Subordinated hedonic games

Autores
Cesco, Juan Carlos
Año de publicación
2013
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Hedonic games are simple models of coalition formation whose main solution concept is that of core-partition. Several conditions guaranteeing the existence of core-partitions have been proposed so far. In this paper, we explore hedonic games where a reduced family of coalitions determines the development of the game. We allow each coalition to select a subset of it so as to act as its set of representatives (a distribution). Then, we introduce the notion of subordination of a hedonic game to a given distribution. Subordination roughly states that any player chosen as a representative for a coalition has to be comfortable with this decision. With subordination we have a tool, within hedonic games, to compare how a "convenient" agreement reached by the sets of representatives of dierent groups of a society is "valued" by the rest of the society. In our approach, a "convenient" agreement is a core-partition, so this paper is devoted to relate the core of a hedonic game with the core of a hedonic game played by the sets of representatives. Thus we have to tackle the existence problem of core-partitions in a reduced game where the only coalitions that matter are those prescribed by the distribution as a set of representatives. We also study how a distribution determines the whole set of core-partitions of a hedonic game. As an interesting example, we introduce the notion of hedonic partitioning game, which resembles partitioning games studied in the case where a utility, transferable or not, is present. The existence result obtained in this new class of games is later used to provide a non constructive proof of the existence of a stable matching in the marriage model.
Fil: Cesco, Juan Carlos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico - CONICET - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis; Argentina;
Materia
Hedonic Games
Core partitions
Distributions
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/1077

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spelling Subordinated hedonic gamesCesco, Juan CarlosHedonic GamesCore partitionsDistributionshttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1Hedonic games are simple models of coalition formation whose main solution concept is that of core-partition. Several conditions guaranteeing the existence of core-partitions have been proposed so far. In this paper, we explore hedonic games where a reduced family of coalitions determines the development of the game. We allow each coalition to select a subset of it so as to act as its set of representatives (a distribution). Then, we introduce the notion of subordination of a hedonic game to a given distribution. Subordination roughly states that any player chosen as a representative for a coalition has to be comfortable with this decision. With subordination we have a tool, within hedonic games, to compare how a "convenient" agreement reached by the sets of representatives of dierent groups of a society is "valued" by the rest of the society. In our approach, a "convenient" agreement is a core-partition, so this paper is devoted to relate the core of a hedonic game with the core of a hedonic game played by the sets of representatives. Thus we have to tackle the existence problem of core-partitions in a reduced game where the only coalitions that matter are those prescribed by the distribution as a set of representatives. We also study how a distribution determines the whole set of core-partitions of a hedonic game. As an interesting example, we introduce the notion of hedonic partitioning game, which resembles partitioning games studied in the case where a utility, transferable or not, is present. The existence result obtained in this new class of games is later used to provide a non constructive proof of the existence of a stable matching in the marriage model.Fil: Cesco, Juan Carlos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico - CONICET - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis; Argentina;Hindawi Publishing Corporation2013-05info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/1077Cesco, Juan Carlos; Subordinated hedonic games; Hindawi Publishing Corporation; Game Theory; 2013; 5-2013; 102314-6559enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.hindawi.com/journals/gt/2013/512742/info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1155/2013/5info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T09:45:01Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/1077instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 09:45:01.632CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Subordinated hedonic games
title Subordinated hedonic games
spellingShingle Subordinated hedonic games
Cesco, Juan Carlos
Hedonic Games
Core partitions
Distributions
title_short Subordinated hedonic games
title_full Subordinated hedonic games
title_fullStr Subordinated hedonic games
title_full_unstemmed Subordinated hedonic games
title_sort Subordinated hedonic games
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Cesco, Juan Carlos
author Cesco, Juan Carlos
author_facet Cesco, Juan Carlos
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Hedonic Games
Core partitions
Distributions
topic Hedonic Games
Core partitions
Distributions
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Hedonic games are simple models of coalition formation whose main solution concept is that of core-partition. Several conditions guaranteeing the existence of core-partitions have been proposed so far. In this paper, we explore hedonic games where a reduced family of coalitions determines the development of the game. We allow each coalition to select a subset of it so as to act as its set of representatives (a distribution). Then, we introduce the notion of subordination of a hedonic game to a given distribution. Subordination roughly states that any player chosen as a representative for a coalition has to be comfortable with this decision. With subordination we have a tool, within hedonic games, to compare how a "convenient" agreement reached by the sets of representatives of dierent groups of a society is "valued" by the rest of the society. In our approach, a "convenient" agreement is a core-partition, so this paper is devoted to relate the core of a hedonic game with the core of a hedonic game played by the sets of representatives. Thus we have to tackle the existence problem of core-partitions in a reduced game where the only coalitions that matter are those prescribed by the distribution as a set of representatives. We also study how a distribution determines the whole set of core-partitions of a hedonic game. As an interesting example, we introduce the notion of hedonic partitioning game, which resembles partitioning games studied in the case where a utility, transferable or not, is present. The existence result obtained in this new class of games is later used to provide a non constructive proof of the existence of a stable matching in the marriage model.
Fil: Cesco, Juan Carlos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico - CONICET - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis; Argentina;
description Hedonic games are simple models of coalition formation whose main solution concept is that of core-partition. Several conditions guaranteeing the existence of core-partitions have been proposed so far. In this paper, we explore hedonic games where a reduced family of coalitions determines the development of the game. We allow each coalition to select a subset of it so as to act as its set of representatives (a distribution). Then, we introduce the notion of subordination of a hedonic game to a given distribution. Subordination roughly states that any player chosen as a representative for a coalition has to be comfortable with this decision. With subordination we have a tool, within hedonic games, to compare how a "convenient" agreement reached by the sets of representatives of dierent groups of a society is "valued" by the rest of the society. In our approach, a "convenient" agreement is a core-partition, so this paper is devoted to relate the core of a hedonic game with the core of a hedonic game played by the sets of representatives. Thus we have to tackle the existence problem of core-partitions in a reduced game where the only coalitions that matter are those prescribed by the distribution as a set of representatives. We also study how a distribution determines the whole set of core-partitions of a hedonic game. As an interesting example, we introduce the notion of hedonic partitioning game, which resembles partitioning games studied in the case where a utility, transferable or not, is present. The existence result obtained in this new class of games is later used to provide a non constructive proof of the existence of a stable matching in the marriage model.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-05
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/1077
Cesco, Juan Carlos; Subordinated hedonic games; Hindawi Publishing Corporation; Game Theory; 2013; 5-2013; 10
2314-6559
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/1077
identifier_str_mv Cesco, Juan Carlos; Subordinated hedonic games; Hindawi Publishing Corporation; Game Theory; 2013; 5-2013; 10
2314-6559
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.hindawi.com/journals/gt/2013/512742/
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1155/2013/5
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Hindawi Publishing Corporation
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Hindawi Publishing Corporation
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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