Can countries lobby for foreign direct investment? : evidence from the US

Autores
Montes Rojas, Gabriel Victorio
Año de publicación
2018
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
This paper empirically studies a mechanism where foreign direct investment (FDI) recipient countries lobby the US government for the allocation of outward US FDI. In this case, lobbying has the goal of informing US policymakers about their countries' market capabilities and of influencing their attitudes toward recipient countries. In turn, policymakers influence firms' decisions about the location of their potential investments abroad.We empirically estimate the direct influence of the recipient country's lobbying agents in obtaining FDI. The econometric results show that increasing foreign lobbying in the US raises the amount of US FDI received. This amount is potentially large for FDI receiving countries.
Fil: Montes Rojas, Gabriel Victorio. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Saavedra 15. Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Política de Buenos Aires. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Política de Buenos Aires; Argentina
Materia
FDI
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
LOBBYING
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/87226
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Can countries lobby for foreign direct investment? : evidence from the USMontes Rojas, Gabriel VictorioFDIFOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTLOBBYINGhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5This paper empirically studies a mechanism where foreign direct investment (FDI) recipient countries lobby the US government for the allocation of outward US FDI. In this case, lobbying has the goal of informing US policymakers about their countries' market capabilities and of influencing their attitudes toward recipient countries. In turn, policymakers influence firms' decisions about the location of their potential investments abroad.We empirically estimate the direct influence of the recipient country's lobbying agents in obtaining FDI. The econometric results show that increasing foreign lobbying in the US raises the amount of US FDI received. This amount is potentially large for FDI receiving countries.Fil: Montes Rojas, Gabriel Victorio. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Saavedra 15. Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Política de Buenos Aires. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Política de Buenos Aires; ArgentinaInderscience Publishers2018-07info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/87226Montes Rojas, Gabriel Victorio; Can countries lobby for foreign direct investment? : evidence from the US; Inderscience Publishers; International Journal of Monetary Economics and Finance; 11; 5; 7-2018; 516-5231752-04791752-0487CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.inderscience.com/info/inarticle.php?artid=95796info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1504/IJMEF.2018.095796info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T09:51:22Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/87226instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 09:51:22.462CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Can countries lobby for foreign direct investment? : evidence from the US
title Can countries lobby for foreign direct investment? : evidence from the US
spellingShingle Can countries lobby for foreign direct investment? : evidence from the US
Montes Rojas, Gabriel Victorio
FDI
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
LOBBYING
title_short Can countries lobby for foreign direct investment? : evidence from the US
title_full Can countries lobby for foreign direct investment? : evidence from the US
title_fullStr Can countries lobby for foreign direct investment? : evidence from the US
title_full_unstemmed Can countries lobby for foreign direct investment? : evidence from the US
title_sort Can countries lobby for foreign direct investment? : evidence from the US
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Montes Rojas, Gabriel Victorio
author Montes Rojas, Gabriel Victorio
author_facet Montes Rojas, Gabriel Victorio
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv FDI
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
LOBBYING
topic FDI
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
LOBBYING
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv This paper empirically studies a mechanism where foreign direct investment (FDI) recipient countries lobby the US government for the allocation of outward US FDI. In this case, lobbying has the goal of informing US policymakers about their countries' market capabilities and of influencing their attitudes toward recipient countries. In turn, policymakers influence firms' decisions about the location of their potential investments abroad.We empirically estimate the direct influence of the recipient country's lobbying agents in obtaining FDI. The econometric results show that increasing foreign lobbying in the US raises the amount of US FDI received. This amount is potentially large for FDI receiving countries.
Fil: Montes Rojas, Gabriel Victorio. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Saavedra 15. Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Política de Buenos Aires. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Política de Buenos Aires; Argentina
description This paper empirically studies a mechanism where foreign direct investment (FDI) recipient countries lobby the US government for the allocation of outward US FDI. In this case, lobbying has the goal of informing US policymakers about their countries' market capabilities and of influencing their attitudes toward recipient countries. In turn, policymakers influence firms' decisions about the location of their potential investments abroad.We empirically estimate the direct influence of the recipient country's lobbying agents in obtaining FDI. The econometric results show that increasing foreign lobbying in the US raises the amount of US FDI received. This amount is potentially large for FDI receiving countries.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-07
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/87226
Montes Rojas, Gabriel Victorio; Can countries lobby for foreign direct investment? : evidence from the US; Inderscience Publishers; International Journal of Monetary Economics and Finance; 11; 5; 7-2018; 516-523
1752-0479
1752-0487
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/87226
identifier_str_mv Montes Rojas, Gabriel Victorio; Can countries lobby for foreign direct investment? : evidence from the US; Inderscience Publishers; International Journal of Monetary Economics and Finance; 11; 5; 7-2018; 516-523
1752-0479
1752-0487
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.inderscience.com/info/inarticle.php?artid=95796
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1504/IJMEF.2018.095796
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Inderscience Publishers
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Inderscience Publishers
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
_version_ 1842269091666067456
score 13.13397

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