Multi-stage taxation by subnational governments: Tax incidence and Leviathan taxation
- Autores
- Cont, Walter; Fernández Felices, Diego
- Año de publicación
- 2016
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- documento de trabajo
- Estado
- versión enviada
- Descripción
- This paper analyzes multi-stage taxation by provinces in a federal country, using a novel two-good, two-province, successive-oligopoly heterogeneous-product Bertrand competition model, where each producer is located in a province and sells its product through exclusive retailers located in both provinces. The producer-retailer setup allows provincial governments to raise taxes on upstream and downstream transactions. First, we analyze tax incidence results and emphasize the importance of the degree of downstream competition on the tax shifting. Second, we solve a non-cooperative revenue maximization problem and study the properties of the equilibrium taxes. We characterize the solution: either all tax rates are positive or one province drops one tax rate. This way, the full-tax solution dominates upstream and downstream taxation. Also, the non-cooperative solution implies over-taxation when compared with the cooperative solution.
Este paper analiza impuestos en múltiples etapas recaudados por provincias en un país federal, utilizando un modelo novedoso de competencia en dos segmentos productor- minorista a la Bertrand con productos diferenciados, donde cada productor está ubicado en una provincia y vende en todo el país a través de sus distribuidores. Este modelo genera la posibilidad de que las provincias recauden en las dos etapas de transacciones. En primer lugar, se obtienen resultados de incidencia, enfatizando la importancia del grado de diferenciación sobre la traslación. En segundo lugar, se resuelve el problema de maximización de recaudación en un contexto no cooperativo y se estudian las propiedades de las alícuotas de equilibrio: las provincias utilizan todas las alícuotas o una de ellas descarta sólo una alícuota. La solución no cooperativa domina (en términos de recaudación) a los casos de impuestos al productor o a las ventas minoristas. Por otro lado, esta solución se caracteriza por imposición excesiva (respecto de un caso cooperativo).
Departamento de Economía - Materia
-
Ciencias Económicas
local indirect taxation
multistage taxes
tax icidence
tax competition
H71
H21
H22 - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Universidad Nacional de La Plata
- OAI Identificador
- oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/65776
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Multi-stage taxation by subnational governments: Tax incidence and Leviathan taxationCont, WalterFernández Felices, DiegoCiencias Económicaslocal indirect taxationmultistage taxestax icidencetax competitionH71H21H22This paper analyzes multi-stage taxation by provinces in a federal country, using a novel two-good, two-province, successive-oligopoly heterogeneous-product Bertrand competition model, where each producer is located in a province and sells its product through exclusive retailers located in both provinces. The producer-retailer setup allows provincial governments to raise taxes on upstream and downstream transactions. First, we analyze tax incidence results and emphasize the importance of the degree of downstream competition on the tax shifting. Second, we solve a non-cooperative revenue maximization problem and study the properties of the equilibrium taxes. We characterize the solution: either all tax rates are positive or one province drops one tax rate. This way, the full-tax solution dominates upstream and downstream taxation. Also, the non-cooperative solution implies over-taxation when compared with the cooperative solution.Este paper analiza impuestos en múltiples etapas recaudados por provincias en un país federal, utilizando un modelo novedoso de competencia en dos segmentos productor- minorista a la Bertrand con productos diferenciados, donde cada productor está ubicado en una provincia y vende en todo el país a través de sus distribuidores. Este modelo genera la posibilidad de que las provincias recauden en las dos etapas de transacciones. En primer lugar, se obtienen resultados de incidencia, enfatizando la importancia del grado de diferenciación sobre la traslación. En segundo lugar, se resuelve el problema de maximización de recaudación en un contexto no cooperativo y se estudian las propiedades de las alícuotas de equilibrio: las provincias utilizan todas las alícuotas o una de ellas descarta sólo una alícuota. La solución no cooperativa domina (en términos de recaudación) a los casos de impuestos al productor o a las ventas minoristas. Por otro lado, esta solución se caracteriza por imposición excesiva (respecto de un caso cooperativo).Departamento de Economía2016-09info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionDocumento de trabajohttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeTrabajoapplication/pdfhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/65776enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/doc108.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1853-3930info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)instname:Universidad Nacional de La Platainstacron:UNLP2025-09-29T11:09:43Zoai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/65776Institucionalhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/oai/snrdalira@sedici.unlp.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:13292025-09-29 11:09:44.233SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Platafalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Multi-stage taxation by subnational governments: Tax incidence and Leviathan taxation |
