The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument
- Autores
- Chichi, Graciela Marta
- Año de publicación
- 2002
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- In this paper, I discuss the current thesis on the modern origin of the ad hominem-argument, by analysing the Aristotelian conception of it. In view of the recent accounts which consider it a relative argument, i.e., acceptable only by the particular respondent, I maintain that there are two Aristotelian versions of the ad hominem, that have identifiable characteristics, and both correspond to the standard variants distinguished in the contemporary treatments of the famous informal fallacy: the abusive and the circumstancial or tu quoque types. I propose to reconstruct the two Aristotelian versions (see sections 1 and 2), which have been recognized again in the ninteenth century (sec. 3). Finally, I examine whether or not it was considered as a fallacious dialogue device by Aristotle and by A. Schopenhauer (sec. 4).
Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación - Materia
-
Filosofía
argumentum ad hominem
argumentum ad personam
Aristotle
dialectics
Schopenhauer - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
- Repositorio
.jpg)
- Institución
- Universidad Nacional de La Plata
- OAI Identificador
- oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/131852
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
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The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-ArgumentChichi, Graciela MartaFilosofíaargumentum ad hominemargumentum ad personamAristotledialecticsSchopenhauerIn this paper, I discuss the current thesis on the modern origin of the <i>ad hominem</i>-argument, by analysing the Aristotelian conception of it. In view of the recent accounts which consider it a relative argument, i.e., acceptable only by the particular respondent, I maintain that there are two Aristotelian versions of the <i>ad hominem</i>, that have identifiable characteristics, and both correspond to the standard variants distinguished in the contemporary treatments of the famous informal fallacy: the abusive and the circumstancial or <i>tu quoque</i> types. I propose to reconstruct the two Aristotelian versions (see sections 1 and 2), which have been recognized again in the ninteenth century (sec. 3). Finally, I examine whether or not it was considered as a fallacious dialogue device by Aristotle and by A. Schopenhauer (sec. 4).Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación2002info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionArticulohttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdf333-348http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/131852enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/0920-427Xinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1023/a:1019967112062info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)instname:Universidad Nacional de La Platainstacron:UNLP2025-09-29T11:32:31Zoai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/131852Institucionalhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/oai/snrdalira@sedici.unlp.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:13292025-09-29 11:32:32.107SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Platafalse |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument |
| title |
The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument |
| spellingShingle |
The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument Chichi, Graciela Marta Filosofía argumentum ad hominem argumentum ad personam Aristotle dialectics Schopenhauer |
| title_short |
The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument |
| title_full |
The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument |
| title_fullStr |
The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument |
| title_full_unstemmed |
The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument |
| title_sort |
The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Chichi, Graciela Marta |
| author |
Chichi, Graciela Marta |
| author_facet |
Chichi, Graciela Marta |
| author_role |
author |
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Filosofía argumentum ad hominem argumentum ad personam Aristotle dialectics Schopenhauer |
| topic |
Filosofía argumentum ad hominem argumentum ad personam Aristotle dialectics Schopenhauer |
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In this paper, I discuss the current thesis on the modern origin of the <i>ad hominem</i>-argument, by analysing the Aristotelian conception of it. In view of the recent accounts which consider it a relative argument, i.e., acceptable only by the particular respondent, I maintain that there are two Aristotelian versions of the <i>ad hominem</i>, that have identifiable characteristics, and both correspond to the standard variants distinguished in the contemporary treatments of the famous informal fallacy: the abusive and the circumstancial or <i>tu quoque</i> types. I propose to reconstruct the two Aristotelian versions (see sections 1 and 2), which have been recognized again in the ninteenth century (sec. 3). Finally, I examine whether or not it was considered as a fallacious dialogue device by Aristotle and by A. Schopenhauer (sec. 4). Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación |
| description |
In this paper, I discuss the current thesis on the modern origin of the <i>ad hominem</i>-argument, by analysing the Aristotelian conception of it. In view of the recent accounts which consider it a relative argument, i.e., acceptable only by the particular respondent, I maintain that there are two Aristotelian versions of the <i>ad hominem</i>, that have identifiable characteristics, and both correspond to the standard variants distinguished in the contemporary treatments of the famous informal fallacy: the abusive and the circumstancial or <i>tu quoque</i> types. I propose to reconstruct the two Aristotelian versions (see sections 1 and 2), which have been recognized again in the ninteenth century (sec. 3). Finally, I examine whether or not it was considered as a fallacious dialogue device by Aristotle and by A. Schopenhauer (sec. 4). |
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2002 |
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2002 |
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