Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors

Autores
González, P.; Rebón, Lorena; Ferreira da Silva, T.; Figueroa, Miguel; Saavedra, Carlos; Curty, Marcos; Lima, G.; Xavier, Guilherme B.; Nogueira, W. A. T.
Año de publicación
2015
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device-independent QKD and measurement-device-independent QKD. Here we present a third solution that might exceed the performance and practicality of the previous two in circumventing detector side-channel attacks, which arguably is the most hazardous part of QKD implementations. Our proposal has, however, one main requirement: the legitimate users of the system need to ensure that their labs do not leak any unwanted information to the outside. The security in the low-loss regime is guaranteed, while in the high-loss regime we already prove its robustness against some eavesdropping strategies.
Instituto de Física La Plata
Materia
Física
Physics
Quantum cryptography
Implementation
Eavesdropping
Computer security
Quantum information science
Detector
Quantum key distribution
Robustness (computer science)
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Repositorio
SEDICI (UNLP)
Institución
Universidad Nacional de La Plata
OAI Identificador
oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/125859

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network_name_str SEDICI (UNLP)
spelling Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectorsGonzález, P.Rebón, LorenaFerreira da Silva, T.Figueroa, MiguelSaavedra, CarlosCurty, MarcosLima, G.Xavier, Guilherme B.Nogueira, W. A. T.FísicaPhysicsQuantum cryptographyImplementationEavesdroppingComputer securityQuantum information scienceDetectorQuantum key distributionRobustness (computer science)Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device-independent QKD and measurement-device-independent QKD. Here we present a third solution that might exceed the performance and practicality of the previous two in circumventing detector side-channel attacks, which arguably is the most hazardous part of QKD implementations. Our proposal has, however, one main requirement: the legitimate users of the system need to ensure that their labs do not leak any unwanted information to the outside. The security in the low-loss regime is guaranteed, while in the high-loss regime we already prove its robustness against some eavesdropping strategies.Instituto de Física La Plata2015-08-18info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionArticulohttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/125859enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1050-2947info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1094-1622info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/arxiv/1410.1422info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1103/physreva.92.022337info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)instname:Universidad Nacional de La Platainstacron:UNLP2025-10-15T11:22:11Zoai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/125859Institucionalhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/oai/snrdalira@sedici.unlp.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:13292025-10-15 11:22:12.245SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Platafalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
title Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
spellingShingle Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
González, P.
Física
Physics
Quantum cryptography
Implementation
Eavesdropping
Computer security
Quantum information science
Detector
Quantum key distribution
Robustness (computer science)
title_short Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
title_full Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
title_fullStr Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
title_full_unstemmed Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
title_sort Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv González, P.
Rebón, Lorena
Ferreira da Silva, T.
Figueroa, Miguel
Saavedra, Carlos
Curty, Marcos
Lima, G.
Xavier, Guilherme B.
Nogueira, W. A. T.
author González, P.
author_facet González, P.
Rebón, Lorena
Ferreira da Silva, T.
Figueroa, Miguel
Saavedra, Carlos
Curty, Marcos
Lima, G.
Xavier, Guilherme B.
Nogueira, W. A. T.
author_role author
author2 Rebón, Lorena
Ferreira da Silva, T.
Figueroa, Miguel
Saavedra, Carlos
Curty, Marcos
Lima, G.
Xavier, Guilherme B.
Nogueira, W. A. T.
author2_role author
author
author
author
author
author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Física
Physics
Quantum cryptography
Implementation
Eavesdropping
Computer security
Quantum information science
Detector
Quantum key distribution
Robustness (computer science)
topic Física
Physics
Quantum cryptography
Implementation
Eavesdropping
Computer security
Quantum information science
Detector
Quantum key distribution
Robustness (computer science)
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device-independent QKD and measurement-device-independent QKD. Here we present a third solution that might exceed the performance and practicality of the previous two in circumventing detector side-channel attacks, which arguably is the most hazardous part of QKD implementations. Our proposal has, however, one main requirement: the legitimate users of the system need to ensure that their labs do not leak any unwanted information to the outside. The security in the low-loss regime is guaranteed, while in the high-loss regime we already prove its robustness against some eavesdropping strategies.
Instituto de Física La Plata
description Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device-independent QKD and measurement-device-independent QKD. Here we present a third solution that might exceed the performance and practicality of the previous two in circumventing detector side-channel attacks, which arguably is the most hazardous part of QKD implementations. Our proposal has, however, one main requirement: the legitimate users of the system need to ensure that their labs do not leak any unwanted information to the outside. The security in the low-loss regime is guaranteed, while in the high-loss regime we already prove its robustness against some eavesdropping strategies.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015-08-18
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Articulo
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/125859
url http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/125859
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1050-2947
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1094-1622
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/arxiv/1410.1422
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1103/physreva.92.022337
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)
instname:Universidad Nacional de La Plata
instacron:UNLP
reponame_str SEDICI (UNLP)
collection SEDICI (UNLP)
instname_str Universidad Nacional de La Plata
instacron_str UNLP
institution UNLP
repository.name.fl_str_mv SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Plata
repository.mail.fl_str_mv alira@sedici.unlp.edu.ar
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