Der Streit um die hundert Taler: Begriff und Erkenntnis des Wirklichen bei Kant und Hegel
- Autores
- Ferreiro, Hector Alberto
- Año de publicación
- 2016
- Idioma
- alemán
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- In the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV, A 599-560/B 627-628), Kant presents the argument of the hundred talers as a concrete example of his general claim against conceiving existence as a real predicate. According to Kant, the content of concepts can be completely determined as merely possible content; in the existential judgment, the subject then relates the completely determined content of his internal thoughts with perception: it is only through perception that the subject knows the content of his concepts as real things of the world. Thus, although in his epistemology conceptual activity plays a crucial role in perceptual activity, Kant still offers an empiricist account of empirical knowledge. Hegel criticizes Kant´s theory of perception by distinguishing representation (Vorstellen) from comprehension (Begreifen) and by developing on that basis a more complex theory of the relation between concept, existence, and empirical knowledge. From the standpoint of representation, concept and existence, being-determined and being-real exclude each other; in comprehension, on the contrary, representation and perception are no longer unilateral forms of knowing: for the mind that comprehends what it perceives, the existence of what it perceives is ?when abstractly considered as such? only a collateral product of the way it knows the real world. According to Hegel, comprehension develops the internal necessity of the contents of knowledge and, by doing so, grasps the individual objects that constitute our world.
Fil: Ferreiro, Hector Alberto. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina - Materia
-
Filosofía Clásica Alemana
Hegel
Kant
Teoría del Conocimiento - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/117782
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Der Streit um die hundert Taler: Begriff und Erkenntnis des Wirklichen bei Kant und HegelFerreiro, Hector AlbertoFilosofía Clásica AlemanaHegelKantTeoría del Conocimientohttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6In the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV, A 599-560/B 627-628), Kant presents the argument of the hundred talers as a concrete example of his general claim against conceiving existence as a real predicate. According to Kant, the content of concepts can be completely determined as merely possible content; in the existential judgment, the subject then relates the completely determined content of his internal thoughts with perception: it is only through perception that the subject knows the content of his concepts as real things of the world. Thus, although in his epistemology conceptual activity plays a crucial role in perceptual activity, Kant still offers an empiricist account of empirical knowledge. Hegel criticizes Kant´s theory of perception by distinguishing representation (Vorstellen) from comprehension (Begreifen) and by developing on that basis a more complex theory of the relation between concept, existence, and empirical knowledge. From the standpoint of representation, concept and existence, being-determined and being-real exclude each other; in comprehension, on the contrary, representation and perception are no longer unilateral forms of knowing: for the mind that comprehends what it perceives, the existence of what it perceives is ?when abstractly considered as such? only a collateral product of the way it knows the real world. According to Hegel, comprehension develops the internal necessity of the contents of knowledge and, by doing so, grasps the individual objects that constitute our world.Fil: Ferreiro, Hector Alberto. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaSociedade Hegel Brasileira2016-11info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/117782Ferreiro, Hector Alberto; Der Streit um die hundert Taler: Begriff und Erkenntnis des Wirklichen bei Kant und Hegel; Sociedade Hegel Brasileira; Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos; 13; 21; 11-2016; 23-381980-8372CONICET DigitalCONICETdeuinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://ojs.hegelbrasil.org/index.php/reh/article/view/170info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T09:51:06Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/117782instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 09:51:06.968CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Der Streit um die hundert Taler: Begriff und Erkenntnis des Wirklichen bei Kant und Hegel |
title |
Der Streit um die hundert Taler: Begriff und Erkenntnis des Wirklichen bei Kant und Hegel |
spellingShingle |
Der Streit um die hundert Taler: Begriff und Erkenntnis des Wirklichen bei Kant und Hegel Ferreiro, Hector Alberto Filosofía Clásica Alemana Hegel Kant Teoría del Conocimiento |
title_short |
Der Streit um die hundert Taler: Begriff und Erkenntnis des Wirklichen bei Kant und Hegel |
