Subordinated hedonic games
- Autores
- Cesco, Juan Carlos
- Año de publicación
- 2013
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- Hedonic games are simple models of coalition formation whose main solution concept is that of core-partition. Several conditions guaranteeing the existence of core-partitions have been proposed so far. In this paper, we explore hedonic games where a reduced family of coalitions determines the development of the game. We allow each coalition to select a subset of it so as to act as its set of representatives (a distribution). Then, we introduce the notion of subordination of a hedonic game to a given distribution. Subordination roughly states that any player chosen as a representative for a coalition has to be comfortable with this decision. With subordination we have a tool, within hedonic games, to compare how a "convenient" agreement reached by the sets of representatives of dierent groups of a society is "valued" by the rest of the society. In our approach, a "convenient" agreement is a core-partition, so this paper is devoted to relate the core of a hedonic game with the core of a hedonic game played by the sets of representatives. Thus we have to tackle the existence problem of core-partitions in a reduced game where the only coalitions that matter are those prescribed by the distribution as a set of representatives. We also study how a distribution determines the whole set of core-partitions of a hedonic game. As an interesting example, we introduce the notion of hedonic partitioning game, which resembles partitioning games studied in the case where a utility, transferable or not, is present. The existence result obtained in this new class of games is later used to provide a non constructive proof of the existence of a stable matching in the marriage model.
Fil: Cesco, Juan Carlos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico - CONICET - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis; Argentina; - Materia
-
Hedonic Games
Core partitions
Distributions - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/1077
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Subordinated hedonic gamesCesco, Juan CarlosHedonic GamesCore partitionsDistributionshttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1Hedonic games are simple models of coalition formation whose main solution concept is that of core-partition. Several conditions guaranteeing the existence of core-partitions have been proposed so far. In this paper, we explore hedonic games where a reduced family of coalitions determines the development of the game. We allow each coalition to select a subset of it so as to act as its set of representatives (a distribution). Then, we introduce the notion of subordination of a hedonic game to a given distribution. Subordination roughly states that any player chosen as a representative for a coalition has to be comfortable with this decision. With subordination we have a tool, within hedonic games, to compare how a "convenient" agreement reached by the sets of representatives of dierent groups of a society is "valued" by the rest of the society. In our approach, a "convenient" agreement is a core-partition, so this paper is devoted to relate the core of a hedonic game with the core of a hedonic game played by the sets of representatives. Thus we have to tackle the existence problem of core-partitions in a reduced game where the only coalitions that matter are those prescribed by the distribution as a set of representatives. We also study how a distribution determines the whole set of core-partitions of a hedonic game. As an interesting example, we introduce the notion of hedonic partitioning game, which resembles partitioning games studied in the case where a utility, transferable or not, is present. The existence result obtained in this new class of games is later used to provide a non constructive proof of the existence of a stable matching in the marriage model.Fil: Cesco, Juan Carlos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico - CONICET - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis; Argentina;Hindawi Publishing Corporation2013-05info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/1077Cesco, Juan Carlos; Subordinated hedonic games; Hindawi Publishing Corporation; Game Theory; 2013; 5-2013; 102314-6559enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.hindawi.com/journals/gt/2013/512742/info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1155/2013/5info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T09:45:01Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/1077instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 09:45:01.632CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Subordinated hedonic games |
title |
Subordinated hedonic games |
spellingShingle |
Subordinated hedonic games Cesco, Juan Carlos Hedonic Games Core partitions Distributions |
title_short |
Subordinated hedonic games |
title_full |
Subordinated hedonic games |
title_fullStr |
Subordinated hedonic games |
title_full_unstemmed |
Subordinated hedonic games |
title_sort |
Subordinated hedonic games |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Cesco, Juan Carlos |
author |
Cesco, Juan Carlos |
author_facet |
Cesco, Juan Carlos |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Hedonic Games Core partitions Distributions |
topic |
Hedonic Games Core partitions Distributions |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
Hedonic games are simple models of coalition formation whose main solution concept is that of core-partition. Several conditions guaranteeing the existence of core-partitions have been proposed so far. In this paper, we explore hedonic games where a reduced family of coalitions determines the development of the game. We allow each coalition to select a subset of it so as to act as its set of representatives (a distribution). Then, we introduce the notion of subordination of a hedonic game to a given distribution. Subordination roughly states that any player chosen as a representative for a coalition has to be comfortable with this decision. With subordination we have a tool, within hedonic games, to compare how a "convenient" agreement reached by the sets of representatives of dierent groups of a society is "valued" by the rest of the society. In our approach, a "convenient" agreement is a core-partition, so this paper is devoted to relate the core of a hedonic game with the core of a hedonic game played by the sets of representatives. Thus we have to tackle the existence problem of core-partitions in a reduced game where the only coalitions that matter are those prescribed by the distribution as a set of representatives. We also study how a distribution determines the whole set of core-partitions of a hedonic game. As an interesting example, we introduce the notion of hedonic partitioning game, which resembles partitioning games studied in the case where a utility, transferable or not, is present. The existence result obtained in this new class of games is later used to provide a non constructive proof of the existence of a stable matching in the marriage model. Fil: Cesco, Juan Carlos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico - CONICET - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis; Argentina; |
description |
Hedonic games are simple models of coalition formation whose main solution concept is that of core-partition. Several conditions guaranteeing the existence of core-partitions have been proposed so far. In this paper, we explore hedonic games where a reduced family of coalitions determines the development of the game. We allow each coalition to select a subset of it so as to act as its set of representatives (a distribution). Then, we introduce the notion of subordination of a hedonic game to a given distribution. Subordination roughly states that any player chosen as a representative for a coalition has to be comfortable with this decision. With subordination we have a tool, within hedonic games, to compare how a "convenient" agreement reached by the sets of representatives of dierent groups of a society is "valued" by the rest of the society. In our approach, a "convenient" agreement is a core-partition, so this paper is devoted to relate the core of a hedonic game with the core of a hedonic game played by the sets of representatives. Thus we have to tackle the existence problem of core-partitions in a reduced game where the only coalitions that matter are those prescribed by the distribution as a set of representatives. We also study how a distribution determines the whole set of core-partitions of a hedonic game. As an interesting example, we introduce the notion of hedonic partitioning game, which resembles partitioning games studied in the case where a utility, transferable or not, is present. The existence result obtained in this new class of games is later used to provide a non constructive proof of the existence of a stable matching in the marriage model. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-05 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/1077 Cesco, Juan Carlos; Subordinated hedonic games; Hindawi Publishing Corporation; Game Theory; 2013; 5-2013; 10 2314-6559 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/1077 |
identifier_str_mv |
Cesco, Juan Carlos; Subordinated hedonic games; Hindawi Publishing Corporation; Game Theory; 2013; 5-2013; 10 2314-6559 |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.hindawi.com/journals/gt/2013/512742/ info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1155/2013/5 |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Hindawi Publishing Corporation |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Hindawi Publishing Corporation |
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reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
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Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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