Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs. Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension

Autores
Bergolo Sosa, Marcelo Luis; Cruces, Guillermo Antonio
Año de publicación
2014
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
This article studies how social insurance programs shape individual's incentives to take up registered employment and to report earnings to the tax authorities. The analysis is based on a social insurance reform in Uruguay that extended healthcare coverage to the dependent children of registered private-sector workers. The identification strategy relies on a comparison between individuals with and without dependent children before and after the reform. The reform increased benefit-eligible registered employment by 1.6 percentage points (about 5% above the pre-reform level), mainly due to an increase in labor force participation rather than to movement from unregistered to registered employment. The shift was greater for parents with younger children and for cohabiting adults whose partners' jobs did not provide the couples' children with access to the benefit. Finally, the reform increased the incidence of underreporting of salaried earnings by about 4 percentage points (25% higher than the pre-reform level), mostly for workers employed at small firms. The increase in fiscal revenue from higher levels of registered employment was several orders of magnitude greater than the loss of revenue due to an increase in underreporting.
Fil: Bergolo Sosa, Marcelo Luis. Universidad de la República; Uruguay. Universidad Nacional de la Plata. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Ciencias Económicas. Centro de Estudios Distributivos Laborales y Sociales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - La Plata; Argentina
Fil: Cruces, Guillermo Antonio. Universidad Nacional de la Plata. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Ciencias Económicas. Centro de Estudios Distributivos Laborales y Sociales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - La Plata; Argentina. Institute for the Study of Labor; Alemania
Materia
LABOR SUPPLY
SOCIAL INSURANCE
TAX EVASION
WORK INCENTIVES
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/32826
Acceder
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repository_id_str 3498
network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs. Evidence from an employment-based benefit extensionBergolo Sosa, Marcelo LuisCruces, Guillermo AntonioLABOR SUPPLYSOCIAL INSURANCETAX EVASIONWORK INCENTIVEShttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5This article studies how social insurance programs shape individual's incentives to take up registered employment and to report earnings to the tax authorities. The analysis is based on a social insurance reform in Uruguay that extended healthcare coverage to the dependent children of registered private-sector workers. The identification strategy relies on a comparison between individuals with and without dependent children before and after the reform. The reform increased benefit-eligible registered employment by 1.6 percentage points (about 5% above the pre-reform level), mainly due to an increase in labor force participation rather than to movement from unregistered to registered employment. The shift was greater for parents with younger children and for cohabiting adults whose partners' jobs did not provide the couples' children with access to the benefit. Finally, the reform increased the incidence of underreporting of salaried earnings by about 4 percentage points (25% higher than the pre-reform level), mostly for workers employed at small firms. The increase in fiscal revenue from higher levels of registered employment was several orders of magnitude greater than the loss of revenue due to an increase in underreporting.Fil: Bergolo Sosa, Marcelo Luis. Universidad de la República; Uruguay. Universidad Nacional de la Plata. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Ciencias Económicas. Centro de Estudios Distributivos Laborales y Sociales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - La Plata; ArgentinaFil: Cruces, Guillermo Antonio. Universidad Nacional de la Plata. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Ciencias Económicas. Centro de Estudios Distributivos Laborales y Sociales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - La Plata; Argentina. Institute for the Study of Labor; AlemaniaElsevier2014-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/32826Bergolo Sosa, Marcelo Luis; Cruces, Guillermo Antonio; Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs. Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension; Elsevier; Journal of Public Economics; 117; 9-2014; 211-2280047-2727CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.04.015info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272714001066info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:54:38Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/32826instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:54:39.05CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs. Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension
title Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs. Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension
spellingShingle Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs. Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension
Bergolo Sosa, Marcelo Luis
LABOR SUPPLY
SOCIAL INSURANCE
TAX EVASION
WORK INCENTIVES
title_short Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs. Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension
title_full Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs. Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension
title_fullStr Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs. Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension
title_full_unstemmed Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs. Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension
title_sort Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs. Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Bergolo Sosa, Marcelo Luis
Cruces, Guillermo Antonio
author Bergolo Sosa, Marcelo Luis
author_facet Bergolo Sosa, Marcelo Luis
Cruces, Guillermo Antonio
author_role author
author2 Cruces, Guillermo Antonio
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv LABOR SUPPLY
SOCIAL INSURANCE
TAX EVASION
WORK INCENTIVES
topic LABOR SUPPLY
SOCIAL INSURANCE
TAX EVASION
WORK INCENTIVES
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv This article studies how social insurance programs shape individual's incentives to take up registered employment and to report earnings to the tax authorities. The analysis is based on a social insurance reform in Uruguay that extended healthcare coverage to the dependent children of registered private-sector workers. The identification strategy relies on a comparison between individuals with and without dependent children before and after the reform. The reform increased benefit-eligible registered employment by 1.6 percentage points (about 5% above the pre-reform level), mainly due to an increase in labor force participation rather than to movement from unregistered to registered employment. The shift was greater for parents with younger children and for cohabiting adults whose partners' jobs did not provide the couples' children with access to the benefit. Finally, the reform increased the incidence of underreporting of salaried earnings by about 4 percentage points (25% higher than the pre-reform level), mostly for workers employed at small firms. The increase in fiscal revenue from higher levels of registered employment was several orders of magnitude greater than the loss of revenue due to an increase in underreporting.
Fil: Bergolo Sosa, Marcelo Luis. Universidad de la República; Uruguay. Universidad Nacional de la Plata. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Ciencias Económicas. Centro de Estudios Distributivos Laborales y Sociales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - La Plata; Argentina
Fil: Cruces, Guillermo Antonio. Universidad Nacional de la Plata. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Ciencias Económicas. Centro de Estudios Distributivos Laborales y Sociales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - La Plata; Argentina. Institute for the Study of Labor; Alemania
description This article studies how social insurance programs shape individual's incentives to take up registered employment and to report earnings to the tax authorities. The analysis is based on a social insurance reform in Uruguay that extended healthcare coverage to the dependent children of registered private-sector workers. The identification strategy relies on a comparison between individuals with and without dependent children before and after the reform. The reform increased benefit-eligible registered employment by 1.6 percentage points (about 5% above the pre-reform level), mainly due to an increase in labor force participation rather than to movement from unregistered to registered employment. The shift was greater for parents with younger children and for cohabiting adults whose partners' jobs did not provide the couples' children with access to the benefit. Finally, the reform increased the incidence of underreporting of salaried earnings by about 4 percentage points (25% higher than the pre-reform level), mostly for workers employed at small firms. The increase in fiscal revenue from higher levels of registered employment was several orders of magnitude greater than the loss of revenue due to an increase in underreporting.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2014-09
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/32826
Bergolo Sosa, Marcelo Luis; Cruces, Guillermo Antonio; Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs. Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension; Elsevier; Journal of Public Economics; 117; 9-2014; 211-228
0047-2727
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/32826
identifier_str_mv Bergolo Sosa, Marcelo Luis; Cruces, Guillermo Antonio; Work and tax evasion incentive effects of social insurance programs. Evidence from an employment-based benefit extension; Elsevier; Journal of Public Economics; 117; 9-2014; 211-228
0047-2727
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.04.015
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272714001066
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.070432

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