Direct democracy and tax exporting: theory and an application to the first referendum ("consulta popular") in Argentina

Autores
Porto, Alberto; Porto, Natalia
Año de publicación
2002
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
documento de trabajo
Estado
versión enviada
Descripción
The assignment of the responsibility for different taxing powers is one of the most important problems in the theory and practice of fiscal federalism. The literature provides us with a set of general guidelines for the "tax assignment problem". One conclusion is that "tax exporting" could create perverse signals for fiscal choice. In this paper the tax exporting problem is analyzed with simple models. The case of a tax passed through a referendum (Consulta Popular) in an argentinean tourist Municipality is studied. In a numerical exercise, using the fiscal data of the Municipality, the size of the public expenditures is calculated under different rules of fiscal decision. Then, an empirical analysis of the results of the voting and its determinants is carried out. The paper concludes with some comments, in order to improve the mechanisms of referendum related to fiscal decisions at the municipal level.
Departamento de Economía
Materia
Ciencias Económicas
Argentina
JEL: H23; H71; H72
Democracia
Economía
Impuestos
Política
direct democracy; tax assignment; fiscal externalities; tax exporting
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Repositorio
SEDICI (UNLP)
Institución
Universidad Nacional de La Plata
OAI Identificador
oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/3477
Acceder
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network_name_str SEDICI (UNLP)
spelling Direct democracy and tax exporting: theory and an application to the first referendum ("consulta popular") in ArgentinaPorto, AlbertoPorto, NataliaCiencias EconómicasArgentinaJEL: H23; H71; H72DemocraciaEconomíaImpuestosPolíticadirect democracy; tax assignment; fiscal externalities; tax exportingThe assignment of the responsibility for different taxing powers is one of the most important problems in the theory and practice of fiscal federalism. The literature provides us with a set of general guidelines for the "tax assignment problem". One conclusion is that "tax exporting" could create perverse signals for fiscal choice. In this paper the tax exporting problem is analyzed with simple models. The case of a tax passed through a referendum (Consulta Popular) in an argentinean tourist Municipality is studied. In a numerical exercise, using the fiscal data of the Municipality, the size of the public expenditures is calculated under different rules of fiscal decision. Then, an empirical analysis of the results of the voting and its determinants is carried out. The paper concludes with some comments, in order to improve the mechanisms of referendum related to fiscal decisions at the municipal level.Departamento de Economía2002-12info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionDocumento de trabajohttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeTrabajoapplication/pdfhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/3477enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/doctrab/doc46.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0)reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)instname:Universidad Nacional de La Platainstacron:UNLP2025-09-29T10:49:12Zoai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/3477Institucionalhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/oai/snrdalira@sedici.unlp.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:13292025-09-29 10:49:12.718SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Platafalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Direct democracy and tax exporting: theory and an application to the first referendum ("consulta popular") in Argentina
title Direct democracy and tax exporting: theory and an application to the first referendum ("consulta popular") in Argentina
spellingShingle Direct democracy and tax exporting: theory and an application to the first referendum ("consulta popular") in Argentina
Porto, Alberto
Ciencias Económicas
Argentina
JEL: H23; H71; H72
Democracia
Economía
Impuestos
Política
direct democracy; tax assignment; fiscal externalities; tax exporting
title_short Direct democracy and tax exporting: theory and an application to the first referendum ("consulta popular") in Argentina
title_full Direct democracy and tax exporting: theory and an application to the first referendum ("consulta popular") in Argentina
title_fullStr Direct democracy and tax exporting: theory and an application to the first referendum ("consulta popular") in Argentina
title_full_unstemmed Direct democracy and tax exporting: theory and an application to the first referendum ("consulta popular") in Argentina
title_sort Direct democracy and tax exporting: theory and an application to the first referendum ("consulta popular") in Argentina
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Porto, Alberto
Porto, Natalia
author Porto, Alberto
author_facet Porto, Alberto
Porto, Natalia
author_role author
author2 Porto, Natalia
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Ciencias Económicas
Argentina
JEL: H23; H71; H72
Democracia
Economía
Impuestos
Política
direct democracy; tax assignment; fiscal externalities; tax exporting
topic Ciencias Económicas
Argentina
JEL: H23; H71; H72
Democracia
Economía
Impuestos
Política
direct democracy; tax assignment; fiscal externalities; tax exporting
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv The assignment of the responsibility for different taxing powers is one of the most important problems in the theory and practice of fiscal federalism. The literature provides us with a set of general guidelines for the "tax assignment problem". One conclusion is that "tax exporting" could create perverse signals for fiscal choice. In this paper the tax exporting problem is analyzed with simple models. The case of a tax passed through a referendum (Consulta Popular) in an argentinean tourist Municipality is studied. In a numerical exercise, using the fiscal data of the Municipality, the size of the public expenditures is calculated under different rules of fiscal decision. Then, an empirical analysis of the results of the voting and its determinants is carried out. The paper concludes with some comments, in order to improve the mechanisms of referendum related to fiscal decisions at the municipal level.
Departamento de Economía
description The assignment of the responsibility for different taxing powers is one of the most important problems in the theory and practice of fiscal federalism. The literature provides us with a set of general guidelines for the "tax assignment problem". One conclusion is that "tax exporting" could create perverse signals for fiscal choice. In this paper the tax exporting problem is analyzed with simple models. The case of a tax passed through a referendum (Consulta Popular) in an argentinean tourist Municipality is studied. In a numerical exercise, using the fiscal data of the Municipality, the size of the public expenditures is calculated under different rules of fiscal decision. Then, an empirical analysis of the results of the voting and its determinants is carried out. The paper concludes with some comments, in order to improve the mechanisms of referendum related to fiscal decisions at the municipal level.
publishDate 2002
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2002-12
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion
Documento de trabajo
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042
info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeTrabajo
format workingPaper
status_str submittedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/3477
url http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/3477
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/doctrab/doc46.pdf
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0)
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0)
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)
instname:Universidad Nacional de La Plata
instacron:UNLP
reponame_str SEDICI (UNLP)
collection SEDICI (UNLP)
instname_str Universidad Nacional de La Plata
instacron_str UNLP
institution UNLP
repository.name.fl_str_mv SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Plata
repository.mail.fl_str_mv alira@sedici.unlp.edu.ar
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