Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts : An investigation for Argentina

Autores
Freille, Sebastián; Avramovich, Cecilia; Moncarz, Pedro; Soffietti, Pablo
Año de publicación
2018
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
documento de conferencia
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
This paper explores the relationship between political influence actions and benefits obtained from public procurement. We develop a theoretical model of electoral competition where interest groups can engage in both ex-ante campaign contributions and ex-post lobbying contributions. We derive the optimal distribution of ex-ante and ex-post contributions by interest groups to candidates. If the preference of the interest groups are aligned, political contributions to both candidates are increasing in their respective announced expenditures. Ex-ante and ex-post contributions are imperfect substitutes and the higher the announced expenditure, the more biased the distribution is towards (ex-post) lobbying. Using previously unavailable individual-level data, we test empirically the predictions of the model and to model the probability of obtaining a public contract as a function of both ex-ante and ex-post efforts by interest groups.
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas
Materia
Ciencias Económicas
Political Investments
Campaign finance
Lobbying Audiences
Public Procurement
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Repositorio
SEDICI (UNLP)
Institución
Universidad Nacional de La Plata
OAI Identificador
oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/169122
Acceder
id SEDICI_d77cc47cb736bfeace6a0094154dddff
oai_identifier_str oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/169122
network_acronym_str SEDICI
repository_id_str 1329
network_name_str SEDICI (UNLP)
spelling Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts : An investigation for ArgentinaFreille, SebastiánAvramovich, CeciliaMoncarz, PedroSoffietti, PabloCiencias EconómicasPolitical InvestmentsCampaign financeLobbying AudiencesPublic ProcurementThis paper explores the relationship between political influence actions and benefits obtained from public procurement. We develop a theoretical model of electoral competition where interest groups can engage in both ex-ante campaign contributions and ex-post lobbying contributions. We derive the optimal distribution of ex-ante and ex-post contributions by interest groups to candidates. If the preference of the interest groups are aligned, political contributions to both candidates are increasing in their respective announced expenditures. Ex-ante and ex-post contributions are imperfect substitutes and the higher the announced expenditure, the more biased the distribution is towards (ex-post) lobbying. Using previously unavailable individual-level data, we test empirically the predictions of the model and to model the probability of obtaining a public contract as a function of both ex-ante and ex-post efforts by interest groups.Facultad de Ciencias Económicas2018-11info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjectinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionObjeto de conferenciahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferenciaapplication/pdfhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/169122enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/isbn/978-987-28590-6-0info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://bd.aaep.org.ar/anales/works/works2018/freille.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1852-0022info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)instname:Universidad Nacional de La Platainstacron:UNLP2025-10-22T17:24:16Zoai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/169122Institucionalhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/oai/snrdalira@sedici.unlp.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:13292025-10-22 17:24:16.679SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Platafalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts : An investigation for Argentina
title Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts : An investigation for Argentina
spellingShingle Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts : An investigation for Argentina
Freille, Sebastián
Ciencias Económicas
Political Investments
Campaign finance
Lobbying Audiences
Public Procurement
title_short Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts : An investigation for Argentina
title_full Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts : An investigation for Argentina
title_fullStr Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts : An investigation for Argentina
title_full_unstemmed Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts : An investigation for Argentina
title_sort Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts : An investigation for Argentina
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Freille, Sebastián
Avramovich, Cecilia
Moncarz, Pedro
Soffietti, Pablo
author Freille, Sebastián
author_facet Freille, Sebastián
Avramovich, Cecilia
Moncarz, Pedro
Soffietti, Pablo
author_role author
author2 Avramovich, Cecilia
Moncarz, Pedro
Soffietti, Pablo
author2_role author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Ciencias Económicas
Political Investments
Campaign finance
Lobbying Audiences
Public Procurement
topic Ciencias Económicas
Political Investments
Campaign finance
Lobbying Audiences
Public Procurement
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv This paper explores the relationship between political influence actions and benefits obtained from public procurement. We develop a theoretical model of electoral competition where interest groups can engage in both ex-ante campaign contributions and ex-post lobbying contributions. We derive the optimal distribution of ex-ante and ex-post contributions by interest groups to candidates. If the preference of the interest groups are aligned, political contributions to both candidates are increasing in their respective announced expenditures. Ex-ante and ex-post contributions are imperfect substitutes and the higher the announced expenditure, the more biased the distribution is towards (ex-post) lobbying. Using previously unavailable individual-level data, we test empirically the predictions of the model and to model the probability of obtaining a public contract as a function of both ex-ante and ex-post efforts by interest groups.
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas
description This paper explores the relationship between political influence actions and benefits obtained from public procurement. We develop a theoretical model of electoral competition where interest groups can engage in both ex-ante campaign contributions and ex-post lobbying contributions. We derive the optimal distribution of ex-ante and ex-post contributions by interest groups to candidates. If the preference of the interest groups are aligned, political contributions to both candidates are increasing in their respective announced expenditures. Ex-ante and ex-post contributions are imperfect substitutes and the higher the announced expenditure, the more biased the distribution is towards (ex-post) lobbying. Using previously unavailable individual-level data, we test empirically the predictions of the model and to model the probability of obtaining a public contract as a function of both ex-ante and ex-post efforts by interest groups.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-11
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Objeto de conferencia
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794
info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferencia
format conferenceObject
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/169122
url http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/169122
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/isbn/978-987-28590-6-0
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://bd.aaep.org.ar/anales/works/works2018/freille.pdf
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1852-0022
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)
instname:Universidad Nacional de La Plata
instacron:UNLP
reponame_str SEDICI (UNLP)
collection SEDICI (UNLP)
instname_str Universidad Nacional de La Plata
instacron_str UNLP
institution UNLP
repository.name.fl_str_mv SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Plata
repository.mail.fl_str_mv alira@sedici.unlp.edu.ar
_version_ 1846783696214949888
score 12.982451

Publicaciones similares