title_full |
Der Streit um die hundert Taler: Begriff und Erkenntnis des Wirklichen bei Kant und Hegel |
title_fullStr |
Der Streit um die hundert Taler: Begriff und Erkenntnis des Wirklichen bei Kant und Hegel |
title_full_unstemmed |
Der Streit um die hundert Taler: Begriff und Erkenntnis des Wirklichen bei Kant und Hegel |
title_sort |
Der Streit um die hundert Taler: Begriff und Erkenntnis des Wirklichen bei Kant und Hegel |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Ferreiro, Hector Alberto |
author |
Ferreiro, Hector Alberto |
author_facet |
Ferreiro, Hector Alberto |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Filosofía Clásica Alemana Hegel Kant Teoría del Conocimiento |
topic |
Filosofía Clásica Alemana Hegel Kant Teoría del Conocimiento |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
In the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV, A 599-560/B 627-628), Kant presents the argument of the hundred talers as a concrete example of his general claim against conceiving existence as a real predicate. According to Kant, the content of concepts can be completely determined as merely possible content; in the existential judgment, the subject then relates the completely determined content of his internal thoughts with perception: it is only through perception that the subject knows the content of his concepts as real things of the world. Thus, although in his epistemology conceptual activity plays a crucial role in perceptual activity, Kant still offers an empiricist account of empirical knowledge. Hegel criticizes Kant´s theory of perception by distinguishing representation (Vorstellen) from comprehension (Begreifen) and by developing on that basis a more complex theory of the relation between concept, existence, and empirical knowledge. From the standpoint of representation, concept and existence, being-determined and being-real exclude each other; in comprehension, on the contrary, representation and perception are no longer unilateral forms of knowing: for the mind that comprehends what it perceives, the existence of what it perceives is ?when abstractly considered as such? only a collateral product of the way it knows the real world. According to Hegel, comprehension develops the internal necessity of the contents of knowledge and, by doing so, grasps the individual objects that constitute our world. Fil: Ferreiro, Hector Alberto. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina |
description |
In the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV, A 599-560/B 627-628), Kant presents the argument of the hundred talers as a concrete example of his general claim against conceiving existence as a real predicate. According to Kant, the content of concepts can be completely determined as merely possible content; in the existential judgment, the subject then relates the completely determined content of his internal thoughts with perception: it is only through perception that the subject knows the content of his concepts as real things of the world. Thus, although in his epistemology conceptual activity plays a crucial role in perceptual activity, Kant still offers an empiricist account of empirical knowledge. Hegel criticizes Kant´s theory of perception by distinguishing representation (Vorstellen) from comprehension (Begreifen) and by developing on that basis a more complex theory of the relation between concept, existence, and empirical knowledge. From the standpoint of representation, concept and existence, being-determined and being-real exclude each other; in comprehension, on the contrary, representation and perception are no longer unilateral forms of knowing: for the mind that comprehends what it perceives, the existence of what it perceives is ?when abstractly considered as such? only a collateral product of the way it knows the real world. According to Hegel, comprehension develops the internal necessity of the contents of knowledge and, by doing so, grasps the individual objects that constitute our world. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-11 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
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publishedVersion |
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http://hdl.handle.net/11336/117782 Ferreiro, Hector Alberto; Der Streit um die hundert Taler: Begriff und Erkenntnis des Wirklichen bei Kant und Hegel; Sociedade Hegel Brasileira; Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos; 13; 21; 11-2016; 23-38 1980-8372 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/117782 |
identifier_str_mv |
Ferreiro, Hector Alberto; Der Streit um die hundert Taler: Begriff und Erkenntnis des Wirklichen bei Kant und Hegel; Sociedade Hegel Brasileira; Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos; 13; 21; 11-2016; 23-38 1980-8372 CONICET Digital CONICET |
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Sociedade Hegel Brasileira |
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Sociedade Hegel Brasileira |
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