Monitoring with Collusion and the Value of Information

Autores
Cont, Walter Alberto
Año de publicación
2004
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
documento de conferencia
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
In a principal-supervisor-agent relationship with collusion, I rank the principal’s preference over the quality of the supervisor’s information. In the presence of imperfect signal and output distortions, the principal does better with hard-butnon-forgeable information than with soft information. Only in the limit case of accurate signal (i.e., the supervisor may observe either the true type or nothing) the principal with soft information is as well off as with hard information even under output distortions (as in Baliga). Nevertheless, distortions are needed for the creation of collusion stakes through differential information rents when the supervisor’s signal is noisy. The conditions under which the supervisor with soft information is still valuable for the principal are, first, that the supervisor’s signal’s must exceed some lower treshold of noise and, second, that side transfers between the agent and the supervisor must be inefficient.
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas
Materia
Ciencias Económicas
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Repositorio
SEDICI (UNLP)
Institución
Universidad Nacional de La Plata
OAI Identificador
oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/170188
Acceder
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network_name_str SEDICI (UNLP)
spelling Monitoring with Collusion and the Value of InformationCont, Walter AlbertoCiencias EconómicasIn a principal-supervisor-agent relationship with collusion, I rank the principal’s preference over the quality of the supervisor’s information. In the presence of imperfect signal and output distortions, the principal does better with hard-butnon-forgeable information than with soft information. Only in the limit case of accurate signal (i.e., the supervisor may observe either the true type or nothing) the principal with soft information is as well off as with hard information even under output distortions (as in Baliga). Nevertheless, distortions are needed for the creation of collusion stakes through differential information rents when the supervisor’s signal is noisy. The conditions under which the supervisor with soft information is still valuable for the principal are, first, that the supervisor’s signal’s must exceed some lower treshold of noise and, second, that side transfers between the agent and the supervisor must be inefficient.Facultad de Ciencias Económicas2004-11info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjectinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionObjeto de conferenciahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferenciaapplication/pdfhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/170188enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://bd.aaep.org.ar/anales/works/works2004/Cont2004.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)instname:Universidad Nacional de La Platainstacron:UNLP2025-10-22T17:24:11Zoai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/170188Institucionalhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/oai/snrdalira@sedici.unlp.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:13292025-10-22 17:24:11.78SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Platafalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Monitoring with Collusion and the Value of Information
title Monitoring with Collusion and the Value of Information
spellingShingle Monitoring with Collusion and the Value of Information
Cont, Walter Alberto
Ciencias Económicas
title_short Monitoring with Collusion and the Value of Information
title_full Monitoring with Collusion and the Value of Information
title_fullStr Monitoring with Collusion and the Value of Information
title_full_unstemmed Monitoring with Collusion and the Value of Information
title_sort Monitoring with Collusion and the Value of Information
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Cont, Walter Alberto
author Cont, Walter Alberto
author_facet Cont, Walter Alberto
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Ciencias Económicas
topic Ciencias Económicas
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv In a principal-supervisor-agent relationship with collusion, I rank the principal’s preference over the quality of the supervisor’s information. In the presence of imperfect signal and output distortions, the principal does better with hard-butnon-forgeable information than with soft information. Only in the limit case of accurate signal (i.e., the supervisor may observe either the true type or nothing) the principal with soft information is as well off as with hard information even under output distortions (as in Baliga). Nevertheless, distortions are needed for the creation of collusion stakes through differential information rents when the supervisor’s signal is noisy. The conditions under which the supervisor with soft information is still valuable for the principal are, first, that the supervisor’s signal’s must exceed some lower treshold of noise and, second, that side transfers between the agent and the supervisor must be inefficient.
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas
description In a principal-supervisor-agent relationship with collusion, I rank the principal’s preference over the quality of the supervisor’s information. In the presence of imperfect signal and output distortions, the principal does better with hard-butnon-forgeable information than with soft information. Only in the limit case of accurate signal (i.e., the supervisor may observe either the true type or nothing) the principal with soft information is as well off as with hard information even under output distortions (as in Baliga). Nevertheless, distortions are needed for the creation of collusion stakes through differential information rents when the supervisor’s signal is noisy. The conditions under which the supervisor with soft information is still valuable for the principal are, first, that the supervisor’s signal’s must exceed some lower treshold of noise and, second, that side transfers between the agent and the supervisor must be inefficient.
publishDate 2004
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2004-11
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Objeto de conferencia
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794
info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferencia
format conferenceObject
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/170188
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dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://bd.aaep.org.ar/anales/works/works2004/Cont2004.pdf
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)
instname:Universidad Nacional de La Plata
instacron:UNLP
reponame_str SEDICI (UNLP)
collection SEDICI (UNLP)
instname_str Universidad Nacional de La Plata
instacron_str UNLP
institution UNLP
repository.name.fl_str_mv SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Plata
repository.mail.fl_str_mv alira@sedici.unlp.edu.ar
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