant is detached from the subject´s rationality. Secondly, two of the reasons offered by Burge to think that perceptions cannot be reasons are critically examined.
Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina
Materia
PERCEPTION
BURGE
GARANTÍA EPISTÉMICA
JUSTIFICACIÓN
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/32897
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling ¿Autorización perceptiva?Kalpokas, Daniel EnriquePERCEPTIONBURGEGARANTÍA EPISTÉMICAJUSTIFICACIÓNhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6This article presents some objections to Burge´s theory of perceptual entitlement. According to Burge, perceptual entitlement is a sort of warrant that is different from justification because it does not require the subject to have reasons for its beliefs. In contrast, it is argued, firstly, that entitlement does not escape from an objection usually made to epistemological externalism, that is, that the warrant is detached from the subject´s rationality. Secondly, two of the reasons offered by Burge to think that perceptions cannot be reasons are critically examined.Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; ArgentinaUniversidad de Oviedo2014-12info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/32897¿Autorización perceptiva?; Universidad de Oviedo; Teorema; XXXIII; 1; 12-2014; 19-370210-1602CONICET DigitalCONICETspainfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/4679973.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-22T11:08:30Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/32897instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-22 11:08:31.087CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv ¿Autorización perceptiva?
title ¿Autorización perceptiva?
spellingShingle ¿Autorización perceptiva?
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
PERCEPTION
BURGE
GARANTÍA EPISTÉMICA
JUSTIFICACIÓN
title_short ¿Autorización perceptiva?
title_full ¿Autorización perceptiva?
title_fullStr ¿Autorización perceptiva?
title_full_unstemmed ¿Autorización perceptiva?
title_sort ¿Autorización perceptiva?
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
author Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
author_facet Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv PERCEPTION
BURGE
GARANTÍA EPISTÉMICA
JUSTIFICACIÓN
topic PERCEPTION
BURGE
GARANTÍA EPISTÉMICA
JUSTIFICACIÓN
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv This article presents some objections to Burge´s theory of perceptual entitlement. According to Burge, perceptual entitlement is a sort of warrant that is different from justification because it does not require the subject to have reasons for its beliefs. In contrast, it is argued, firstly, that entitlement does not escape from an objection usually made to epistemological externalism, that is, that the warrant is detached from the subject´s rationality. Secondly, two of the reasons offered by Burge to think that perceptions cannot be reasons are critically examined.
Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina
description This article presents some objections to Burge´s theory of perceptual entitlement. According to Burge, perceptual entitlement is a sort of warrant that is different from justification because it does not require the subject to have reasons for its beliefs. In contrast, it is argued, firstly, that entitlement does not escape from an objection usually made to epistemological externalism, that is, that the warrant is detached from the subject´s rationality. Secondly, two of the reasons offered by Burge to think that perceptions cannot be reasons are critically examined.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2014-12
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/32897
¿Autorización perceptiva?; Universidad de Oviedo; Teorema; XXXIII; 1; 12-2014; 19-37
0210-1602
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/32897
identifier_str_mv ¿Autorización perceptiva?; Universidad de Oviedo; Teorema; XXXIII; 1; 12-2014; 19-37
0210-1602
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/4679973.pdf
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de Oviedo
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de Oviedo
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 12.982451

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