Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits
- Autores
- Bérgolo, Marcelo; Ceni, Rodrigo; Cruces, Guillermo Antonio; Giaccobasso, Matias; Perez Truglia, Ricardo
- Año de publicación
- 2018
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- For some entities, such as self-employed individuals reporting income taxes or firms reporting value-added taxes, the optimal evasion rate depends substantially on audit features like audit probabilities and penalty rates (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). Whereas it is easy for firms to find other important information such as inflation rates or exchange rates, it is difficult to find information about the probability of being audited and penalty rates. Indeed, Bérgolo et al. (2017) show evidence that firms have large misperceptions about these audit features.1 In this paper, we expand their analysis to explore the sources of these misperceptions.
Fil: Bérgolo, Marcelo. Universidad de la República; Uruguay
Fil: Ceni, Rodrigo. Universidad de la República; Uruguay
Fil: Cruces, Guillermo Antonio. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Ciencias Económicas. Centro de Estudios Distributivos Laborales y Sociales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - La Plata; Argentina
Fil: Giaccobasso, Matias. University of California at Los Angeles; Estados Unidos
Fil: Perez Truglia, Ricardo. University of California at Los Angeles; Estados Unidos - Materia
-
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Tax Law
Economic Development - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/101091
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
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Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax auditsBérgolo, MarceloCeni, RodrigoCruces, Guillermo AntonioGiaccobasso, MatiasPerez Truglia, RicardoTax Evasion and AvoidanceTax LawEconomic Developmenthttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5For some entities, such as self-employed individuals reporting income taxes or firms reporting value-added taxes, the optimal evasion rate depends substantially on audit features like audit probabilities and penalty rates (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). Whereas it is easy for firms to find other important information such as inflation rates or exchange rates, it is difficult to find information about the probability of being audited and penalty rates. Indeed, Bérgolo et al. (2017) show evidence that firms have large misperceptions about these audit features.1 In this paper, we expand their analysis to explore the sources of these misperceptions.Fil: Bérgolo, Marcelo. Universidad de la República; UruguayFil: Ceni, Rodrigo. Universidad de la República; UruguayFil: Cruces, Guillermo Antonio. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Ciencias Económicas. Centro de Estudios Distributivos Laborales y Sociales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - La Plata; ArgentinaFil: Giaccobasso, Matias. University of California at Los Angeles; Estados UnidosFil: Perez Truglia, Ricardo. University of California at Los Angeles; Estados UnidosAmerican Economic Association2018-05info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/101091Bérgolo, Marcelo; Ceni, Rodrigo; Cruces, Guillermo Antonio; Giaccobasso, Matias; Perez Truglia, Ricardo; Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits; American Economic Association; AEA Papers and Proceedings; 108; 5-2018; 83-872574-0768CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pandp.20181039info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/pandp.20181039info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:34:41Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/101091instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:34:41.768CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits |
title |
Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits |
spellingShingle |
Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits Bérgolo, Marcelo Tax Evasion and Avoidance Tax Law Economic Development |
title_short |
Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits |
title_full |
Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits |
title_fullStr |
Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits |
title_full_unstemmed |
Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits |
title_sort |
Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Bérgolo, Marcelo Ceni, Rodrigo Cruces, Guillermo Antonio Giaccobasso, Matias Perez Truglia, Ricardo |
author |
Bérgolo, Marcelo |
author_facet |
Bérgolo, Marcelo Ceni, Rodrigo Cruces, Guillermo Antonio Giaccobasso, Matias Perez Truglia, Ricardo |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Ceni, Rodrigo Cruces, Guillermo Antonio Giaccobasso, Matias Perez Truglia, Ricardo |
author2_role |
author author author author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Tax Evasion and Avoidance Tax Law Economic Development |
topic |
Tax Evasion and Avoidance Tax Law Economic Development |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
For some entities, such as self-employed individuals reporting income taxes or firms reporting value-added taxes, the optimal evasion rate depends substantially on audit features like audit probabilities and penalty rates (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). Whereas it is easy for firms to find other important information such as inflation rates or exchange rates, it is difficult to find information about the probability of being audited and penalty rates. Indeed, Bérgolo et al. (2017) show evidence that firms have large misperceptions about these audit features.1 In this paper, we expand their analysis to explore the sources of these misperceptions. Fil: Bérgolo, Marcelo. Universidad de la República; Uruguay Fil: Ceni, Rodrigo. Universidad de la República; Uruguay Fil: Cruces, Guillermo Antonio. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Ciencias Económicas. Centro de Estudios Distributivos Laborales y Sociales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - La Plata; Argentina Fil: Giaccobasso, Matias. University of California at Los Angeles; Estados Unidos Fil: Perez Truglia, Ricardo. University of California at Los Angeles; Estados Unidos |
description |
For some entities, such as self-employed individuals reporting income taxes or firms reporting value-added taxes, the optimal evasion rate depends substantially on audit features like audit probabilities and penalty rates (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). Whereas it is easy for firms to find other important information such as inflation rates or exchange rates, it is difficult to find information about the probability of being audited and penalty rates. Indeed, Bérgolo et al. (2017) show evidence that firms have large misperceptions about these audit features.1 In this paper, we expand their analysis to explore the sources of these misperceptions. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-05 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/101091 Bérgolo, Marcelo; Ceni, Rodrigo; Cruces, Guillermo Antonio; Giaccobasso, Matias; Perez Truglia, Ricardo; Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits; American Economic Association; AEA Papers and Proceedings; 108; 5-2018; 83-87 2574-0768 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/101091 |
identifier_str_mv |
Bérgolo, Marcelo; Ceni, Rodrigo; Cruces, Guillermo Antonio; Giaccobasso, Matias; Perez Truglia, Ricardo; Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits; American Economic Association; AEA Papers and Proceedings; 108; 5-2018; 83-87 2574-0768 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pandp.20181039 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/pandp.20181039 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
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openAccess |
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https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
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application/pdf application/pdf |
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American Economic Association |
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American Economic Association |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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