title |
Multi-stage taxation by subnational governments: Tax incidence and Leviathan taxation |
spellingShingle |
Multi-stage taxation by subnational governments: Tax incidence and Leviathan taxation Cont, Walter Ciencias Económicas local indirect taxation multistage taxes tax icidence tax competition H71 H21 H22 |
title_short |
Multi-stage taxation by subnational governments: Tax incidence and Leviathan taxation |
title_full |
Multi-stage taxation by subnational governments: Tax incidence and Leviathan taxation |
title_fullStr |
Multi-stage taxation by subnational governments: Tax incidence and Leviathan taxation |
title_full_unstemmed |
Multi-stage taxation by subnational governments: Tax incidence and Leviathan taxation |
title_sort |
Multi-stage taxation by subnational governments: Tax incidence and Leviathan taxation |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Cont, Walter Fernández Felices, Diego |
author |
Cont, Walter |
author_facet |
Cont, Walter Fernández Felices, Diego |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Fernández Felices, Diego |
author2_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Ciencias Económicas local indirect taxation multistage taxes tax icidence tax competition H71 H21 H22 |
topic |
Ciencias Económicas local indirect taxation multistage taxes tax icidence tax competition H71 H21 H22 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
This paper analyzes multi-stage taxation by provinces in a federal country, using a novel two-good, two-province, successive-oligopoly heterogeneous-product Bertrand competition model, where each producer is located in a province and sells its product through exclusive retailers located in both provinces. The producer-retailer setup allows provincial governments to raise taxes on upstream and downstream transactions. First, we analyze tax incidence results and emphasize the importance of the degree of downstream competition on the tax shifting. Second, we solve a non-cooperative revenue maximization problem and study the properties of the equilibrium taxes. We characterize the solution: either all tax rates are positive or one province drops one tax rate. This way, the full-tax solution dominates upstream and downstream taxation. Also, the non-cooperative solution implies over-taxation when compared with the cooperative solution. Este paper analiza impuestos en múltiples etapas recaudados por provincias en un país federal, utilizando un modelo novedoso de competencia en dos segmentos productor- minorista a la Bertrand con productos diferenciados, donde cada productor está ubicado en una provincia y vende en todo el país a través de sus distribuidores. Este modelo genera la posibilidad de que las provincias recauden en las dos etapas de transacciones. En primer lugar, se obtienen resultados de incidencia, enfatizando la importancia del grado de diferenciación sobre la traslación. En segundo lugar, se resuelve el problema de maximización de recaudación en un contexto no cooperativo y se estudian las propiedades de las alícuotas de equilibrio: las provincias utilizan todas las alícuotas o una de ellas descarta sólo una alícuota. La solución no cooperativa domina (en términos de recaudación) a los casos de impuestos al productor o a las ventas minoristas. Por otro lado, esta solución se caracteriza por imposición excesiva (respecto de un caso cooperativo). Departamento de Economía |
description |
This paper analyzes multi-stage taxation by provinces in a federal country, using a novel two-good, two-province, successive-oligopoly heterogeneous-product Bertrand competition model, where each producer is located in a province and sells its product through exclusive retailers located in both provinces. The producer-retailer setup allows provincial governments to raise taxes on upstream and downstream transactions. First, we analyze tax incidence results and emphasize the importance of the degree of downstream competition on the tax shifting. Second, we solve a non-cooperative revenue maximization problem and study the properties of the equilibrium taxes. We characterize the solution: either all tax rates are positive or one province drops one tax rate. This way, the full-tax solution dominates upstream and downstream taxation. Also, the non-cooperative solution implies over-taxation when compared with the cooperative solution. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-09 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion Documento de trabajo http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeTrabajo |
format |
workingPaper |
status_str |
submittedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/65776 |
url |
http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/65776 |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) |
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openAccess |
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) |
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