Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits

Autores
Bérgolo, Marcelo; Ceni, Rodrigo; Cruces, Guillermo Antonio; Giaccobasso, Matias; Perez Truglia, Ricardo
Año de publicación
2018
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
For some entities, such as self-employed individuals reporting income taxes or firms reporting value-added taxes, the optimal evasion rate depends substantially on audit features like audit probabilities and penalty rates (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). Whereas it is easy for firms to find other important information such as inflation rates or exchange rates, it is difficult to find information about the probability of being audited and penalty rates. Indeed, Bérgolo et al. (2017) show evidence that firms have large misperceptions about these audit features.1 In this paper, we expand their analysis to explore the sources of these misperceptions.
Fil: Bérgolo, Marcelo. Universidad de la República; Uruguay
Fil: Ceni, Rodrigo. Universidad de la República; Uruguay
Fil: Cruces, Guillermo Antonio. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Ciencias Económicas. Centro de Estudios Distributivos Laborales y Sociales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - La Plata; Argentina
Fil: Giaccobasso, Matias. University of California at Los Angeles; Estados Unidos
Fil: Perez Truglia, Ricardo. University of California at Los Angeles; Estados Unidos
Materia
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Tax Law
Economic Development
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/101091
Acceder
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spelling Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax auditsBérgolo, MarceloCeni, RodrigoCruces, Guillermo AntonioGiaccobasso, MatiasPerez Truglia, RicardoTax Evasion and AvoidanceTax LawEconomic Developmenthttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5For some entities, such as self-employed individuals reporting income taxes or firms reporting value-added taxes, the optimal evasion rate depends substantially on audit features like audit probabilities and penalty rates (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). Whereas it is easy for firms to find other important information such as inflation rates or exchange rates, it is difficult to find information about the probability of being audited and penalty rates. Indeed, Bérgolo et al. (2017) show evidence that firms have large misperceptions about these audit features.1 In this paper, we expand their analysis to explore the sources of these misperceptions.Fil: Bérgolo, Marcelo. Universidad de la República; UruguayFil: Ceni, Rodrigo. Universidad de la República; UruguayFil: Cruces, Guillermo Antonio. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Ciencias Económicas. Centro de Estudios Distributivos Laborales y Sociales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - La Plata; ArgentinaFil: Giaccobasso, Matias. University of California at Los Angeles; Estados UnidosFil: Perez Truglia, Ricardo. University of California at Los Angeles; Estados UnidosAmerican Economic Association2018-05info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/101091Bérgolo, Marcelo; Ceni, Rodrigo; Cruces, Guillermo Antonio; Giaccobasso, Matias; Perez Truglia, Ricardo; Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits; American Economic Association; AEA Papers and Proceedings; 108; 5-2018; 83-872574-0768CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pandp.20181039info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/pandp.20181039info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-22T12:07:04Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/101091instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-22 12:07:04.629CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits
title Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits
spellingShingle Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits
Bérgolo, Marcelo
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Tax Law
Economic Development
title_short Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits
title_full Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits
title_fullStr Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits
title_full_unstemmed Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits
title_sort Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Bérgolo, Marcelo
Ceni, Rodrigo
Cruces, Guillermo Antonio
Giaccobasso, Matias
Perez Truglia, Ricardo
author Bérgolo, Marcelo
author_facet Bérgolo, Marcelo
Ceni, Rodrigo
Cruces, Guillermo Antonio
Giaccobasso, Matias
Perez Truglia, Ricardo
author_role author
author2 Ceni, Rodrigo
Cruces, Guillermo Antonio
Giaccobasso, Matias
Perez Truglia, Ricardo
author2_role author
author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Tax Law
Economic Development
topic Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Tax Law
Economic Development
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv For some entities, such as self-employed individuals reporting income taxes or firms reporting value-added taxes, the optimal evasion rate depends substantially on audit features like audit probabilities and penalty rates (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). Whereas it is easy for firms to find other important information such as inflation rates or exchange rates, it is difficult to find information about the probability of being audited and penalty rates. Indeed, Bérgolo et al. (2017) show evidence that firms have large misperceptions about these audit features.1 In this paper, we expand their analysis to explore the sources of these misperceptions.
Fil: Bérgolo, Marcelo. Universidad de la República; Uruguay
Fil: Ceni, Rodrigo. Universidad de la República; Uruguay
Fil: Cruces, Guillermo Antonio. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Ciencias Económicas. Centro de Estudios Distributivos Laborales y Sociales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - La Plata; Argentina
Fil: Giaccobasso, Matias. University of California at Los Angeles; Estados Unidos
Fil: Perez Truglia, Ricardo. University of California at Los Angeles; Estados Unidos
description For some entities, such as self-employed individuals reporting income taxes or firms reporting value-added taxes, the optimal evasion rate depends substantially on audit features like audit probabilities and penalty rates (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). Whereas it is easy for firms to find other important information such as inflation rates or exchange rates, it is difficult to find information about the probability of being audited and penalty rates. Indeed, Bérgolo et al. (2017) show evidence that firms have large misperceptions about these audit features.1 In this paper, we expand their analysis to explore the sources of these misperceptions.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-05
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/101091
Bérgolo, Marcelo; Ceni, Rodrigo; Cruces, Guillermo Antonio; Giaccobasso, Matias; Perez Truglia, Ricardo; Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits; American Economic Association; AEA Papers and Proceedings; 108; 5-2018; 83-87
2574-0768
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/101091
identifier_str_mv Bérgolo, Marcelo; Ceni, Rodrigo; Cruces, Guillermo Antonio; Giaccobasso, Matias; Perez Truglia, Ricardo; Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits; American Economic Association; AEA Papers and Proceedings; 108; 5-2018; 83-87
2574-0768
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pandp.20181039
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/pandp.20181039
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv American Economic Association
publisher.none.fl_str_mv American Economic Association
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.084731

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