Balanced many-to-one matching problems with preferences over colleagues

Autores
Cesco, Juan
Año de publicación
2016
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
documento de conferencia
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Matching problems is a well studied class of coalitions formation models. Several core-like type solutions have been proposed for these models. However, unlike what happens in game theory, no balancedness properties have been introduced to study existence problems so far. In this paper we state a balancedness condition on a many-to-one matching problem with preferences over colleagues which turns to be a necessary and sufficient condition to guarantee the non-emptiness of the set of core matchings. We use this result to improve a recent characterization about the existence of core matchings for the classical many-to-one matching problem without preferences over colleagues. Our approach has been carried out by using some techniques and results from the theory of hedonic games, which is another class of coalitions formation models.
Sociedad Argentina de Informática e Investigación Operativa (SADIO)
Materia
Ciencias Informáticas
teoría de grafos
theory of hedonic games
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/
Repositorio
SEDICI (UNLP)
Institución
Universidad Nacional de La Plata
OAI Identificador
oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/58572
Acceder
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network_name_str SEDICI (UNLP)
spelling Balanced many-to-one matching problems with preferences over colleaguesCesco, JuanCiencias Informáticasteoría de grafostheory of hedonic gamesMatching problems is a well studied class of coalitions formation models. Several core-like type solutions have been proposed for these models. However, unlike what happens in game theory, no balancedness properties have been introduced to study existence problems so far. In this paper we state a balancedness condition on a many-to-one matching problem with preferences over colleagues which turns to be a necessary and sufficient condition to guarantee the non-emptiness of the set of core matchings. We use this result to improve a recent characterization about the existence of core matchings for the classical many-to-one matching problem without preferences over colleagues. Our approach has been carried out by using some techniques and results from the theory of hedonic games, which is another class of coalitions formation models.Sociedad Argentina de Informática e Investigación Operativa (SADIO)2016-09info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjectinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionObjeto de conferenciahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferenciaapplication/pdf37-47http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/58572enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://45jaiio.sadio.org.ar/sites/default/files/Sio-21.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/2451-7550info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported (CC BY-SA 3.0)reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)instname:Universidad Nacional de La Platainstacron:UNLP2025-10-15T10:59:16Zoai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/58572Institucionalhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/oai/snrdalira@sedici.unlp.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:13292025-10-15 10:59:16.344SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Platafalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Balanced many-to-one matching problems with preferences over colleagues
title Balanced many-to-one matching problems with preferences over colleagues
spellingShingle Balanced many-to-one matching problems with preferences over colleagues
Cesco, Juan
Ciencias Informáticas
teoría de grafos
theory of hedonic games
title_short Balanced many-to-one matching problems with preferences over colleagues
title_full Balanced many-to-one matching problems with preferences over colleagues
title_fullStr Balanced many-to-one matching problems with preferences over colleagues
title_full_unstemmed Balanced many-to-one matching problems with preferences over colleagues
title_sort Balanced many-to-one matching problems with preferences over colleagues
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Cesco, Juan
author Cesco, Juan
author_facet Cesco, Juan
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Ciencias Informáticas
teoría de grafos
theory of hedonic games
topic Ciencias Informáticas
teoría de grafos
theory of hedonic games
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Matching problems is a well studied class of coalitions formation models. Several core-like type solutions have been proposed for these models. However, unlike what happens in game theory, no balancedness properties have been introduced to study existence problems so far. In this paper we state a balancedness condition on a many-to-one matching problem with preferences over colleagues which turns to be a necessary and sufficient condition to guarantee the non-emptiness of the set of core matchings. We use this result to improve a recent characterization about the existence of core matchings for the classical many-to-one matching problem without preferences over colleagues. Our approach has been carried out by using some techniques and results from the theory of hedonic games, which is another class of coalitions formation models.
Sociedad Argentina de Informática e Investigación Operativa (SADIO)
description Matching problems is a well studied class of coalitions formation models. Several core-like type solutions have been proposed for these models. However, unlike what happens in game theory, no balancedness properties have been introduced to study existence problems so far. In this paper we state a balancedness condition on a many-to-one matching problem with preferences over colleagues which turns to be a necessary and sufficient condition to guarantee the non-emptiness of the set of core matchings. We use this result to improve a recent characterization about the existence of core matchings for the classical many-to-one matching problem without preferences over colleagues. Our approach has been carried out by using some techniques and results from the theory of hedonic games, which is another class of coalitions formation models.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016-09
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Objeto de conferencia
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format conferenceObject
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/58572
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dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/2451-7550
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported (CC BY-SA 3.0)
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported (CC BY-SA 3.0)
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
37-47
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)
instname:Universidad Nacional de La Plata
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reponame_str SEDICI (UNLP)
collection SEDICI (UNLP)
instname_str Universidad Nacional de La Plata
instacron_str UNLP
institution UNLP
repository.name.fl_str_mv SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Plata
repository.mail.fl_str_mv alira@sedici.unlp.edu.ar
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