Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs : Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension
- Autores
- Bérgolo Sosa, Marcelo; Cruces, Guillermo
- Año de publicación
- 2014
- Idioma
- español castellano
- Tipo de recurso
- documento de trabajo
- Estado
- versión enviada
- Descripción
- This article studies how social insurance programs shape individual’s incentives to take up registered employment and to report earnings to the tax authorities. The analysis is based on a social insurance reform in Uruguay that extended healthcare coverage to the dependent children of registered private-sector workers. The identification strategy relies on a comparison between individuals with and without dependent children before and after the reform. The reform increased benefit-eligible registered employment by 1.6 percentage points (about 5 percent above the prereform level), mainly due to an increase in labor force participation rather than to movement from unregistered to registered employment. The shift was greater for parents with younger children and for cohabiting adults whose partners’ jobs did not provide the couples’ children with access to the benefit. Finally, the reform increased the incidence of underreporting of salaried earnings by about 4 percentage points (25 percent higher than the pre-reform level), mostly for workers employed at small firms. The increase in fiscal revenue from higher levels of registered employment was several orders of magnitude greater than the loss of revenue due to an increase in underreporting.
Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales (CEDLAS) - Materia
-
Ciencias Económicas
labor supply
work incentives
social insurance
tax evasion
impuesto
JEL: J22, H26, O17
empleo - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Universidad Nacional de La Plata
- OAI Identificador
- oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/49628
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
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Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs : Evidence from an employment-based benefit extensionBérgolo Sosa, MarceloCruces, GuillermoCiencias Económicaslabor supplywork incentivessocial insurancetax evasionimpuestoJEL: J22, H26, O17empleoThis article studies how social insurance programs shape individual’s incentives to take up registered employment and to report earnings to the tax authorities. The analysis is based on a social insurance reform in Uruguay that extended healthcare coverage to the dependent children of registered private-sector workers. The identification strategy relies on a comparison between individuals with and without dependent children before and after the reform. The reform increased benefit-eligible registered employment by 1.6 percentage points (about 5 percent above the prereform level), mainly due to an increase in labor force participation rather than to movement from unregistered to registered employment. The shift was greater for parents with younger children and for cohabiting adults whose partners’ jobs did not provide the couples’ children with access to the benefit. Finally, the reform increased the incidence of underreporting of salaried earnings by about 4 percentage points (25 percent higher than the pre-reform level), mostly for workers employed at small firms. The increase in fiscal revenue from higher levels of registered employment was several orders of magnitude greater than the loss of revenue due to an increase in underreporting.Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales (CEDLAS)2014-05info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionDocumento de trabajohttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeTrabajoapplication/pdfhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/49628spainfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://cedlas.econo.unlp.edu.ar/download.php?file=archivos_upload/doc_cedlas161.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1853-0168info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)instname:Universidad Nacional de La Platainstacron:UNLP2025-09-29T11:03:42Zoai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/49628Institucionalhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/oai/snrdalira@sedici.unlp.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:13292025-09-29 11:03:42.639SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Platafalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs : Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension |
title |
Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs : Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension |
spellingShingle |
Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs : Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension Bérgolo Sosa, Marcelo Ciencias Económicas labor supply work incentives social insurance tax evasion impuesto JEL: J22, H26, O17 empleo |
title_short |
Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs : Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension |
title_full |
Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs : Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension |
title_fullStr |
Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs : Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension |
title_full_unstemmed |
Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs : Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension |
title_sort |
Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs : Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Bérgolo Sosa, Marcelo Cruces, Guillermo |
author |
Bérgolo Sosa, Marcelo |
author_facet |
Bérgolo Sosa, Marcelo Cruces, Guillermo |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Cruces, Guillermo |
author2_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Ciencias Económicas labor supply work incentives social insurance tax evasion impuesto JEL: J22, H26, O17 empleo |
topic |
Ciencias Económicas labor supply work incentives social insurance tax evasion impuesto JEL: J22, H26, O17 empleo |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
This article studies how social insurance programs shape individual’s incentives to take up registered employment and to report earnings to the tax authorities. The analysis is based on a social insurance reform in Uruguay that extended healthcare coverage to the dependent children of registered private-sector workers. The identification strategy relies on a comparison between individuals with and without dependent children before and after the reform. The reform increased benefit-eligible registered employment by 1.6 percentage points (about 5 percent above the prereform level), mainly due to an increase in labor force participation rather than to movement from unregistered to registered employment. The shift was greater for parents with younger children and for cohabiting adults whose partners’ jobs did not provide the couples’ children with access to the benefit. Finally, the reform increased the incidence of underreporting of salaried earnings by about 4 percentage points (25 percent higher than the pre-reform level), mostly for workers employed at small firms. The increase in fiscal revenue from higher levels of registered employment was several orders of magnitude greater than the loss of revenue due to an increase in underreporting. Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales (CEDLAS) |
description |
This article studies how social insurance programs shape individual’s incentives to take up registered employment and to report earnings to the tax authorities. The analysis is based on a social insurance reform in Uruguay that extended healthcare coverage to the dependent children of registered private-sector workers. The identification strategy relies on a comparison between individuals with and without dependent children before and after the reform. The reform increased benefit-eligible registered employment by 1.6 percentage points (about 5 percent above the prereform level), mainly due to an increase in labor force participation rather than to movement from unregistered to registered employment. The shift was greater for parents with younger children and for cohabiting adults whose partners’ jobs did not provide the couples’ children with access to the benefit. Finally, the reform increased the incidence of underreporting of salaried earnings by about 4 percentage points (25 percent higher than the pre-reform level), mostly for workers employed at small firms. The increase in fiscal revenue from higher levels of registered employment was several orders of magnitude greater than the loss of revenue due to an increase in underreporting. |
publishDate |
2014 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2014-05 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion Documento de trabajo http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeTrabajo |
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http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/49628 |
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) |
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