The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument

Autores
Chichi, Graciela Marta
Año de publicación
2002
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
In this paper, I discuss the current thesis on the modern origin of the ad hominem-argument, by analysing the Aristotelian conception of it. In view of the recent accounts which consider it a relative argument, i.e., acceptable only by the particular respondent, I maintain that there are two Aristotelian versions of the ad hominem, that have identifiable characteristics, and both correspond to the standard variants distinguished in the contemporary treatments of the famous informal fallacy: the abusive and the circumstancial or tu quoque types. I propose to reconstruct the two Aristotelian versions (see sections 1 and 2), which have been recognized again in the ninteenth century (sec. 3). Finally, I examine whether or not it was considered as a fallacious dialogue device by Aristotle and by A. Schopenhauer (sec. 4).
Fil: Chichi, Graciela Marta. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación. Instituto de Investigaciones en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales (UNLP-CONICET); Argentina.
Fuente
Argumentation (Dordrecht), 16(3), 333-348. (2020)
ISSN 0920-427X
Materia
Filosofía
Argumentum ad hominem
Argumentum ad personam
Aristotle
Dialectics
Schopenhauer
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Repositorio
Memoria Académica (UNLP-FAHCE)
Institución
Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación
OAI Identificador
oai:memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar:snrd:Jpr16871

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spelling The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-ArgumentChichi, Graciela MartaFilosofíaArgumentum ad hominemArgumentum ad personamAristotleDialecticsSchopenhauerIn this paper, I discuss the current thesis on the modern origin of the ad hominem-argument, by analysing the Aristotelian conception of it. In view of the recent accounts which consider it a relative argument, i.e., acceptable only by the particular respondent, I maintain that there are two Aristotelian versions of the ad hominem, that have identifiable characteristics, and both correspond to the standard variants distinguished in the contemporary treatments of the famous informal fallacy: the abusive and the circumstancial or tu quoque types. I propose to reconstruct the two Aristotelian versions (see sections 1 and 2), which have been recognized again in the ninteenth century (sec. 3). Finally, I examine whether or not it was considered as a fallacious dialogue device by Aristotle and by A. Schopenhauer (sec. 4).Fil: Chichi, Graciela Marta. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación. Instituto de Investigaciones en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales (UNLP-CONICET); Argentina.2002info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfhttps://www.memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar/art_revistas/pr.16871/pr.16871.pdfArgumentation (Dordrecht), 16(3), 333-348. (2020)ISSN 0920-427Xreponame:Memoria Académica (UNLP-FAHCE)instname:Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educacióninstacron:UNLPenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/hdl/10915/131852info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1023/a:1019967112062info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/2025-09-29T11:58:13Zoai:memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar:snrd:Jpr16871Institucionalhttps://www.memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar/Universidad públicahttps://www.fahce.unlp.edu.ar/https://www.memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar/oaiserver.cgimemoria@fahce.unlp.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:13412025-09-29 11:58:14.345Memoria Académica (UNLP-FAHCE) - Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educaciónfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument
title The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument
spellingShingle The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument
Chichi, Graciela Marta
Filosofía
Argumentum ad hominem
Argumentum ad personam
Aristotle
Dialectics
Schopenhauer
title_short The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument
title_full The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument
title_fullStr The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument
title_full_unstemmed The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument
title_sort The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Chichi, Graciela Marta
author Chichi, Graciela Marta
author_facet Chichi, Graciela Marta
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Filosofía
Argumentum ad hominem
Argumentum ad personam
Aristotle
Dialectics
Schopenhauer
topic Filosofía
Argumentum ad hominem
Argumentum ad personam
Aristotle
Dialectics
Schopenhauer
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv In this paper, I discuss the current thesis on the modern origin of the ad hominem-argument, by analysing the Aristotelian conception of it. In view of the recent accounts which consider it a relative argument, i.e., acceptable only by the particular respondent, I maintain that there are two Aristotelian versions of the ad hominem, that have identifiable characteristics, and both correspond to the standard variants distinguished in the contemporary treatments of the famous informal fallacy: the abusive and the circumstancial or tu quoque types. I propose to reconstruct the two Aristotelian versions (see sections 1 and 2), which have been recognized again in the ninteenth century (sec. 3). Finally, I examine whether or not it was considered as a fallacious dialogue device by Aristotle and by A. Schopenhauer (sec. 4).
Fil: Chichi, Graciela Marta. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación. Instituto de Investigaciones en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales (UNLP-CONICET); Argentina.
description In this paper, I discuss the current thesis on the modern origin of the ad hominem-argument, by analysing the Aristotelian conception of it. In view of the recent accounts which consider it a relative argument, i.e., acceptable only by the particular respondent, I maintain that there are two Aristotelian versions of the ad hominem, that have identifiable characteristics, and both correspond to the standard variants distinguished in the contemporary treatments of the famous informal fallacy: the abusive and the circumstancial or tu quoque types. I propose to reconstruct the two Aristotelian versions (see sections 1 and 2), which have been recognized again in the ninteenth century (sec. 3). Finally, I examine whether or not it was considered as a fallacious dialogue device by Aristotle and by A. Schopenhauer (sec. 4).
publishDate 2002
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2002
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://www.memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar/art_revistas/pr.16871/pr.16871.pdf
url https://www.memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar/art_revistas/pr.16871/pr.16871.pdf
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/hdl/10915/131852
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1023/a:1019967112062
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Argumentation (Dordrecht), 16(3), 333-348. (2020)
ISSN 0920-427X
reponame:Memoria Académica (UNLP-FAHCE)
instname:Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación
instacron:UNLP
reponame_str Memoria Académica (UNLP-FAHCE)
collection Memoria Académica (UNLP-FAHCE)
instname_str Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación
instacron_str UNLP
institution UNLP
repository.name.fl_str_mv Memoria Académica (UNLP-FAHCE) - Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación
repository.mail.fl_str_mv memoria@fahce.unlp.edu.ar
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